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Summary
The relationship between language and human action is a pervasive theme of 
Wittgenstein’s writings. And yet explicit references to the essentially instinctive nature of 
the actions into which language is woven are sparse. This thesis, by explanation and by 
the further development o f these few remarks, aims to advance our understanding of the 
role of instinctive reactions in the formation and possession of our concepts.
Wittgenstein has been criticised — rightly or wrongly — for viewing language too much 
on the model of the application of a technique, as if speaking were merely a system of 
rule-governed actions. Following Rush Rhees, I argue that speaking is more intimately 
woven into our constitution as persons than can be understood from such an over­
simplified view. Wittgenstein has also been accused of harbouring a theory o f concept- 
formation from instinctive behaviour — an accusation that is refuted. Our understanding 
of the nature and role of instinctive reactions (both linguistic and non-linguistic) in the 
constitution of our conceptual form of life must therefore take account o f the more 
complex picture of the nature of speaking that emerges. Examples o f concepts 
(psychological concepts and concepts to do with knowledge and belief) which are 
situated in complex ways within the instinctive dimension of our lives are then discussed 
in detail.
This investigation into the nature o f the possession of our concepts is worked out in 
concert with a discussion o f what concepts are, of what the relationship is between the 
conceptual and the factual, and of the level at which our concepts engage with the world. 
Finally, it is argued that instinctive reactions, akin to those which comprise the 
cornerstones of our language-games, are also implicated both in generating the perplexity 
that lies at the bottom of philosophical problems, and in its elucidation.
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A note on punctuation: the use o f the dash
In the text I use two ‘dashes’ — in addition to the short hyphen, which is used only to 
hyphenate words. The ‘en’ dash is used to place a phrase or clause in parenthesis, either 
within or at the end of a sentence. It never follows a punctuation mark. The ‘em’ dash is 
used quite differendy to stress a connection of sense between clauses or sentences. It is 
only used after a punctuation mark. Most commonly is it used to connect sentences, but 
it is sometimes used after a semi-colon or a comma. This use of the ‘em’ dash is derived 
from Wittgenstein, who used it very frequently in this way.
Gensha was one day eating cakes with General Wei. The general said, “What is it which 
we use everyday, but don’t know it?” Gensha picked up a cake and said, “Have one!” The 
general took it and ate it, and then repeated the question. Gensha said, ‘W e use it 
everyday, but we don’t know it.” 1
A monk said to Joshu, “From One lamp a hundred thousand lamps are lit; how is the 
first one lighted?” Joshu kicked off one o f his shoes. Also he said, “A clever chap 
wouldn’t ask such a question.” 2
.. .and write with confidence “In the beginning was the deed.” 3
(Ludwig Wittgenstein)
1 R. H. Blyth, Zen <&Zen Classics, Volume U, History of Zen, (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1964), p. 52.
2 R. H. Blyth, Zen <& Zen Classics, Volume III (Nangaku Branch), History of Zen, (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 
1964), p. 77.
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Chapter 1 ~  Introduction, a Survey o f Issues
The relation between language and human action is a pervasive theme in Wittgenstein’s 
writings. Indeed his most well-known philosophical tool, the language-game, is defined as 
‘language and the actions into which it is woven’.4 And yet explicit references to the 
fundamentally instinctive nature o f the actions into which language is woven, and which 
are essential to it, are sparse. This apparently undeveloped aspect of his thinking has — 
perhaps rather predictably — lead to controversies of interpretation. Indeed, some 
commentators have taken him to be introducing a quite new element into the discussion, 
even to the extent of accusing him — quite obviously against the grain o f his thought — of 
a priori theorising on the origins of language.
Now it will certainly be a part o f my aim to demonstrate how these few remarks are in 
fact entirely consistent with the general direction of his philosophy; indeed the resolution 
o f this uncertainty could well have provided a sufficient basis in itself for the 
development o f a thesis. However it is not my intention to limit my discussion to this 
issue but to use it as a means of entry into the core topic, which can best be described as 
an investigation into the nature o f our possession of our concepts,— of how our concepts 
are seated in our lives. For the recognition that the concept of language is the concept of 
something participating in instinctive, i.e. groundless, activity is the recognition of an 
important aspect of how our possession of our concepts is constituted. And the further 
elucidation of this relation takes us beyond into other most fundamental dimensions of 
our form of life — i.e. our relations to ourselves, to language and the world — which 
characterise that possession.
The investigation o f what it is to possess concepts will also be an investigation into the 
nature of that which is possessed. Our concepts are a part of our relations both to the 
world and to ourselves. Insight into the nature of that possession will therefore also 
contribute to our understanding o f how our concepts stand in relation to ourselves and 
the wodd, and therefore o f what concepts are. It is for this reason that, before entering 
into the main body o f the thesis, I examine in Chapter 2 the nature of the understanding 
o f the wodd that lies in the very possession of our concepts, and differentiate this 
especially from our factual understanding of the wodd.
4 PI 7.
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It is fundamental to Wittgenstein’s philosophy that philosophical perplexity itself arises 
out of faults in our capacity to reflect upon our concepts. Moreover, a confused 
understanding o f the relation between factual and conceptual investigations is of the 
essence of these difficulties. The discussion in Chapter 2 is extended, therefore, to 
include a discussion of the bearing of these issues on the nature of conceptual 
investigation and philosophical understanding generally. I should perhaps add here a 
comment on my use o f the term ‘metaphysics’. It is fundamental to my approach to 
philosophy that, as a mode o f investigation into the nature of phenomena, it is essentially 
conceptual and elucidatory and not factual and explanatory. That is, it is not my view that 
the aim of philosophy is to develop its own system of concepts to explain phenomena 
which are only partially, or confusedly, or provisionally captured in the concepts with 
which we engage with the world in our daily lives, or which are represented in the ‘beliefs’ 
or ‘assumptions’ that are supposed to underlie those concepts. I understand metaphysics to 
be the way of doing philosophy which does approach the philosophical investigation of 
phenomena from that point o f view (inadvertendy or otherwise). Whenever I speak of 
metaphysics, then, I am speaking of an approach which I take to be already in confusion. 
I accept, however, that others may use the term to refer to any philosophical investigation 
into the nature o f phenomena, even where its methods and assumptions are legitimate. 
From this point of view my own investigation would be regarded as metaphysics.
This question o f the nature o f philosophical investigation is not an issue arising only in 
the introductory phase of this thesis. It is a central topic. For the difficulties we 
experience when reflecting on our concepts — the reasons why they are so difficult to 
reflect on clearly, and why our understanding of them is so easily deflected — has a great 
deal to do with our relations to them, with how they are embedded in our lives. Moreover, 
the spontaneous way in which philosophical problems arise has much in common with 
the instinctive responses that play such an important role in the use of language,—in 
both its daily employment and in the determination o f its concepts. Consequendy, this 
topic returns throughout the thesis and becomes the concluding issue in the final Chapter 
8.
The main body o f the thesis begins in Chapter 3, where I survey the various contexts in 
which the notion o f instinct enters into Wittgenstein’s discussions of the nature of 
language. These provide the background for the subsequent chapters. The first approach 
to establishing the link between language and behaviour is in the context o f action in 
accordance with a rule. The use o f language is, in an important sense, a rule-governed activity
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-  though of course it is in no wise wholly understandable in these terms. And so to this 
extent, the recognition of the limits to justifying how we apply a rule — which in turn 
entails the recognition that the substratum of rule-governed activity as such lies in 
spontaneous instinctive activity itself and not in some prior reasoning — is a first step in 
this direction. But the challenge then remains of showing how this relation to action 
survives the further recognition that speaking and the possession of concepts cannot be 
understood simply as activities,—that thay cannot be understood except in connection 
with the range of human qualities that are constitutive of persons. And this, of course, 
requires that we reintroduce into the equation the concepts of thinking and 
understanding,—and without any reduction o f them, to mere activity or behaviour.
Chapter 3 therefore provides a specific point o f departure for the following chapter in 
its identification of a possible limitation in Wittgenstein’s discussions, namely his 
tendency to treat the use of language too closely on the model of the application of a 
technique. This is not to deny that in important respects this comparison can be 
illuminating. The shortcoming arises rather in a tendency — at times at least — to limit the 
discussion to this model. In Chapter 4 ,1 take up Rush Rhees’ criticism of Wittgenstein on 
this point, and try to develop his view that the use o f language has to be seen not so 
much as an activity carried out by a person but as constitutive of the very being of a 
person. This requires that we bring simultaneously into view the whole spectrum of 
concepts that are characteristic both of the concept of a person and of the concept of 
language. Rhees sums this up with his epithet that a person who is speaking is not just 
doing something but has ‘something to say’,—which is different. This widening of the 
perspective demands that we also project our discussion of the nature o f the possession 
of our concepts into this larger conceptual context. And of course it also has a bearing on 
the sense in which both the use of language and the possession of concepts are rooted in 
instinctive behaviour. For if the nature of speaking is not circumscribed by notions of 
instinctive action and reaction but is tied to the notions of thinking and understanding — 
which are not themselves reducible to action — then we are going to have to explain the 
relevance o f maintaining the emphasis on instinct within this larger conceptual 
framework. Here I pay particular attention to the relationship between having something 
to say’ and that suite of concepts — the possession of which is most fundamentally 
constitutive of our reality as persons — that are most intimately woven into the fabric of 
our thought and language, and which are also the greatest source of philosophical 
perplexity. The examples I discuss at this stage are belief and time, but it will include the
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great range of psychological concepts, concepts to do with language, ethical concepts, 
and so on.
An important investigative tool in this thesis derives from the recognition that amongst 
our concepts are what I call the concepts of the language-game in which a given concept is 
embedded. For example, not only do we leam to express intentions and to follow others’ 
expressions of intention, we also recognise (I.e. have a conception of) the circumstances 
in which people employ the concept o f intention. In other words, the possession of 
concepts expressing a ‘meta-view’ of the employment of other concepts is a normal part 
of our conceptual armoury. Moreover, much of philosophy consists in elucidating just 
these views. There is great danger, however, of failing to recognise this relation; for is 
very important not to treat this as a ‘transcendental’ view, or as something that can be 
appealed to in justification o f a concept These are not concepts whose determination 
transcends, i.e. is not answerable to, the concepts of daily discourse; indeed they take for 
granted the concepts embedded in the language-game. They are concepts like any other, 
and have a normal part to play in our life with language. I emphasise this because it is 
essential to be clear about when, on the one hand, we are dealing directly with a concept 
(i.e. appealing to what it makes sense to say in its employment) and when, on the other, 
we are elucidating the concept of the language-game in which it is embedded. Muddle 
over the level’ at which we are viewing a concept is the cause of endless confusion in 
philosophy.
This distinction has especially to be bome in mind when examining the way in which 
the concept is fabricated in our instinctive reactions; for this examination too may be 
mistaken for an attempt to explain our concepts by reference to these reactions. Our 
conception of the language-game in which a concept is embedded will contain reference to 
the instinctive reactions which give form to the language-game, such as the natural and 
verbal expressions o f intention. But this is not to provide them with a ground. This point 
gains special prominence in Chapter 5, where I develop Wittgenstein’s conception of 
language as arising out o f instinctive behaviour. Much of this chapter is devoted to 
defending Wittgenstein against claims that his remarks contain the elements of a theory of 
concept-formation from instinctive reactions. My argument here is that Wittgenstein is 
trying to establish a conceptual not a theoretical link between the possession of certain 
concepts (and their formation), the forms o f behaviour within which they have their 
life,—their sense or content. All o f these are components of our conception o f the
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language-game in which the specific concepts are embedded, so that the elucidation of 
this conception is an elucidation of the conceptual links between these components.
In Chapter 6 I follow up these observations with a more detailed examination of how 
our possession o f the concepts to do with mental life is woven into the manifold of our 
subjective lives. Our possession of these concepts participates in our subjectivity,—in our 
expressions of subjective states and in our inter-subjective relations with others. Our 
subjectivity is itself a component in their possession. Clearly an issue here is the need to 
distinguish this relationship (between subjectivity and the possession of certain concepts) 
from any notion of private ostensive definition. And again an important component in 
this discussion will be the recognition that we are dealing with the conceptual relations 
between the concept o f the individual qua subjective agent and the concept of the 
possession of mental concepts. This has nothing to do with justifying our concepts by 
reference to our subjective states.
Chapter 6 also develops further the view (initiated in the previous chapters) of certain 
of our concepts as extensions o f more primitive behaviour. This again is a conception that 
is apt to get confused with the idea that our concepts are explained by primitive non- 
linguistic behaviour; and again the real point is a conceptual one. For example, we may 
say that the expression of intention in language is an extension o f the natural behavioural 
expression of intention. But this does not mean that natural expressions of intention 
explain the genesis of linguistic expressions (of what makes them linguistic expressions); 
rather it establishes the conceptual link between the behavioural and the linguistic 
expressions of intention, and that the former is logically prior to the latter.—That is, our 
concept of the linguistic expression of intention is dependent on the concept o f natural 
intention and its expression.
The penultimate Chapter 7 applies similar principles to the concepts of belief, 
knowledge and certainty. Again I come to Wittgenstein’s defence, this time against an 
attempt to exploit an apparent equivocation in his conception of the nature and role of 
‘hinge propositions’ and to impute to him a metaphysical theory of such propositions. A 
main concern here is to tease out the relationship between the linguistic and behavioural 
expressions o f belief, knowledge and certainty. The linguistic forms may in this way be 
shown to be extensions of the natural forms. Again I find that this needs to be 
understood in terms of the conceptual links between linguistic and non-linguistic 
expressions of belief, knowledge and certainty, that is, in terms of the concept o f each (as 
expressed in either in words or through actions) and o f the logical priority between them.
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Emerging out of this discussion we see how the possession of the concepts of belief, 
knowledge and certainty is itself largely a function of the manifestation o f these things in 
words and behaviour, i.e. that the things we say and do are examples o f these things before 
being claims to them, and that this is important to our possession of the concepts. We 
may also express this the other way about by saying that the acquisition of these concepts 
is part and parcel o f our capacity for speech,— of our ability to say anything at all. For if 
we are able to say anything at all, then we are already able to express beliefs, or to say 
things that demonstrate knowledge or certainty. This is already a large part of our 
acquiring a concept of them; they are not like other concepts of which we might say that 
a basic command of the language is a prerequisite for — but is not structural to — their 
possession.
In the final chapter, the argument is brought back to the nature of the philosophical 
mind. Philosophical perplexity has its origins in assertions or puzzlements about the nature 
of the mind, or reality, or truth, or whatever it may be, that arise spontaneously when we 
turn our attention in a reflective way upon these phenomena. In their most original forms 
these will appear to us either as self-evidently true or obviously unknowable or 
mysterious. In this respect they have much in common with the fundamentally 
groundless nature o f language use, both insofar they are not founded on some prior 
reasoning and also insofar as they resemble the primitive reactions that are characteristic 
of concept-formation. Here they also have a kinship with the kinds of reactions that lie at 
the origin of superstitious beliefs.
The breeding grounds for these reactions are various: the misleading forms in the 
surface of our language and the false analogies between language-games, the ‘craving for 
generality*, the natural uncertainties that do in any case surround the determination of 
these concepts, and the various specific features of the circumstances in which we 
possess these concepts — the subjective impressions that naturally accompany the use of 
language, for example. But this leads to a puzzle regarding the failure of our native 
understanding of our concepts to protect us from these forces. Given that our normal 
command of our concepts is itself not founded upon some rational principle (which would 
be subject to human error in its application) but depends on the integrity of our instincts, 
why does this understanding not shine through these tendencies and prevent them from 
hardening up into conceptually confused, metaphysical beliefs? It is here, I maintain, that 
we need to recall once again one o f the principle themes of the thesis, that is, that our 
relations to these concepts is not reducible to the command of a technique, but is a
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complex interweaving of language into the constitution of ourselves as persons — in our 
"having things to say’, for example. It is in this arena that the circumstances are created in 
which the grammars of these concepts may fail to show themselves transparently and 
which leave us vulnerable to the illusory appearances of our concepts that arise in our 
reflective moments.
Finally, there is another theme which I first treat in Chapter 2, which is implicit 
throughout and which becomes more prominent in this last chapter: the philosophical 
notion of showing. Our concepts are placed centrally in our lives. They are not in this 
sense a tool which we may pick up or leave as we wish: our possession of them is 
constitutive o f our lives, and their constitution too is a function of the way they are 
embedded in our lives. An aspect of this is reflected in the circumstances in which we are 
able to make their sense, and their relations of sense, clearer to ourselves. For their 
necessarily being taken for granted in our thinking — in our thinking anything at all — is one 
way of expressing the truth that our seeing into them more clearly has to be something 
that shows and cannot be said (it shows in what is said). Moreover, a relation can also be 
demonstrated between the instinctive, groundless nature of language and this 
philosophical concept of what can only be shown. For what can only be shown is precisely 
that which can only be grasped in the practice o f language and not by explanation. And 
that which can only be grasped in the practice of language is that which can only be 
grasped spontaneously or instinctively. Hence it is something belonging to the midst of 
our lives in which our reflections must take place too, and not from some transcendent 
vantage point, not from the "boundary’ of our lives.
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Chapter 2 ~  Facts, Concepts and Philosophy.
1 ~ Introduction
It is the aim o f this thesis to examine the way that concepts are seated in our lives, that 
is, to try to understand better what it is to have concepts. But since it is also a fundamental 
presupposition of this thesis that its very method is by the elucidation of concepts, the 
outcome of the investigation is very likely to have a significant bearing on its own 
methods.— Our understanding o f what concepts are ought to be relevant to the conduct of 
our conceptual examination of the nature o f concepts. In anticipation of this, it will be 
helpful, therefore, to begin the thesis by examining certain aspects of the nature of 
conceptual investigation. At this stage, however, I shall concentrate on elements that 
neither anticipate too much, nor will be undermined by, the fruits of investigations in 
later chapters.
2 ~ Concepts and Facts
I follow Wittgenstein in the view that a philosophical investigation is essentially a 
conceptual investigation, in so far as the problems it has to deal with are problems arising 
out o f how we conceive of things, and that the ‘solutions’ lie in tracing out the 
connections between the concepts that are at the root of the problems. A helpful way of 
bringing out some of the essential features of this enterprise will be to compare, from 
some quite different points of view, the relationships between concepts and facts, and to 
commence with what are, at first sight, some puzzling features.
Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophical method is founded on a clear-cut distinction 
between factual and conceptual investigations. Indeed he identifies the prime 
manifestation o f philosophical confusion, metaphysics, in the confusion of these two.—We 
treat philosophical problems as if they demanded a factual investigation of phenomena; 
we interpret what should properly be regarded as insights into the grammatical relations 
between our concepts as if they were statements of necessary facts about the world. For 
example, he remarks in Zetteh
Philosophical investigations: conceptual investigations. The essential thing about 
metaphysics: it obliterates the distinction between factual and conceptual
investigations. (Z 458)
8
We employ concepts in the representation of facts. Therefore an investigation into the 
grammar o f our concepts must be distinct from an investigation of the world by means 
of those concepts. The difference seems obvious enough. However, when we examine 
his method more closely — and the other claims he makes for it — we find a re-emergence 
o f interest in facts. In the first place, the representation of the grammar of a concept in 
philosophy is itself referred to by Wittgenstein as being by description, suggesting a 
comparison with factual investigation. In the second place, Wittgenstein entreats 
philosophers to remind themselves of general facts of nature — facts which we normally 
overlook just because of their great generality. Principal amongst these are descriptions o f 
the factual circumstances in which linguistic expressions are used:
What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we 
are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, 
but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes. (PI 415)
Furthermore, since there is a strong inclination to suppose that our knowledge and 
understanding o f the world is constituted in the body of facts that we have built up about 
it (and here we might include religious and other beliefs), one might then wonder 
whether a conceptual investigation that yields no facts can yield any understanding of the 
world in its own right at all.
Clearly there are different issues at stake here, but at first sight a rather confusing 
picture emerges. My intention will be to separate out the issues and to try to resolve the 
apparent tensions between facts and concepts arising in these three areas.
3 ~ Describing Grammar
We may question how far the philosopher’s representation o f the grammar o f a 
concept, in the service of the kind of account that is required in philosophy, may be 
fruitfully compared with factual description in general. Throughout most o f his later 
period, Wittgenstein apparendy saw no obvious difficulty in the idea that grammar can be 
described Indeed he saw it as the principal job of the philosopher to describe grammar, or 
linguistic rules:
Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its 
purpose, in order to have such-and-such an effect on human beings. It only describes 
and in no way explains the use of signs. (PI 496)
There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with 
all explanation, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets it
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light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, 
not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our 
language,.... (PI 109)
(We want to replace wild conjectures and explanations by quiet weighing of linguistic 
facts.) (Z 447)
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end 
only describe it. (PI 124)
In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown (not some sort of 
preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts 
about language. (PI 120)
When we say “Certain propositions must be excluded from doubt”, it sounds as if I 
ought to put these propositions—for example, that I am called L.W.—into a 
logic-book. For if it belongs to the description of a language-game, it belongs to logic.
(OC 628)
And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic. (OC 56)
Only at the end of his life did he seem to become troubled that grammar might not be 
describable after all:
Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described?
You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it. (OC 501)
We may distinguish here between two different modes in the description of the 
grammar of a concept: 1) the description o f the logical relations between the linguistic 
expressions expressing concepts, and 2) the description of the language-game, i.e. of 
language and the activities into which it is woven’.5 In both cases we may question the 
status of the descriptions we may wish to offer.
With regard to the first, there is one obvious dimension in which the grammar of a 
concept can be described. I am thinking of the extent to which the account merely 
describes the way that an expression is used in connection with others, or how it may 
occur in propositions, etc. This easily falls within the category of factual description in 
general, because it simply describes from an external point of view the relations between 
expressions. We may refer to this as the external aspect of the account o f the grammar of 
a concept. And generally, we may say that the external aspect o f the account represents 
the extent to which the relations between concepts may be explained or represented 
without necessarily engaging an understanding of the concepts themselves. The crucial 
question, however, will be to determine the extent to which the account o f the grammar 
o f a concept that is required in philosophy presupposes an understanding of the concept
5 PI 8.
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being studied. For to this extent, the account will differ in important respects from what 
we would normally regard as a mode of description. Let us examine this.
If philosophical problems are conceptual in nature but are not merely ‘operational’ 
mistakes with signs,6 then they will arise from within our understanding of our concepts 
and must therefore be addressed at that level. A philosophical investigation should 
promote an improved understanding of our concepts by bringing us to a more lively 
reflective awareness of their sense and the force of their internal connections, these being 
obscured in the circumstances that give rise to philosophical thinking. This is achieved by 
tracing out our understanding of the concept through the wider reaches of its 
grammatical relations and within a larger field of connections of meaning than may be 
expressly demanded in normal daily circumstances. This is what an account of the 
grammar of our concepts is intended to achieve. But evidendy it cannot be achieved by 
external description of grammatical relations alone, since in its very nature this does not 
appeal to our understanding of the concepts and so cannot illuminate that understanding. 
For this we need to turn to the internal aspect of the account of a concept, the force of 
which will trade on an understanding of the concept itself; that is, the value of the 
account will depend on an appeal to our understanding of what it makes sense to say in the 
connections in which the concept is employed.
Similar considerations will apply where the description of a language-game is called for. If 
I am reporting a game that some people are playing, I will describe what they do. Out of 
this description I may be able to construct the rules that the players are following. O f 
some of the actions that I describe — for example, that when the ball lands out of the 
court the player is deducted a point — I may be able to conclude that this is one of the 
rules of the game. Here we will have no difficulty in making sense of the notion that the 
rules of the game are being described. We could also extend the example — perhaps along 
the lines o f the simple language-games that introduce the Philosophical Investigations — to 
assign a function to any ‘words’ (i.e. signals) that are used within the course of the game. 
Again the description is external, the terms of the description are understood 
independently o f the game; there is nothing in the game that has to be ‘understood’ prior 
to understanding the description o f it.
6 See Chapter 4 for a further development o f this point.
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Now when it comes to the description of the ‘rules’7 governing the use of a word that 
has currency in a spoken language8, there will be many situations which may be accounted 
for in superficially similar terms. For example, I may give a functional account of the use 
of ‘squirrel’ by describing the circumstances in which it is used to refer to this (pointing to 
it). In this way I will have described a rule for the use of the word. Moreover, one might 
wish to claim that that in so doing I have successfully described the grammar of the word 
by employing an external description; for the concept ‘squirrel’ — as opposed to ‘rat’, or 
whatever else we may wish to contrast with it — will not have been taken for granted in 
the terms of the definition. But only the most superficial aspects of the grammar of the 
concept will have been represented in this way. To have a concept does not mean merely 
to be able to name or to distinguish one object verbally from another. Underpinning the 
grammar of ‘squirrel’ is the grammar of the concept animal, and then, at a deeper level, 
the grammar of the concept material object. It is these which show the logical space’ that 
the concept occupies, and which must also be understood if the concept is to be 
understood. Understanding a concept means being able to distinguish relations of sense,—  
to be able to talk sense and make sense with the concepts as they occur in discourse 
generally. And as we reach into these deeper layers o f our concepts — and of course it is 
these layers which become the objects of our elucidations — then it will become 
increasingly difficult to give any kind of account which does not itself take for granted these 
layers. This ties in with the fact that the call for any such elucidations in philosophy — as I 
have pointed out — is one that arises out of a confusion arising from within our 
understanding of the concept and not from difficulties that can be resolved by simple 
external descriptions or definitions.
In conclusion, to the extent that the grammar of the concept being ‘described’ is 
assumed within the grammars of the terms of the ‘description’, what we are offering will 
not, properly speaking, be description at all;— or, at least, it certainly deviates significantly 
from the description of natural phenomena. We will have shifted from independent 
description to circular elucidation. This corresponds to the distinction between ‘saying’ and 
‘showing’, which has its origins in the Tractatus but which I believe still has an application 
in the later Wittgenstein. For the fruits of the elucidation will not be an external 
statement of facts about the grammar of the concept but a more lucid appreciation of its
7 1 speak of ‘rules o f language’ here whilst acknowledging that whatever a rule of language is it cannot be 
given the same kind o f account as the rule o f a game. But for present purposes I do not need to anticipate 
what this amounts to.—Again, this will be treated more fully in Chapter 4.
8 That is, beyond the narrow functional confines of a discrete language-game.
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grammatical relations and ramifications as manifested in our ability to make the right 
connections between it and other concepts. The grammar of a concept is illuminated 
primarily by eliciting what already lies in our understanding and only secondarily by the 
external statements of fact about the relations between expressions that are adduced in 
the course of the account. So if we still wish to call this internal account a description, it will 
not bear comparison with, for example, describing the formal relations between symbols, 
or the rules of a game, or a purely functional system of signals. Generally, the more 
deeply a concept sits in our system of concepts as a whole, the less its grammar can be 
given a satisfactory treatment in purely descriptive terms; and it is of course these deeper 
aspects of our concepts that we are most concerned with in philosophy and which give 
rise to the puzzlement that is at the bottom of the most intractable philosophical 
problems. This circular appeal to our understanding of a concept we may refer to as the 
internal aspect o f the grammatical account o f the concept. An external description of its 
grammar needs to be supplemented by this. In any worthwhile philosophical 
investigation external description of grammatical relations will be woven together with an 
internal account.
Now I think it is a matter of conjecture how far Wittgenstein had already taken this 
distinction into account when he spoke of describing grammar; for it is arguable that the 
concept of description is broad enough to include accounts which contain circular 
elucidations. On the other hand, in his last writings it seems he was becoming 
increasingly aware that this circularity created difficulties to which he might not 
previously have given sufficient attention. In the Remarks on Colour; for example, he raises 
the question of whether sighted and colour-blind people can have the same conception 
of colour-blindness, and he asks what measure of communication can exist between 
those who do and those who do not have a given concept.9 He goes on:
And to whom can I describe all the things we normal people can leam?
Understanding the description itself already presupposes that he has learned 
something. (ROC 121)
How can I describe to someone how we use the word “tomorrow”? I can teach it to a 
child; but this does not mean I’m describing its use to him 
But can I describe the practice of people who have a concept, e.g. creddish-green’, 
that we don’t possess? — in any case I certainly can’t teach this practice to anyone.
(ROC 122)
Can I then only say: “These people call this (brown, for example) reddish green”? 
Wouldn’t it then be another word for something that I have a word for? If they really
9 ROC 119 & 120.
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have a different concept than I do, this must be shown by the fact that I can’t quite 
figure out their use of words. (ROC 123)
But I have kept on saying that it’s conceivable for our concepts to be different than 
they are. Was that all nonsense? (ROC 124)
The impossibility of explaining a concept to someone who does not already possess it, 
or of imagining novel concepts that we admit fall outside the scope of our own, is 
essentially the same as the impossibility of presenting an account of one of our own 
concepts which does not already take for granted an understanding of it. That this 
difficulty only seemed to manifest itself latterly to Wittgenstein draws us to an aspect of 
his view of the nature of language which has been criticised especially by Rush Rhees 
(which I shall be discussing more fully in Chapter 4).10 Rhees argues that Wittgenstein — 
at times at least — had too much the view of language as the operation of a system,— over 
impressed perhaps by his own comparisons between language and games. The view of 
language as a technique, i.e. thinking of it in functional terms as a Svay of doing things’, 
lends itself to treating the use of a word as an object that can be completely described 
externally. On this account, direct descriptions o f grammar will grade seamlessly into 
factual descriptions of the surrounding circumstances of the use of words — just as we 
may move from the description of the motions of a hammer on a nail to a wider 
description o f the activity of building within which those motions occur. Wittgenstein’s 
apparent lack of concern that there might be anything problematic in describing grammar 
until this late stage in his thinking is consistent with this alleged trend in his thinking.
My own view, as I have argued, is that there remain important differences between 
description in general and giving an account of the grammar of a concept These 
differences can only be obscured by bringing them under the same heading, and for this 
reason it will cause least confusion11 if we maintain the distinction between them. At best, 
the external description of grammatical relations will normally only play a limited role in 
any account o f the grammar of a concept,— our real need being for a greater reflective 
understanding o f the concept.
At this point we might turn our attention for a moment to one way in which the issue 
o f the describability of grammar may get muddled up with other issues. Kathleen 
Emmett12 berates the ‘transcendentalist’ philosophers13 who hold that linguistic rules -
10 Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein and the possibility of discourse, ed. D. Z. Phillips, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), (Rheesl); see also Rush Rhees, “The Philosophy o f Wittgenstein” (Rhees2) and 
‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ (Rhees3), in Discussions of Wittgenstein, (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1970).
11 Cf. PI 16.
12 Kathleen Emmett, ‘Forms o f Life’, Philosophical Investigations, 13:3, July 1990, pp. 213-231. (Emmett)
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except in their most superficial aspects — are ineffable, i.e. they cannot be described and 
represent non-empirical necessities.14 She holds that it is just an empirical fact that we 
have the rules that we do and not others, and that these can be described.15 The problem 
with presenting the dichotomy in this way is that it ties together the separate issues o f 
describability and necessity, if grammatical rules are not empirical then they must be both 
indescribable and necessary; so that if they turn out not to be necessary after all, then 
they must be describable. But I think that Emmett fails here to distinguish empirical fact 
from contingent fact. What she should have said is that it is a contingent fact that we have 
the concepts that we do have; hence the existence of concepts with these grammars is a 
contingent fact and not a necessary one (the wider issue of necessity will be returned to in 
later sections of this chapter). But this is not at all to say that our grasp of their properties 
is a matter of sense experience: o f observation and description. Our relation to the 
grammars o f our concepts is not essentially an empirical relation.
For example, if I want to understand the rule governing the use of your words — that is, 
to see the sense in the way you use a word — I do not describe what you are doing (still 
less have ‘theory’ of what you are doing); at best that might be a preliminary. Rather, I try 
to follow what you are saying. This, in fact, is another way of approaching the point made 
in the previous paragraphs: I cannot have a view of the linguistic rule that is being 
employed except insofar as I already understand and follow it; the sense and utility of any 
description o f the circumstances of its use will depend on that. Within the terms available 
to me, 1 may describe all the facts surrounding its use (all the facts in which the concept 
is not taken for granted, that is) and still misunderstand it — as I may make all the 
observations I like of the tribe’s use o f colour words but still misunderstand ‘reddish- 
green’.
A complicating factor here is that there is no doubt that in many cases concepts are 
determined by reference to facts. For example, a disease may be defined on the basis of 
the description of an array o f symptoms and causes. Facts are part o f the constitution o f the 
concept; they are functionally part of its grammar. Understanding these constituent facts 
is, therefore, internal to the understanding o f the concept, and citing them will belong to 
an internal account of the grammar of the concept However, there are two points that 
should be made here. Firstly, citing these facts is not in itself a external description of the
13 In particular she has in mind Bernard Williams, Jonathan Lear, and Lynne Rudder-Baker. Whereas I do 
not defend Emmett on this point, elsewhere I shall criticise the transcendentalist approach.
14 Emmett p. 215.
15 Ibid. p. 225.
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grammar o f the concept; on the contrary, the external aspect of the description of its 
grammar would lie in stating that these facts are constitutive of the concept (and how). 
Secondly, revealing the constitutive role of any such facts is not likely to be adequate to 
illuminating the most fundamental problems of philosophy. For philosophy is in its 
element when occupied with concepts that are deeply rooted in our practices16 and which 
are not, in their most fundamental aspects, determined by reference to facts.—Hence the 
most fundamental investigations in philosophy must be of a different kind. Nevertheless, 
facts may have a part to play in philosophical discussion in certain specific contexts, and 
so we should devote some space to clarifying this.
4 ~ Facts, Concepts and Philosophical Investigation
In the quotation from Philosophical Investigations 415 in Section 2 above, Wittgenstein 
speaks o f philosophy as supplying ‘remarks on the natural history of human beings’, these 
being observations of great generality which normally are overlooked. In the immediate 
context one might suppose his view to be that it is the failure to observe these facts that 
is at the bottom of philosophical problems. Philosophy is a factual investigation after all, 
since its aim is to reveal these facts. But this impression is in conflict with other remarks 
where the relevance of general facts of nature is stated to be dependent on setting the 
facts in a larger context,—  a logical context:
If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be 
interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of 
grammar?—Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and 
very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their 
generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the 
formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural 
history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have 
different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain 
concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean 
not realizing something that we realize—then let him imagine certain very general 
facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of 
concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him. (PI p. 230)
16 This point will be developed at length in subsequent sections.
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And then:
What kind of investigation ate we carrying out? Am I investigating the probability of 
cases that I give as examples, or am I investigating their actuality} No, I’m just citing 
what is possible and am therefore giving grammatical examples. (BigT p. 187)
The basic form of the game can’t include doubt.’ What we are doing here above all is 
to imagine a basic form: a possibility, indeed a very important possibility. (We very often 
confuse what is an important possibility with historical reality.) (C&E p. 377)
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed 
not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the possibilities of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make 
about phenomena Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. (PI 90)
It now appears that it is not the facts as such but their conceivability that is relevant, the 
point o f stating them being grammatical, i.e. logical. What are we to make of this 
apparent inconsistency? First o f all, it follows from the point made in the last paragraph 
of the previous section, that facts may be relevant in philosophy just for the facts that 
they are, but in a way that does not compromise the grammatical nature of philosophical 
investigation. This can occur if the facts are constitutive of a concept: if the concept 
under philosophical investigation has facts integrated into it, then citing these facts will 
belong to the account we give of it in philosophy. Here their actuality is relevant to the 
grammatical investigation and so has logical significance.17
Now there is one particular circumstances where facts are commonly integrated into a 
concept which is o f particular relevance in philosophy. Here it will be helpful to start by 
distinguishing between two conceptual ‘levels’ at which the philosophical investigations 
may be aimed. For example, if we are giving an account of the concept intention, the 
purpose of describing the language-game migfit be to illuminate the grammar of the 
concept as it is employed to articulate and express intentions. Here we will be concerned 
with showing what it makes sense to say in the articulation and expression of intentions. 
This I shall call the first level investigation. On the other hand, our interest might be with 
how we attribute intentions to others; for in addition to the employment of the concept 
o f intention in our verbal expressions of intention, we also have a conception of the 
expression o f intention as a mode of linguistic behaviour set in the larger context o f human 
activity. Wittgenstein describes language-games where these are defined as ‘language and the
17 The phrase ‘logical significance of facts’ is borrowed from Hertzberg where he employs it — I believe — in 
the course o f making a similar point: Lars Hertzberg, ‘Primitive Reactions — Logic or Anthropology?’, in 
The Wittgenstein Legay, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, eds. French, Uehling & Wettstein, XVII, (Notre Dame 
Press, 1992), pp. 24-39. (Hertzberg)
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actions into which it is woven.’18 The point I want to emphasise here is that in addition to 
the concepts operating within the language-game, we also have a conception of the 
language-game as such, that is, as a functioning part of human life. Hence, when we are 
concerned with our conception of a language-game as a part of human life, our account 
will include a description both of the language use and of the surrounding circumstances 
of its use,—where those circumstances will include not only the actions themselves but 
their context in the social and material worlds in which the expressions are employed. 
This conception may also be investigated grammatically, and we may call this a second level 
investigation.
This ‘functioning part’ of human life may even be conceived of as a phenomenon in its 
own right, of which language is just one component. ‘The expression of intention’ is just 
such a phenomenon comprising linguistic and non-linguistic elements — other examples 
being: hope, belief, etc.19 Hence the second level investigation may have just as much 
right to be called an investigation into a specific phenomenon within human life as the 
first level investigation.
Now of course the concepts that are subject to second level investigations are just as 
likely to have facts as a part of their constitution as any other concept.— Our conception 
of language as a phenomenon within human life, and as a component within other 
phenomena of human life, may itself be partly determined by reference to facts about 
human life. Here, then, is a significant area in which the description of facts about human 
life may play an important part in what remains otherwise a conceptual investigation.
The second level investigation may also be pitched at different levels. The second level 
investigation of intention, being an investigation into the way that language enters into 
the formation o f the phenomenon of intention, may also be treated as belonging to an 
elucidation of the concept of language. By examining different modes in the use of 
language, and marking out the different grammars lying in our conceptions of different 
language-games, we say something about the variety of what counts as a grammar. By 
looking at how language enters into and is partly constitutive of phenomena such as 
intention, hope, or belief, we illuminate the concept language. Note that these are still all 
part o f a grammatical investigation, not into the concept of the expression of intention but 
into the concept o f language. In practice, of course, it may not be straightforward to 
separate second level from first level investigations, which will frequently be intertwined.
18 PI 7.
19 I shall be examining this in more detail in Chapter 5.
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Certainly, a second level investigation may shed light on a first level one, and vice verscr. the 
grammar of ‘I intend....’ is evidently connected with the grammar of Tie intends....’.
Before continuing there is an important caveat we should add. The failure to appreciate 
that the grammatical investigations may be carried on, or may have significance, at such 
different conceptual levels may give rise to confusion over which elements in the 
investigation are factual and which are purely conceptual. In the first place, in philosophy 
it is commonplace to utter propositions that resemble statements o f general fact but 
which on examination turn out to be straightforwardly grammatical. This is a source of 
confusion in its own right. The proposition ‘Every rod has a length’, for instance, 
evidently looks like a statement of fact. But propositions o f this type can be readily 
identified as not being ordinary statements o f fact by trying to imagine the opposite:
Of course, here “I can’t imagine the opposite of this” doesn’t mean: my powers of 
imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a defence against something 
whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a 
grammatical one. (PI 251)
To try to state the opposite would be simply to violate the grammar of the concept 
rod,— for these are expressions of grammatical rules, not statements of fact. This 
impression of factuality is amplified by confusion over the conceptual level of the 
investigation. Consider the following remarks by Wittgenstein:
I look at an animal and am asked: “What do you see?” I answer: “A rabbit”.—I see a 
landscape; suddenly a rabbit runs past. I exclaim “A rabbit!”
He then comments:
Both things, both the report and the exclamation, are expressions of perception and 
of visual experience. But the exclamation is so in a different sense from the report: it 
is forced from us.—It is related to the experience as a cry is to pain. (PI p. 197)
Evidently the comment is not meant to contribute to an understanding of the sense of 
the concept rabbit. Rather, the comment is concerned with the kinds of expressions that 
they are. They are observations of the nature of their use, and belong therefore to an 
account of their employment as linguistic expressions of a particular kind. It appears, 
then, that here we have a different kind of investigation; not a grammatical one, but one 
that contributes to a descriptive account of a whole dimension of human life. For the 
statement that the exclamation is forced from us looks like a general fact of nature belonging 
to a general factual account of the nature of language.
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This impression is strengthened because the second order investigation looks like an 
instance o f ‘getting outside the language-game’, of explaining the possibility o f the 
language-game from without, the difference in kind between the modes of visual 
experience that the report and the exclamation express being explained by the fact that 
the one is forced from us whilst the other is n o t This is a natural way of expressing the 
point, and it is common enough in philosophy, even in accounts of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy. For example, Elizabeth Wolgast (in a paper which I shall be discussing at 
length in a later chapter), remarks: ‘In On Certainty, Wittgenstein wrestled with the 
question hon> there can be such certainties, a task which a Kantian might call 
transcendental’.20 But it is a confusion if we are led to think that we have transcended 
grammatical investigation; as if we were now in the realms of a transcendental 
investigation as opposed to a grammatical investigation and were observing the 
phenomenon of belief from a conceptually independent point of view and theorising 
upon its necessary conditions. For whilst the comments on these utterances may take the 
form of an external account of the circumstances of their use, they are still a part o f an 
internal account of the grammar of a concept but at a different, i.e. secondary, level. For 
Wittgenstein’s general observations about the nature and circumstances of the use of the 
phrase ‘A rabbit!’ are in fact grammatical remarks on the concepts report and exclamation, 
and link these concepts to the concepts perception and visual experience. The statement that 
the exclamation is forced from us is a grammatical remark: the concept of exclamation 
contains the concept of being forced; it is part of what distinguishes the concept of a 
report from that of an explanation. In virtue of this, the concepts report and exclamation 
help to determine different conceptions of visual experience and its expression.
Now the difference between the two concepts could be explained by saying that the fact 
that some utterances are forced from us whilst others are not is integrated into two 
contrasting concepts: report and exclamation. But this does not mean that they are 
distinguished by a general fact of nature. For whereas ‘some utterances are forced from 
us, whilst others are not5 is a general fact of nature, ‘exclamations are forced from us’ is 
not — and neither is ‘reports are not forced from us’.—As I have said, they are 
grammatical remarks. Moreover, it would be misleading to present the genuine fact here 
as forming the basis of a theory explaining the possibility of different perceptual 
phenomena. It would be clearer to say that two different concepts of visual experience 
are (or can be) determined by reference to this fact.
20 Eliaabeth Wolgast, Whether Certainty is a Form o f Life’, Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37 No. 147, 1987, 
pp. 151-165. (Wolgastl)
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The second order grammatical investigation of the concept of the language-game will 
contain within it a perspective upon the concepts embedded within the language-game 
that is once removed.—Within the framework of an internal account of the concept of the 
verbal expression of intention, we have a higher order perspective on the concept of an 
intentional act But this higher order perspective is not a transcendental perspective, for 
in philosophical terms it still belongs to what I have referred to as an internal grammatical 
account.— It still takes for granted the concept that is being investigated, and so it still 
trades on an understanding o f the internal connections between the concept of intention 
and the concept of the language-game in which it is embedded. This remains essentially 
the case even though the concept of the language-game may also contain facts about the 
circumstances which surround the language-game but which do not in themselves take 
for granted the concepts being elucidated. For the concept of the expression of intention 
cannot be explained in terms o f these facts alone (in the case of other concepts the 
situation may, o f course, be different).
In conclusion, then, it is not inconsistent to suggest, on one occasion, that general facts 
o f nature may be relevant in their own right to a philosophical investigation, whilst 
insisting, on another occasion, that it is the possibility of a fact21 that is important because 
o f what it shows of the grammar o f the concepts involved. Only it is important to show 
that these apply to different situations in philosophy. Generally, whereas the elucidation 
o f the grammar of a concept is not — at the most fundamental level, or in the case o f the 
most fundamental concepts — a factual investigation,^^ may nevertheless have logical 
significance within it. General facts of nature may have a place within what remains 
essentially a conceptual investigation.
5 ~ Facts, Concepts and Necessity
In the last section I explained how facts may have logical significance when integrated 
into a concept. This appeal to logic was also important to the argument in the second 
section o f this chapter, where I argued that describing grammar is different from 
describing natural phenomena in as much as it takes for granted an understanding o f the 
concepts whose grammar is being described; for the appeal to our understanding of a 
concept is also an appeal to what is necessary in its constitution. For this reason, another
21 See quotation o f PI 190 above.
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difficulty in the description of grammar will be the failure of purely descriptive accounts 
of language-games to bring home what is necessary in them:
Is grammar, as I use the word, only the description of the actual handling of the 
language//languages//? So that its propositions could actually be understood as the 
propositions of a natural science?
That could be called the descriptive science of speaking, in contrast to that of 
thinking.
Indeed, the rules of chess could be taken as propositions from the natural history of 
man. (As the games of animals are described in books on natural history.) (BigT p.
163)
I should like to be able to describe how it comes about that mathematics appears to us 
now as the natural history of the domain of numbers, now again as a collection of 
rules. (RFM p. 230)
What you say seems to amount to this, that logic belongs to the natural history of 
man. And that is not combinable with the hardness of the logical “must”.
But the logical “must” is a component part of the propositions of logic, and these are 
not propositions of human natural history. If what a proposition of logic said was: 
Human beings agree with one another in such and such ways (and that would be the 
form of the natural-historical proposition), then its contradictory would say that there 
is a lack of agreement. Not, that there is an agreement of another kind. (RFM pp. 352-
3)
If a proposition is to be a proposition of logic, i.e. a philosophical proposition, then it 
cannot be merely a statement of natural history. If the account of the language-game is to 
have logical force, then the grasp of the ‘must/ must lie outside the simple statement of 
fact that the words are used in such and such a way. ‘Logic’ is of course a phenomenon 
of human life,—in other words, it is an aspect o f a human activity. Moreover, that we 
have a concept of logic playing a special role in our concept of discourse is a part of our 
natural history. But propositions offered just from a natural historical point of view 
cannot be propositions o f logic,—which have to be expressive of and therefore must 
appeal to, the ‘must’. Without this there is no internal connection between the account we 
are giving and the philosophical problems we are trying to understand. For the 
understanding that is required in philosophy is the understanding of why there is confusion 
if we try to speak in a particular way, not just that we do not speak in that way. 
Philosophy is a logical and not merely an anthropological investigation.
Even amongst Wittgensteinian philosophers there has been equivocation over this 
point. There is a nervousness of speaking of ‘necessity’ at all This arises principally, I 
believe, because it is difficult to see how one can avoid sliding towards the idea of 
necessities inherent in the world. But these scruples are a misunderstanding in my view;
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for the necessity relates not to the propositions themselves as statements of fact, but 
follows from the statements being given logical significance within the language-game.—  
Given the constitution of the concept, these facts are necessary components of it: if 
someone has measles, then of necessity we are talking of these observable symptoms and 
not others. The facts are necessary in as much as they are constitutive of the concept, 
which is not to deny that they are in themselves anything other than contingent. The facts 
could have been otherwise, and if so would simply have gone to determine different 
concepts.
The temptation to treat grammatical necessities as if they were worldly ones has its 
opposite in the temptation to dismiss logic and to deny necessity. Where a fact is 
integrated into a concept we may, of course, imagine circumstances where the fact is 
stated without the intention of drawing attention to its logical role. For instance, we may 
remark on some symptom that is exhibited by a patient without having in mind that this 
belongs to the definition of a disease. The same principle arises with the sorts of cases 
that we deal with in philosophy. For example, it may be a fact that, in the ordinary course 
of events, doubts are directed towards some states of affairs and not others. And it may 
be observed that as a matter of fact this is always the case where doubts are raised, i.e. 
that there is always something that is not doubted. It may then seem that drawing 
attention to such a fact is sufficient in itself to ‘solving’ the philosophical problem of 
scepticism, for example. From this it may look as if we can do philosophy without drawing 
upon any conception of necessity: it is not that we cannot doubt beyond this point — 
which just looks like an a priori prejudice — it is just that we do not, and that is enough. 
This would be a mistake. For it fails to acknowledge that the fact that doubting only goes 
so fa r determines our concept of the language-game of doubting, and that if we expressed 
‘doubts’ in ways that differed radically from our usual ones, we would have the right to 
say that this is now not the same concept,—it is no longer what we call doubt.22 Observing 
the limit we place to doubting is therefore a contribution to our understanding of its 
logic.23 Recalling Wittgenstein’s remark ‘And everything descriptive of a language-game is 
part o f logic’,24 no proposition can belong to logic unless it appeals to a conception of 
necessity. It is not that we are driven by necessity to stop doubting at a certain point; for 
as Phillips points out, in a certain sense it just is a fact that we stop doubting at this
22 See e.g. OC 450 & 625, C&E p. 383.
23 This may be said without having to deny that the limit o f doubt is not fixed.
24 OC 56.
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point.25 But in an important sense this is circular. For the fact that we do stop at a certain 
point ‘is what characterises our thinking\26 And if normally we ‘doubted’ beyond that 
point, then it would not, as a matter of fact, be the same language-game, and ‘doubting’ 
would mean something different. The logical context of the description should be 
understood.
No doubt there are a great many concepts — perhaps the overwhelming majority — 
which might be regarded as optional That is, we might imagine linguistic cultures in which 
just these concepts are lacking, or alternative ones take their place. Moreover, such 
variations may be observed both at the level where concepts are determined by reference 
to facts or at level at which concepts are determined in practice. The concepts that we 
might most easily imagine being dispensed with, or for which we might easily imagine 
alternatives, will perhaps be those defined by reference to facts; for as long as the 
concepts by means of which the facts are construed are familiar ones, we can always 
imagine the facts being other than they are, or different suites of facts being brought 
together to determine different concepts. However, we may also fairly readily imagine 
different concepts amongst those determined essentially in practice,—where the practice 
is in some obvious sense a variation on a practice belonging to the determination of 
concepts we already possess. For example, we might imagine a creature with the 
perceptual modes of a bat developing different perceptual concepts, but which are 
nevertheless strictly analogous to our own visual perceptual concepts. More intractable 
difficulties will arise, however, where the formation of the concept is a practical extension 
or addition to a form of life in a way that is not shared with others; here the imagination 
comes up against a limit. Be that as it may, even where there are limits to the sharing and 
understanding of alternative concepts, there will be plenty of cases where it remains 
possible to recognise the existence o f different options. A quite different situation arises, 
however, in the case of those concepts which, if we are to imagine persons having 
concepts at all’ it becomes difficult to suppose that they might either be lacking or be in a 
radically different form. These comprise most of the concepts that typically give rise to 
the problems of philosophy, and indeed it is no accident that puzzlement over them has 
endured across millennia. I am thinking here of those concepts which are taken for 
granted as soon as we begin to say anything at all: language, meaning, concept, sense; and all 
those related to them such as belief, truth, knowledge, necessity, and so on. These are structural 
to the whole o f our thinking; they are the branch on which we sit. If we are speaking at all
25 D. Z. Phillips, Phihsophy's Cool Place, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999). (Phillips)
26 Phillips, p. 53.
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then we have the concept of speaking; it is not an optional concept for a speaker. Hence, 
a kind of necessity attaches to these concepts which we will not find elsewhere. But again 
it should be emphasised that this is not a woddly necessity; rather: if we are to imagine a 
form of life differing in these dimensions, then we will just not be imagining one in which 
there is anything we understand as speech, meaning, belief, knowledge, etc.
6 ~ Concepts, Generality and the World
Finally I shall explore another area where the relations between facts and concepts give 
rise to uncertainties. It has become a commonplace, inherited from our positivist 
tradition,27 to view concepts as essentially content-less vessels which do not in themselves 
embody anything we might call knowledge or understanding of the world. Only in the 
falsifiable proposition do we find any notion of Vhat the world is like’. And so except 
insofar as our concepts are defined by reference to facts, concepts are merely the 
arbitrary system of measures from which propositions are fashioned,— any elucidations 
of our concepts being merely ‘analytic’, i.e. the straightening out o f confusions over 
definitions. This strict dichotomy on the matter of content has been used, on the one 
hand, by some Wittgensteinians to defend a non-revisionist conception of philosophy, i.e. 
the view that there is no such thing as questioning the ‘correctness’ of our concepts 
(inside or outside philosophy). And it is used elsewhere by his critics, who put the point 
the other way about and complain he is committed to a negative conception of 
philosophy: since concepts have no content, a philosophy based on the elucidation of 
concepts cannot illuminate the nature o f things. Either way, the idea o f philosophy as 
essentially a conceptual inquiry condemns it to being a barren enterprise.
Now it may well be that there are remarks in Wittgenstein’s writings that suggest an 
interpretation along these lines.28 It is not my intention to defend a revisionist 
interpretation of Wittgenstein — the reasons for which will emerge later — but I think 
there is something wrong with the idea that concepts are not in their own right part of 
our understanding of Vhat the wodd is like’ (independently of whether or not they 
contain facts, that is), and that this may be dedved from Wittgenstein’s writings also. The 
dichotomy arises because we are dominated by one model of what constitutes an
271 am grateful to my supervisor H.O. Mounce for drawing my attention to this issue.
28 Although points o f interpretation will be raised from time to time, it is not my intention to try to settle 
this exegetical issue.
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understanding Vhat the world is like’, namely, that which is expressed in statements of 
fact.
Let us remind ourselves of one of the essential differences between concepts and facts. 
When we look at the foundations of language, bedrock lies in the practice o f language, i.e. in 
the application o f a rule, unaided by the acknowledgement of any fact. Since the possibility 
of facts being integrated into concepts depends ultimately on the fact being formulated 
according to linguistic rules,29 clearly we would have an infinite regress if the concepts 
were founded ultimately on facts. Facts take for granted the concepts by which they are 
expressed. Hence the establishment of linguistic practices is more fundamental to — and 
so in an important sense more characteristic of — the formation of concepts than the 
determination of concepts by reference to facts. What is at stake, therefore, in the matter 
of whether a conceptual inquiry carries substance, is how the formation of a linguistic 
practice may itself be regarded as constitutive of our understanding of Vhat the world is 
like’.
Now the general distinction between concepts {qua linguistic practice) and facts can be 
made to correspond to the traditional distinction between analytic and empirical truths, 
that is, the distinction — roughly speaking — between propositions which are true by 
definition in contrast to those which state a substantial truth about the world. On this 
assumption, what we are searching for, in looking for an understanding of concepts as 
having content, would appear to be a class of propositions lying somewhere between 
analytic emptiness and factual substance. There have, of course, been previous attempts 
to find a middle way: the notion of a priori/ synthetic propositions was introduced for just 
this purpose. But one trouble with this move — which is especially relevant to our present 
purposes — is that it presents the alternative as another mode of factual discourse; whereas, 
what we are interested in is precisely that which cannot be presented as fact, just because it 
lies essentially in the practice itself and not in any propositions generated by means of 
that practice. To avoid analytic emptiness in a conceptual inquiry, we therefore need to 
show:
1) How concept-formation as such represents, in some substantial sense, a grasp of 
V hat the world is like’; whilst showing
2) How what is grasped cannot be substituted for by the grasp o f any fact — 
general or particular.
29 The limitations of thinking of the employment of a concept as the application of a rule will be discussed 
at length in Chapter 4; the important point here is that the notion o f applying a rule is at least an aspect o f 
the notion of the employment o f a concept — it is an essential aspect.
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‘Grasping what the world is like’: we might begin by approaching this negatively by 
saying that concepts would not tell us what the world is like if they were ‘arbitrary’. We 
could put it like this: if our concepts were arbitrary, then for any change in the world our 
concepts would not have to change except in so far as they embodied facts that had 
changed. On this view, any genuine change in the world would be reportable as fact, and 
any changes to our concepts would be driven by the recognition of these new facts, 
which might then be taken up into a new or revised concept (new facts about the nature 
or cause of a disease, for example). By contrast, if concepts are to be recognised as being 
non-arbitrary in their practical dimension, then this will be by observing how we may be 
forced to change our concepts in ways that cannot be accounted for merely in terms of 
the recognition o f a need to integrate new facts into a language-game.
We might illustrate this with the — now rather hackneyed — example from physics: two 
modes o f description, particle and wave, are effective up to a point in the description of 
sub-atomic phenomena, but are ultimately recognised as being conceptually 
incompatible.—We cannot make proper sense of the phenomena by using either mode, 
neither can they be integrated. This dilemma cannot be resolved by adducing new facts, 
but will be driven from within the practice of science to generate a new mode of 
description, and as a result a new concept, a new grammatical form, will come directly into 
being. In forming the new concept we have a new way of understanding the world, but 
not new facts — though of course new facts will now be expressible by means of it. We 
now see the world under the aspect of the new form,— from within a new formal relation 
to it. In this and related ways the world prompts us into forming new concepts. 
Moreover, the generation of the new concept is ‘spontaneous’, which means that it is not 
founded on the prior observation of some fact. Wittgenstein remarks:
Something new (spontaneous, ‘specific5) is always a language-game. (PI p. 224).
One way of approaching the more positive view of conceptual content, then, would be 
to say that concepts are not arbitrary to the extent that they represent a grasp of the form 
o f the world. This way of speaking does of course present immediate dangers. In 
particular, we should avoid the suggestion that there is some kind of ontological distinction 
between the form o f the world and the facts (general or particular) that are constructed 
from it. To clarify this, let us ignore the world for the moment and look at how the 
distinction operates relative to the circumstance which make language ‘possible’.
Firstly, it is clear that talk about the world requires that we have formal relations to it. 
Without this we have no means of making statements of fact (or any other kinds of
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utterance). There would be no such thing as saying anything if there were nothing 
corresponding to a grasp of the form of the world as distinct from making actual 
statements o f fact. When I speak of ‘the form of the world’, then, I am as yet 
presupposing nothing about the world. A distinction between form and fact is an inherent 
feature o f conceptualising the wodd at alt. it is a distinction that belongs to the grammar 
of ‘talking about the wodd’. Our concepts are our formal relations to the world.
The distinction between form and fact represents, on the one hand, a quantitative 
transition in the generality o f the level at which we understand the world (philosophy 
studies the wodd at the greater level of generality). But the transition also represents a 
change in kind from the factual to the conceptual. This difference in kind is necessary just 
because our intelligent engagement with the wodd reaches bedrock in a practice and not in 
the realisation of a fact (that too being a grammatical remark).
What is there to be said, now, in favour of saying that concepts in themselves embody a 
knowledge or understanding of the wodd is like? If I am learning how to measure using a 
ruler and am learning how to describe the lengths o f objects, etc., I am getting the 
concept length. But we may also express this by saying that I know or am getting to 
understand what length is. It adds something to express the point this way just because it 
reminds us that to have a concept is not merely to operate with a sign or to have 
command over a technique; rather, it pervades our intelligent relations to the world. It 
shows not only in the methods I use to measure and compare, but is distributed 
throughout my ways of speaking and the sense that I make of things by means of 
language. It would not be difficult to imagine the breakdown of a person’s grasp o f the 
concept length and the loss of understanding and general intellectual collapse in the 
person’s life that would manifest it. It would not be adequate in these circumstances to 
say that the person had merely lost the use of a word. Neither could it be accounted for 
as the loss of knowledge of any fact that might be referred to in the application of the 
concept No, he no longer understands what length is; he is losing his grip on reality,— 
on V hat the world is like’.
Likewise, if a child is getting hold of the concept cause, this shows not merely in his 
ability to make simple judgements of the relation of one event to another; rather, it is 
something that is working its way into the whole of his thinking and is manifested in the 
myriad ways in which he is able to make connections between things that are said and 
things that are done. If, on the other hand, the child fails to become fluent in all these 
connections, again it would not be adequate to say that this is simply a failure to grasp
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how to use a word (for one thing, it might fail to grasp the use of the word even if its 
grasp of the concept showed in others things that it said). Here again we would have the 
right to say that he is failing at the conceptual level to grasp the nature of the reality in 
which he lives. Beyond the reportage of facts, a person shows he has a grip on reality in 
being able to talk sense.
The formation of concepts has sometimes been called arbitrary on the grounds that the 
ways in which we construct the world through our concepts are unlimited. This is fine. But 
it is not all right if it means that any construction will do. If anything went, there would be 
no such thing as running into difficulty or inconsistency in the projection of our concepts 
into situations,—the only inconsistency would be internal to language. We go out into the 
world and we make rules out of the ways in which we engage with it. The phenomena we 
engage with are integrated into, and indeed become part op the language. Wittgenstein 
speaks of this as the use of samples, and he insists that ‘it is most natural.. ..to reckon the 
samples among the instruments of the language’.30 That our concepts are not arbitrary 
(the extent to which they are not arbitrary), therefore, shows in the fact that discord and 
confusion in our attempts to form and apply concepts cannot be ruled out. The failure to 
make consistent use of samples is one possible manifestation of this. Certainly, if we are 
unable to make consistent use of certain words, the propositions in which they occur will 
be useless, that is, senseless.31 But this does not only reflect on the propositions; it reflects 
on our understanding of Svhat the world is like\
A related point is suggested in this remark by Wittgenstein:
... .We don’t perceive that we see space perspectivally or that the visual image is in 
some sense blurred near its edge. We don’t notice this, and can never notice it, 
because it is the mode of perception. We never think about it, and it is impossible, 
because the form of our world has no contrary. (BigT p. 191) (my emphasis)
The relevance of this is that when we say that the formation of our concepts is a mode 
in our understanding of what the world is like, it might be objected that this cannot be 
right because — unlike statements of fact — we cannot imagine the opposite of what our 
world is like, and so our concepts cannot contain genuine content: if we try to imagine 
the opposite we are not, as it were, doing violence to the world, we are simply violating 
our system of definitions. But this is not correct. For — of course — our world is as it is, 
and unlike the contrast between possible facts within the world, the only contrary to the
30 PI 16. It may be argued that often there are no — or very often no — such discrete reactions to samples in 
the formation or learning of a concept. This is not the point. Even if it is implicit, it is an aspect of the use 
of language.
31 See RFM p. 200.
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most general form of our world is another world. And in order to imagine this we would 
first have to create a different set of concepts within which to imagine possible states of 
affairs within it. And of course we cannot do this starting just from those we already 
have. So the fact that we cannot imagine the contrary is, in this instance, a sign that we 
have reached the highest generality in our understanding of the world in which we live. It 
is not a sign that we are no longer dealing with the content o f that understanding, which 
would therefore have to reside solely in the world of facts.
To command a clear view of a concept, then, is to command a clear view of a 
phenomenon in its most fundamental aspect, namely at the level at which we construct it 
and integrate it into (‘rule it into5) our language in the form of a concept. To explore the 
grammar o f a concept is to explore our intelligible relations to a phenomenon at their 
most general level, which is to explore the nature of the phenomenon in its most general 
aspect. Hence any question o f V hat the world is like’ on this level has to be a matter of 
logic and not fact, otherwise it would not be a question about the essential nature of the 
phenomenon.
The logical nature of a conceptual inquiry means that the content lying within our 
concepts remains in an important sense prior to fact. This lends itself to the supposition 
that philosophy is an investigation into necessary features of the world,—that the world 
has a necessary or logical structure that is mirrored in language. This impression is again 
encouraged by the idea — which I have already criticised — of a priori truths, i.e. by the 
idea that the concepts (as such and in general) are founded on factual truths which may 
be represented by means of a priori/  synthetic factual propositions (their a priori necessity 
being all that distinguishes them from empirical truths). But such a point of view is not 
supported by the idea that a conceptual investigation may be ‘about the world’, at least 
not in the way that I have tried to explain this; for the necessity of logical insight lies within 
the terms of reference of our concepts and not with reference to the world. Clarifications 
o f our concepts express necessity because they express what makes them the concepts 
they are; this is what is meant by the ‘essential nature o f the phenomenon’. But it does 
not follow from this that the understanding of the world that lies in the grasp of a 
concept is the grasp of a worldly necessity. The form of the world is no more necessary 
than any facts.
One case that might perhaps be regarded as an exception to this — and which I have 
already referred to in a related context at the end of the last section — is where the 
concepts in question are themselves to do with language: if we are raising any questions at
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all\ then we raise them in a language. And so in an obviously circular way, if we raise any 
questions at all, then the concepts of language and any concepts to which thy are internally 
related (e.g. action, experience, etc.) must already be given. This might be regarded as a 
kind o f necessity: you cannot saw off the branch you are sitting on. But still, the fact 
remains that there might not have been language at all.—The necessity is still 
grammatical.
In elucidating concepts, philosophy does not itself say anything about the world; rather 
it aims to show, in a specific context, what our concepts already show about the world.—  
We see the world more clearly because we see the grammar of our concepts more clearly 
(reflectively). We should remember that it is our concepts that are about the world, not our 
statements about our concepts. A  priori and empirical propositions are, in this sense, not on the 
same plane; for insofar as statements of fact are about the world they complement the 
concepts themselves, not a priori grammatical propositions. The latter only illuminate the 
nature of the world because they illuminate what is already given in our concepts. It 
would be a confusion to think that whereas science finds new facts about the world 
philosophy also finds out new things about the world only on an a priori, conceptual level. 
Neither does it follow from our concepts being ‘about the world’ that it is the job of 
philosophy to correct our concepts and change them if necessary. Philosophy has no 
privileged access to the world; and if there is a demand to change our concepts, this arises 
not out of philosophy but directly out of our linguistic engagement with the wodd and is 
effected through the formation of new concepts. It may be part of the task o f philosophy 
to warn o f difficulties in our concepts; but the formation of new concepts remains 
‘spontaneous’.
7 ~ Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to set out some very general aspects of our relations to our 
concepts, which may be summarised as follows:
1) That concepts are determined primarily through the establishment of linguistic 
practices and only secondarily by reference to facts;
2) That ihuminating the conceptual content that is established through these 
practices will be by a process that must take for granted an understanding of 
their content, and is therefore by internal elucidation, or ‘showing’, and not by 
external description of these practices, or ‘saying’;
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3) That the philosophical method of describing the circumstances of a language- 
game is not to adopt — or try to adopt — a point of view that transcends normal 
discourse, but is a grammatical investigation in its own right into the concept of 
the language-game;
4) That the content of our concepts is not to be understood simply in terms of 
arbitrary rules governing the technique for using words, but represents our 
understanding of Vhat the world is like’ at its most general level.
The last point is made to emphasise that when we speak of the adoption of linguistic 
practices, and generally of how language is seated in our lives, we are not speaking merely 
of how a technique is acquired, we are speaking of how the most fundamental 
dimensions of our understanding of ourselves and the world are established in our lives. 
This will be an important underlying theme of this thesis and will be addressed explicitly 
in various contexts throughout.
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Chapter 3 ~  The Concept o f Instinct in Wittgenstein’s Writings
/ ~ Introduction
The passage from Augustine’s Confessions that introduces the Philosophical Investigations 
contains two assumptions32 which together become major objects of criticism in 
Wittgenstein’s subsequent discussions — indeed they ramify the whole of his later 
philosophy. The first is the monolithic view of language as a system of names. The 
second is the idea that the formation of concepts and the employment of language are 
grounded in an articulate, subjective mode of understanding that is prior to, or that 
anticipates, the use of language. This is the conception of an ‘inner world’ of meanings 
that is known as ‘mentalism’. In response to this Wittgenstein strives to show the 
diversity in the functioning of language and concepts, and develops the idea that the use 
of language (and the expression of concepts) is to be understood essentially in connection 
with human activity, for which mentalist explanations are neither required nor can be 
given a coherent presentation. This notion of the fundamental role of activity is another 
expression of the spontaneous or instinctive nature of language use. In this chapter I shall 
trace its emergence in Wittgenstein’s writings.
The purpose of this present chapter is exegetical and is intended primarily as a survey 
of the texts. By means o f his most explicit statements, I shall trace the unfolding of his 
conception of the relation of language to action. In particular I shall try to illustrate the 
continuity in Wittgenstein’s thinking, from the systematic development of the simple 
language-games in the Philosophical Investigations, to the remarks on concept-formation that 
are scattered throughout the later work. I leave it to later chapters to develop the 
interpretation of the remarks and to consider criticisms, contrary views and other aspects 
o f these topics which are less clear or less well developed in Wittgenstein’s own writings. 
I shall not attempt to expound Wittgenstein’s critique of mentalism systematically, 
though I shall employ it where necessary.
32 The passage does not o f course contain only two points o f departure for Wittgenstein. For a point o f view 
on Wittgenstein’s choice of this passage — with which I am entirely sympathetic — see Margaret Urban 
Walker, ‘Augustine’s Pretence: Another Reading o f Wittgenstein’s PI V, Philosophical Investigations, 13:2, April 
1990, pp. 99-109.
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2 ~ The Instinct for Rules
Wittgenstein’s first response to Augustine is to describe a series of very simple linguistic 
transactions in a shop. All that he describes are the different ways in which the ‘words’ 
function and then the fact that, without further ado or explanation, the shopkeeper acts in 
certain ways. Subsequent remarks33 introduce more complex functions and their 
circumstances, and some references are made to mental processes accompanying the use 
o f language.34 However it is not until PI 33 that Wittgenstein turns his attention more 
explicitly to mentalistic accounts o f the use o f language. Here he begins by attacking one 
o f its most familiar manifestations: the interpretation of the understanding of an 
ostensive definition (e.g. pointing to, or ‘meaning’, an object, its colour, or its shape) as a 
mental, spiritual, or ‘occult’ process:
And here we may indeed fancy naming to be some remarkable act of mind, as it were a 
baptism of an object. As we can also say the word “this” to the object, as it were 
address the object as “this”—a queer use of this word, which doubtless only occurs in 
doing philosophy. (PI 38)
Wittgenstein attends briefly to the supposed role of memory in determining, or 
grounding, future applications of a (colour) word,35 but this topic -  and hence the whole 
question of the relation between mentalism, concepts and action — is not treated 
thoroughly until his discussions of rule following and language are well under way.
The latter begins in earnest where Wittgenstein first introduces the example of a pupil 
who is given a formation rule for writing down a series of signs or numbers.361 think it is 
an important general point that Wittgenstein’s extensive deployment of this, and 
subsequent related examples, is not intended to form the basis of a comprehensive 
account of what it is for an utterance to be a word with meaning; rather, the intention is 
to isolate and examine a particular aspect of language use, namely the nature of the 
commitment to the use of a word that we make when we learn to speak. His discussion is 
intended to shed light on the nature of logic and necessity, which is of prime interest to 
him; but it also serves to bring out — though probably in an oversimplified way, as we 
shall examine later — important aspects of speaking as behaviour; and provides a clear-cut 
context in which the assumptions of mentalism can be extracted and disposed of.
33 PI 2-32.
34 Ibid. 19 & 20.
35 Ibid. 56.
36 Ibid. 143.
34
The puzzle that Wittgenstein sets himself here is this. When we teach the pupil the rule, 
we are at the mercy of the his reactions;37 moreover, if he doesn’t react in the way we 
intended — in the ‘right’ way — then his learning will grind to a halt.38 But what if he then 
does go on to ‘get the system’? The criterion of his understanding is his correct application 
of the rule; and yet his understanding does not consist in his having made a correct 
application,39 and neither does the pupil say that he understands on the basis of observing 
his own success.40 Rather, his understanding would seem to consist in that state of mind 
from which the application flows.41 Now, we are all familiar, directly and subjectively, 
with the phenomenon of realising that we have understood the system: we exclaim ‘Now 
I can do it!’;42 and that may look like a manifestation of the said state of mind. But is that 
the understanding?43
To answer this Wittgenstein suggests that we begin by examining the circumstances in 
which we express understanding,44— a theme which he then develops by reference to the 
example of learning to read. The lesson drawn from this discussion is that we cannot give 
an account of reading in terms of the various experiences that may accompany it; neither 
is there any one act or process o f deriving the words from the page which we might hold 
up and say 'This is reading’. When we express ourselves as being guided by the letters, 
etc., we are speaking for ourselves and not on the basis of some external observations of our 
behaviour. But what this amounts to cannot be explained in terms of a mental state or 
reported experiences — these being phenomena which I interpret through the medium o f 
the concept of being influenced or guided.45 No, we are speaking out of our lives.
Wittgenstein now returns to the phrase ‘Now I can go on!’, as used to express the 
moment of grasping a rule.46 Clearly it is closely akin to saying ‘Now I can read’. Similarly, 
this is not the description o f a state of mind or experience. At best we might call it a 
signal.47 So, what is it? Again, we might express this by saying that it is an essential 
phenomenon of human life that we speak from it: the utterance of the phrase is an 
expression o f our lives. It is a fundamentally characteristic feature of our form of life that
37 Ibid. 145.
38 Ibid. 143.
39 Ibid. 146.
40 Ibid. 147.
41 Ibid. 146-149.
42 Ibid. 151.
43 Ibid. 152.
44 Ibid. 154.
45 Ibid. 177.
46 Ibid. 179.
47 Ibid. 180.
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we respond like this. We anticipate our ability to carry out specific courses of action 
without either inner or external ‘evidence’. If I suddenly remember a tune and am certain 
that I can sing it, this is not the expression of an experience; neither does it mean that it 
must have occurred to me in its entirety.48 It is just a fact of life, and without it we would 
not be the creatures that we are.
We may now apply these thoughts to Wittgenstein’s examples of extending arithmetical 
series. If I give the pupil a series of numbers to work out according to the formula + 2 ,1 
know what I mean or intend him to do at any stage in the series even if I have never 
myself worked it out to that point.49 Now of course there is no guarantee that the pupil 
will find it natural or obvious to do what I would do at any stage (nor that I might not 
breakdown myself). Again, his ability to follow my course of action may cease;50 he may 
not be able to make any sense of, or understand at all, why I go on as I do; or indeed he 
may protest that his own way of continuing is in accord with his understanding of the rule. 
Now how does this bear on my certainty with respect to each application of the formula? 
My subjective certainty appears to be linked to something given in the formula which it 
seems could only be worked out in one way;51 and yet it seems that there is nothing given 
absolutely in the formula which both constrains the individual to work out the series in 
one way rather than another and which corresponds to m j subjective certainty (and to 
propose a further qualification or formula would only push the same problem a step 
further back52).53 The mentalist conception of rule following — which supposes that if I 
know how to extend the rule then I must have something present to mind which 
anticipates all future applications — and the conception of the rule expression as, in some 
determinate way, containing a priori the possibility of all future applications are of a piece.
48 Ibid. 184.
49 Ibid. 187.
50 Ibid, 185.
51 Ibid. 188.
52 Ibid. 201.
53 One may argue that the plausibility o f Wittgenstein’s case here lies in the fact that he imagines his 
example series as being worked out in complete isolation — it has no compeer. If one imagines the working 
out o f the series interacting with the working out o f others, or being used in calculations engaging with 
other assumptions, etc., then it may seem less easy to present the behaviour of the pupil as being anything 
other that an aberration. The meaning of the formula +2 also lies in its relations to mathematics as a whole, 
not just to an isolated exercise. Well, this raises issues that will be returned to; but my own view is that 
whereas this does lead us into complexities that Wittgenstein seems not to have anticipated, it does not 
return us to the position he is attacking — his argument being that we cannot form a general conception of  
formulae as having determinate sense independent o f their working out in practice. Wittgenstein’s 
argument still captures the essence of this.
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The answer is that the sense of the rule expression hangs together with the application 
in practice:54 obeying a rule is a practice;55 the essence of the language-game is a practical 
method.56 Indeed:
The rule can only seem to me to produce all its consequences in advance if I draw 
them as a matter of course. As much as it is a matter of course for me to call this colour 
“blue”. (PI 238)
Removing the priority of both the rule expression and the mental accompaniments 
leads to the conclusion that any justification for how we are to obey the rule finds bedrock 
in the practice itself:
Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.” (PI 217)
And this explains the remark:
When I obey a rule, I do not choose.
I obey the rule blindly. (PI 219)
Unless I am already following a rule there is no choosing; unless I am already following 
a rule there is no ‘seeing’. Again it is important to emphasise that we are talking about 
bedrock. There remains a sense in which, in ordinary circumstances, we do not follow rules 
blindly. I have in mind here the fact that rules are not learned in isolation. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, the learning of many linguistic rules is surrounded by descriptions 
o f the circumstances in which the rule is to be applied, the actions to be carried out, and 
so on. And if we are asked to justify why we go on in a particular way, we will refer to 
other rule expressions, etc., which are not a matter of dispute; we will try to show, for 
example, that anomalous results will ensue if we carry on in this way rather than that.57 To 
this extent we do gp into the learning of the rule with our eyes open. But this will not do 
as a general account of what it is to learn to follow a rule, since that already takes for 
granted that we are following rules in the descriptions we are employing. At this level, 
resort to mentalistic conceptions of an intelligibility given prior to the practice of 
language and which determ ines its application are of no help.58 The subjective certainty
54 PI 190.
55 Ibid. 202.
56 C&E p. 399.
57 See previous footnote.
58 At this juncture in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein moves on to expound the so-called ‘private 
language argument’ (PI 243). This is clearly no accident since the argument is an extension o f the case 
against mentalism. Up to this point the argument has been that in essence the concept of following a rule is 
not the concept of an experience or mental state that accompanies a practice. However, the private 
language argument is more than just a corollary to this, for it argues that it makes no sense to speak of a rule 
(and hence of a language) as founded on subjective judgement. It is therefore a keystone in the attack on
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with which we realise that TSfow I can go on’ is, therefore, not a certainty derived from 
the direct introspection or intuition of a necessity determined a priori. Rather it is itself a 
primary manifestation of ourselves, qua willing subjects, as rule-following creatures. It is 
the subjective correlate of an otherwise outward manifestation o f our lives; and of course 
we should expect there to be such a correlate.
We have arrived at the point where Wittgenstein has established the primacy of practice 
in his discussions. To speak of ‘primacy’ here is to speak of the essential blindness of 
linguistic practice;— and this is to speak of its essentially instinctive nature. The notion that 
the use of language is driven ultimately by blind, instinctive ways of acting is given 
expression by Wittgenstein in a variety o f ways. It might be helpful to have some of the 
most striking of these before us:
What counts as its test? [i.e. an empirical proposition]—“But is this an adequate test?
And, if so, must it not be recognizable as such in logic?”—As if giving grounds did 
not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is 
an ungrounded way of acting. (OC 110)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is 
not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)
You must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I 
mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
It is there — like our life. (OC 559)
I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants 
instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough 
for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not 
emerge from some kind of ratiocination. (OC 475)
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or 
superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly 
thought as well.) (OC 358)
But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or 
unjustified; as it were, as something animal. (OC 359
Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules 
leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself. (OC 139)
The essence of the language-game is a practical method (a way of acting)—not 
speculation, not chatter. (C&E p. 399)
To begin by teaching someone “That looks red” makes no sense. For he must say that 
spontaneously once he has learnt what “red” means, i.e. has leamt the technique of 
using the word. (Z 418)
mentalism. I do not intend to rehearse the argument again here — though I shall have occasion to make 
reference to it from time to time.
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Bearing in mind that for Wittgenstein all philosophical remarks are grammatical, the 
notions of instinct and spontaneity should be treated as internally related to that of the 
ultimately ungrounded nature o f linguistic practices,—to the notion that it makes no 
sense to speak of them emerging out of reasoning. The latter is, therefore, part of what is 
meant by saying, in the context o f language use, that these reactions are instinctive.
3 ~ Forms of Life, Primitive Reactions and Conceptformation
At this point we should say more of the notion of a form of life, which plays an important 
though largely only implicit role in Wittgenstein’s investigations. The responses which 
form the groundwork of our language-games belong to the larger picture of human life 
which Wittgenstein refers to as the ‘hurly-burly’:
How could human behaviour be described? Surely only by showing the actions of a 
variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one man is doing now, 
but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it 
determines our judgement, our concepts, and our reactions. (RPP2 629; see also Z 
567)
The particular and characteristic weaving together o f those fundamental linguistic and 
behavioural reactions which make up the human ‘hurly-burly’ is what Wittgenstein refers 
to as our form of life.™ Because of the paucity of references to forms of life in 
Wittgenstein’s writings, it is a notion that has proven open to interpretation. But I  take it 
as referring to the mode of life of the individual taken as a whole and in its most general 
and fundamental and therefore in its most instinctive aspects. It refers to what is not 
optional in the pattern that he shares with others o f his kind and which makes up what 
we recognise as characteristic o f human life. Later I shall discuss some of these other 
interpretations in more detail, however one variant which it might be helpful to mention 
to briefly is the interpretation — put forward by Hacker — that a form of life should be 
understood to be a cultural rather than a biological entity.601 think that this distinction is 
spurious since — as we shall later — Wittgenstein regards it important to see language as 
extending our pre-conceptual lives. To be sure, what makes the human form of life 
different from animal forms is linguistic culture, but that does not mean that what is animal 
in our constitution is not also constitutive of our form of life.
59 And equally to the non-linguistic, animal forms o f life.
60 G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 
238-243. (Hackerl)
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Some authors61 have argued that we have to make a choice between the notion of a 
form of life as the mode of our life taken as a whole and the notion of it as some particular 
aspect o f our lives — such as hope — so that our form of life might be also be thought o f as a 
composite of such lesser forms. But, again, this seems spurious. ‘Form of life’ is not an 
explanatory concept but a guide to exploring the grammars of our concepts of life and 
language. There is no reason especially why we should not use it to refer either to the 
mode o f life taken as a whole or to an aspect of it — be it hope, intention or whatever. 
But for most purposes, we may take the form of life to be that larger framework of 
life,—the ‘given’ within which what is grounded or reasoned is generated.
The remaining uses of the phrase ‘form of life’ in Wittgenstein’s texts are as follows:
What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—-forms of life. (PI p. 226)
Instead of the unanalysable, specific, indefinable: the fact that we act in such-and-such 
ways, e.g. punish certain actions, establish the state of affair [sic] thus and so, give orders, 
render accounts, describe colours, take an interest in others’ feelings. What has to be 
accepted, the given -  it might be said -  are facts of living.62 (RPP1 630)
It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a 
language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And 
innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (PI 
19)
Here the term “language-#?/?/’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI 23)
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?”—It 
is what human beings sag that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use.
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI 241)
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of 
language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form 
of life.63 (PI p. 174)
I want to say: it is a feature of our language that it springs up / /  it grows / /  out of the 
foundations of forms of life, regular actions /  /  that it springs up from the soil of firm 
forms of life, regular forms of actions. (Nachlass, Vol. XV, 148)64
61 See Newton Garver, This Complicated Form of Life, (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994).
62 “Forms o f life” was a variant here. Trans.
63 In the Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psycholog}!, Volume 1, the variant is: ‘The signs of hope are modes of 
this complicated pattern o f life.’ (Lastl 365)
64 Ludwig Wittgenstein, from unpublished notes, Volume XV cited in ‘The Wittgenstein Papers’ by G. H. 
von Wright, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951, eds. J. C. Klagge and A. Nordmann, (Cambridge: Hackett, 
1993), pp. 480-506, here translated by G. P. Baker & P. M. S. Hacker in: Hackerl p. 242.
40
Closely related to ‘forms of life’ is the notion of ‘ways of living’ — which occurs as a 
variant in some texts:
I want to say: it is characteristic o f  our language that the foundation on which it grows 
consists in steady ways o f  living, regular ways o f  acting.65 (C&E p. 397)
And in a similar vein:
Language, I should like to say, relates to a way o f  living. (RFM p. 335)
Remarks identifying primitive linguistic reactions, woven together with characteristic 
forms of behaviour, as the cornerstones of language-games and which contribute to 
determining the nature of the language-game are scattered throughout the later work. 
These remarks are usually combined with references to the fact that the emergence of 
these reactions belongs to concept-formation, the quotation above from the Nachlass 
being an obvious example. The fullest treatment of this is to be found in the notes ‘Cause 
and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’, where Wittgenstein states the general point quite 
explicitly:
The origin and the primitive form o f  the language-game is a reaction; only from this 
can more complicated forms develop.
Language— I want to say— is a refinement. “In the beginning was the deed.”66 (C&E 
p. 395)
Elsewhere Wittgenstein uses the notion of ‘spontaneity’ to express the ungrounded, 
instinctive nature of the newly formed language-game, i.e. that the newly generated 
element is not anticipated in thought:
Something new (spontaneous, ‘specific5) is always a language-game. (PI p. 224)
W e decide on a new language-game.’
W e decide spontaneously’ (I should like to say) ‘on a new language-game.’ (RFM p.
236)
What is essential for us is, after all, spontaneous agreement, spontaneous sympathy.
(RPP2 699)
The following are perhaps some of the most striking instances of concrete examples of 
primitive reactions that go to form the foundations o f language-games:
....It is a help here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part 
that hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is— and so to
65cSteady ways o f living’ here refers to the instinctive regularity that belongs to the notion of rule following 
as explained previously.
66 Goethe, Faust I, opening scene in the Studierzimmer.
41
pay attention to other people’s pain-behaviour, as one does not pay attention to one’s 
own pain behaviour. (Z 540)
But what is the word “primitive” meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of 
behaviour is pre-linguistic. that a language-game is based on ity that it is a prototype of a 
way of thinking and not the result of thought (Z 541)
—Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many 
natural, instinctive, kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language 
is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is 
an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct). (Z 
545)
The contribution of sympathetic responses to the determination of the language-games 
of pain and sympathy is complemented in the first person by the replacement of 
expressions of pain by linguistic responses:
“So are you saying that the word ‘pain’ really means ‘crying’?”—On the contrary: the 
verbal expression replaces crying and does not describe it. (PI 244)
And again:
Primitive pain-behaviour is a sensation-behaviour; it gets replaced by a linguistic 
expression. “The word ‘pain’ is the name of a sensation” is equivalent to ‘“I’ve got a 
pain’ is an expression of sensation”. (RPP1 313)
Similarly:
What is the primitive reaction with which the language-game begins, which can then 
be translated into words such as “When this word occurred I thought of...”? How do 
people get to use these words? (LAST1 133)
“You said the word as if something different had suddenly occurred to you as you 
were saying it” One doesn’t learn this reaction.
The primitive reaction could also be a verbal one. (LAST1 134)
“The word is on the tip of my tongue.” What is going on in my consciousness? That is 
not the point at all. Whatever did go on was not what I meant by those words. It is of 
more interest what went on in my behaviour. What I said, which pictures I used, my 
facial expression. — “The word is on the tip of my tongue” is a verbal expression of 
what is also expressed, in a quite different way, by a particular kind of behaviour.
Again, ask for the primitive reaction that is the basis of the expression. (LAST1 828)
What is primitive to the language-game determines what kind of language-game it is. A 
reaction that is primitive to a language-game is always instinctive: a new language-game is 
not any newly contrived way o f speaking — such as might have been invented by giving a 
definition — since what is primitive to that will reside not in what is defined but in the 
terms of the definition. A genuinely new language-game will be irreducible, i.e. ‘specific’.67
67 PI p. 224.
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It is most important to note here that, in referring to specific reactions as determining 
the nature of a language-game, we have moved on in our conception of instinct as an 
element in the use of language.—We have passed from the notion of instinct as a way of 
expressing just the groundlessness of linguistic practice in general’ i.e. the groundless 
nature of rule following, to the notion that the specific characteristics o f a language-game are 
determined fundamentally by specific kinds of response which, in that role, are essentially 
instinctive or ungrounded, i.e. not the product o f thought The mode of these spontaneous 
responses is constitutive of the grammar of the concept.
As has already been noted, the most continuous treatment of this topic is to be found 
in the notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’. Here Wittgenstein describes a 
variety of primitive reactions which he identifies as being of the kind that belong to the 
origin of the language-game of cause and effect and language-games closely related to i t  
The remarks here are directed principally against the notion — which he finds in Russell — 
that the origin o f our language-game might be found in an intuition (which we might 
construe as a version of mentalism).—Wittgenstein holds that it is to be found in the 
reactions themselves:
i)
We react to the cause.
Calling something ‘the cause’ is like pointing and saying: ‘H e’s to blame!’
W e instinctively get rid o f  the cause if  we don’t want the effect. We instinctively look 
from what has been hit to what has hit it. (I am assuming we do this.) (C&E p. 373)
2)
[On cause and effect, intuitive awareness:]
A  sound seems to come from over there, even before I have investigated its (physical) 
source. In the cinema the sound o f  speech seems to com e from the mouth o f  the 
figures on the screen.
What does this experience consist in? Perhaps in the fact that we involuntarily look 
towards a particular spot— the apparent source o f  the sound— when we hear a sound.
And in the cinema no one looks towards where the microphone is.
The basic form  o f  our game must be one in which there is no such thing as doubt.—
What makes us sure o f  this? It can’t surely be a matter o f  historical certainty.
T h e  basic form o f  our game can’t include doubt.’ What w e are doing here above all is 
to imagine a basic form: a possibility, indeed a very important possibility. (We very often  
confuse what is an important possibility with historical reality.) (C&E p. 377)
3)
There is a reaction which can be called ‘reacting to the cause’.— W e also speak o f  
‘tracing’ the cause; a simple case would be, say, following a string to see who is pulling
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at it. If I then find him—how do I know that he, his pulling, is the cause of the 
string’s moving? Do I establish this by a series of experiments?
Someone has followed the string and has found who is pulling at it: does he make a 
further step in concluding: so that was the cause—or did he not just want to discover 
if someone, and if so who, was pulling at it? Let’s imagine once more a language-game 
simpler that the one we play with the word “cause”.
Consider two procedures: in the first somebody who feels a tug on a string, or has 
some similar sort of experience, follows the string—the mechanism—in this sense 
finds the cause, and perhaps removes it. He may also ask: “Why is this string moving?”, 
or something of the sort—-The second case is this: He has noticed that, since his 
goats have been grazing on that slope, they give less milk. He shakes his head, asks 
“Why?”—and then makes some experiments. He finds that such and such a fodder is 
the cause of the phenomenon.
In one case “He is the cause” simply means: be pulled the string. In the other case it 
means roughly: those are the conditions that I would have to change in order to get 
rid of this phenomenon.
“But then how did he come by the idea—how was it even possible to come by the 
idea—of altering the condition in order to get rid of such and such a phenomenon?
Surely that presupposes that he first of all senses there is some connection. Thinks 
there may be a connection: where no connection is to be seen. So he must already 
have got the idea of such a causal connection.” Yes, we can say it presupposes that he 
looks round for a cause; that he doesn’t attend to this phenomenon—but to another 
one.—  (C&E pp. 387-391)
4)
The primitive form of the language-game is certainty, not uncertainty. For uncertainty
could never lead to action The simple form (and that is the prototype) of the cause-
effect game is determining the cause, not doubting....The basic form of the game must 
be one in which we act. (C&E p. 397)
5> The game doesn’t begin with doubting whether someone has toothache, because that 
doesn’t—as it were—fit the game’s biological function in our life. In its most 
primitive form it is a reaction to somebody’s cries and gestures, a reaction of sympathy
or something of the sort “The game can’t begin with doubting” means: we
shouldn’t call it ‘doubting’, if the game began with it. (C&E pp. 381-383)
And another example of a primitive reaction which may anticipate a language-game:
You can ‘see the d<uck> and r<abbit> aspects’ only if you are thoroughly familiar 
with the shapes of those animals; the principal aspects of the double cross could 
express themselves in primitive reactions of a child who couldn’t yet talk. (Lastl 700)
In Chapter 5 I shall consider some criticisms of Wittgenstein which — on the basis of 
these and similar remarks — interpret him as holding a foundationaJist theory of 
concept-formation. My argument will be that this is not the correct interpretation. Closely
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related to this — and which has attracted similarly misguided comment — is Wittgenstein’s 
assertion that language-games may be viewed as extensions of primitive behaviour:
Believing that someone else is in pain, doubting whether he is, are so many natural 
kinds of behaviour towards other human beings; and our language is but an auxiliary 
to and extension of this primitive behaviour. I mean: our language is an extension of 
the more primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is a piece of behaviour.) (RPP1 
151; see also Z 545 and Z540 & 541 above.)
I can easily imagine that a particular primitive behaviour might later develop into a 
doubt. There is, e.g. a kind of primitive investigation. (An ape who tears apart a 
cigarette, for example. We don’t see an intelligent dog do such things.) The mere act 
of turning the object around and looking it over is a primitive root of doubt. But there 
is doubt only when the typical antecedents and consequences of doubt are present.
(RPP2 345)
In this way I should like to say the words “Oh, let him come!” are charged with my 
desire. And the words can be wrung from us,—like a cry. Words can be hard to say: 
such, for example, as are used to effect renunciation, or to confess a weakness. 
(Words are also deeds.) (PI 546; see also CV p. 46)
In these passages and elsewhere, I take the view that Wittgenstein does not mean that a 
concept is an extension of behaviour; rather, the behaviour — the character of which is 
pardy determined in the way that language and its concepts are integrated into it — may be 
seen as an extension of the more primitive, non-conceptual behaviour that precedes it. 
Thus the primitive behaviour o f the ape is the non-conceptual counterpart of that human 
behaviour in which doubt is expressed in both actions and words. T doubt’ is a deed of 
doubting.
Finally, we should not overlook the fact that for Wittgenstein instinct also plays an 
important part in the generation of philosophical difficulties:
We must not forget: even our more refined, more philosophical doubts have a 
foundation in instinct. E.g. that expressed in We can never know...’. Continuing 
accessibility to further arguments. We should find people to whom we could not teach 
this mentally inferior. Still incapable of forming a certain concept. (CV 73)
The fact that we use a word one way rather than another as a matter of course is o f the 
essence of the use of language; but the same force in other circumstances may drive us 
into philosophical difficulties. Philosophical investigation is there to guide us to a more 
orderly perception:
A philosophical question is similar to one about the constitution of a particular 
society.—And it would be as if a society came together without clearly written rules, 
but with a need for them; indeed also with an instinct according to which they 
observed /  /  followed//  certain rules at their meetings; but this is made difficult by the 
fact that nothing is clearly expressed about this and no arrangement is made which
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clarifies //brings out clearly// the rules. Thus they in fact view one of them as 
president, but he doesn’t sit at the head of the table and has no distinguishing marks, 
and that makes doing business difficult Therefore we come along and create a clear 
order: we seat the president in a clearly identifiable spot, seat his secretary next to him 
at a litde table of his own, and seat the other full members in two rows on both sides 
of the table, etc., etc. (BigT p. 173)
Approaching from the other direction, the fact o f a certain instinctive reaction may 
even give grounds for questioning the propriety of a line of philosophical inquiry:
Think of the uncertainty about whether animals, particularly lower animals, such as 
flies, feel pain.
The uncertainty whether a fly feels pain is philosophical; but couldn’t it also be 
instinctive? And how would that come out?
Indeed, aren’t we really uncertain in our behaviour towards animals? One doesn’t 
know: Is he being cruel or not? (RPP2 659)
For there is uncertainty of behaviour which doesn’t stem from uncertainty in thought.
(RPP2 660)
Ultimately our capacity to make headway in philosophy depends on our ambivalence 
towards our own instinctive relations to language:
People are deeply embedded in philosophical, i.e. grammatical confusions. And to free 
them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections 
they are caught up in. One must so to speak regroup their entire language.—But this 
language came about //developed// as it did because people had—and have—the 
inclination to think in this way. Therefore pulling them out only works with those 
who live in an instinctive state of rebellion against /  / dissatisfaction with/  /  language.
Not with those who following all their instincts live within the herd that has created 
this language as its proper expression./ (BigT p. 185)
Any account of our form of life must also reserve a space for the responses giving rise 
to philosophical problems and our reactions to them.
In this chapter I have traversed the majority of the explicit references to instinctive or 
primitive behaviour in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. Roughly speaking they 
divide between notions of the groundlessness of language use per se and the primitive 
reactions that determine the qualities of a language-game. However, in a very important 
sense these explicit references only represent the tip of the iceberg. In innumerable other 
contexts he describes, without using this explicit terminology, moves in language-games 
which belong to ‘the given’. These are facts of human behaviour which are fundamental 
determinants of the language-game and not intended for further explanation. For 
example:
“I have heard that he is coming; I have been waiting for him all day.” That is a report 
on how I have spent the day. In conversation I came to the conclusion that a
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particular event is to be expected, and I draw this conclusion in the words: “So now I 
must expect him to come”. This may be called the first thought, the first act, of this
expectation. The exclamation ‘Tm longing to see him!” may be called an act of
expecting. But I can utter the same words as the result of self-observation, and then 
they might mean: “So, after all that has happened, I am still longing to see him.” The 
point is: what led up to these words? (PI 586)
And there are many more examples. Identifying ‘the given’ is not always so easy. Indeed 
one of the primary skills of the philosopher is to be able to recognise it when it presents 
itself. It is evident that Wittgenstein himself experienced great difficulty both in resisting 
the temptation to look outside the realm of ‘the given’ and even in knowing where its 
boundary lies:
It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning.
And not try to go further back. (OC 471)
Hence:
Children do not leam that books exist, that armchairs exist, etc. etc.,—they learn to 
fetch books, sit in armchairs, etc. etc.
Later, questions about the existence of things do of course arise. “Is there such a 
thing as a unicorn?” and so on. But such a question is possible only because as a rule 
no corresponding question presents itself. For how does one know how to set about 
satisfying oneself of the existence of unicorns? How did one leam the method for 
determining whether something exists or not? (OC 476)
“So one must know that the objects whose names one teaches a child by an ostensive 
definition exist.”—Why must one know they do? Isn’t it enough that experience 
doesn’t later show the opposite?
For why should the language-game rest on some kind of knowledge? (OC 477)
4 ~ Conclusion
The sense in which language is grounded in instinct, and which I have described as ‘the 
groundlessness of language in general’, has been explained in this chapter principally by 
reference to, and in terms of, the ‘blindness’ o f rule following. This approach is all right 
as far as it goes but, as I have also forewarned in the previous chapter, it is a perspective 
that has the limitation o f presenting the use of language as essentially the exercise o f a 
technique. This will not do as an account of what it is to speak a language and so will not 
do as an account of what it is to possess concepts. Hence it will also not yield a rounded 
presentation of the groundless nature of our grasp o f concepts, if only because it does 
not show enough of what is grasped.—The model of rule-following does not take us far 
enough. The next chapter is devoted principally to rectifying this shortcoming.
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Chapters 5 to 7 turn to the development of the other main aspect of the instinctive 
nature of language, namely its role in concept-formation and the sense in which language 
and its concepts may be regarded as an extension o f our form of life. This investigation 
begins with an examination of some of the difficulties that other authors have found in 
this idea, and then goes on to look in more detail at some more specific examples: 
subjective concepts in Chapter 6, and the concepts o f knowledge and certainty in Chapter 
7. The latter also introduces another element and shows how the groundlessness o f the 
use of language per se is itself an element in the formation of the concepts of knowledge 
and certainty.
The final chapter, from the perspectives developed in the previous chapters, returns us 
to an examination of the difficulties that we experience with our concepts in philosophy.
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Chapter 4 ~  Concepts, Speaking and Persons.
1 ~ Introduction
I explained in Chapter 2 that Rhees detected in Wittgenstein’s thinking an inclination 
(at times, at least) to think of the use of language — or speaking a language — as essentially 
the exercise of a technique. I argued there that such a tendency goes with the idea that in 
philosophy it may be sufficient for the purpose of giving an account of the grammar of a 
concept to describe — from an external point of view — its relations to other concepts. The 
riposte was that the elucidation of the grammar of a concept in philosophy trades on an 
understanding of the concept itself. This is because our difficulty arises within our 
understanding of the concept, so that what is required is that we see more clearly, 
explicitly and internally, the connections o f sense between our concepts. This falls outside 
the realm of purely external observation of how various expressions are normally used in 
connection with one another.
In this chapter I intend to revisit Rhees’ objection from a different point of view; 
indeed from the point o f view that he himself develops most thoroughly. Rhees’ thoughts 
on this have been followed up recently by Raimond Gaita,68 and so I shall draw on both 
of these sources. The essence of Rhees’ position is that the concept o f a person and the 
concept of language — or of speaking a language — are mutually constitutive. We may 
therefore approach the one from the direction of the other: we may try to understand the 
nature of a person better by seeing how life is transformed and extended in the use of 
language; conversely, we may try to understand language better by seeing how it partakes 
of and extends the qualities that are definitive of ourselves as persons. It is upon the 
second of these alternatives that we shall focus for the present. Put into the language of 
grammatical elucidation, we need to see how far the concept of language is constituted in 
its relations to the concept of a person.
Rhees’ principal tool for introducing this element into the discussion of the nature of 
language lies in the way he distinguishes between operating a system of signals and having 
something to say.— Only a person can say anything. Coming to have things to say is o f the 
nature of the coming into being of ourselves as persons. So if we have not investigated
68 Raimond Gaita, ‘Language and Conversation: Wittgenstein’s Builders’, in Wittgenstein Centenary Essays, ed. 
A. Philips Griffiths, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 101-115. (Gaita)
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how speaking is a manifestation of person-hood, then we will have overlooked something 
that is fundamental to the nature of language.
We may begin by looking at how Rhees works his way towards this position starting 
from a consideration of Wittgenstein’s discussions o f language-games.
2 ~ Wittgenstein’s Builders
In Chapter 3 I presented Wittgenstein’s simple, builders’ language-games at the 
beginning of the Philosophical Investigations as essentially devices for breaking up some 
common assumptions about the how language works and how it relates to our mental 
life. Whether these language-games should be taken as the foundations of a general 
account of language is less certain. It is true that such an interpretation does seem to 
agree with some o f Wittgenstein’s more generally expressed views about language. It is 
also true that Rhees saw them in this light. But it is not my interest here to try to settle 
just how far Wittgenstein might have been aware o f their limitations as models. The real 
value of Rhees’ presentation of them is just that it leads on in a convenient way to the 
richer conception of the nature of language that he wishes to develop. Moreover, there is 
also no doubt that this richer conception is derived from nowhere other than 
Wittgenstein’s own discussions. So it is fitting that we should try to advance his insights 
in this area by beginning with what he himself might well have regarded as ‘eggshells 
from the old view’.69
Rhees holds that Wittgenstein should be regarded from the outset as wanting to give an 
account of what it is to speak a language.70 He makes a start on this at the beginning of the 
Philosophical Investigations by showing, contra Augustine, the variety of things we do with 
language and the variety of ways in which we connect it up amongst ourselves and with 
the world about us. He begins by imagining very simple language-games used by builders 
on a building site, the builders having no other language than the one they use on the site; 
and he insists that this might be the whole o f their language. This is where Rhees’ 
difficulties start; for if the language-games are to illustrate speaking, they must themselves 
be bona fide examples of speaking a language. Rhees’ feeling is that they are not, and he 
argues that the language-games are so impoverished that what would make them
69 CV p. 44.
70 Rhees3 p. 82.
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illustrative o f speaking is no longer in view. What were supposed to be examples of 
language are nothing but a system of signals.71
Rhees develops this distinction between speaking and merely using a system of signals 
along two avenues, which he weaves closely together. The first, which he describes as his 
‘chief difficult/, is that there is no room for a distinction between sense and nonsense.72 
The second is that the games cannot show what it is to have ‘something to say’, or to 
recognise others as having things to say, in short, what it is to converse.11 What 
Wittgenstein describes is just a routine: if the use of one of the signals is out of place, or 
if an unaccustomed signal is used, then this might cause confusion, but the confusion is 
not the confusion or uncertainty over the sense of a remark, it is simply confusion in the 
face o f a departure from what is normally done.74 This is not sufficient to attract the 
range of concepts that belong to treating an utterance as having or lacking sense. Neither 
does it add up to the individuals making sensible conversation. Without these they are 
not speaking and cannot be said to be using language.
That finding sense in a remark cannot be reduced to following the purely functional 
aspect of the use o f a word is shown principally by drawing attention to the difference it 
makes that the Vords’ are not used in just one situation but are employed elsewhere:
The meaning they have within this game is not to be seen simply in what we do with
them or how we react to them in this game remarks could have no bearing on one
another unless the expressions they used were used in other connexions as well. 
(Rhees3 p. 79).
Rhees is careful to avoid confusing the meaning that the words have in a given situation 
with the function they have there,—even in a language-game where they do also function 
in a practical way, or are a part o f achieving some ‘common enterprise’.75 Unless the 
utterances have a use elsewhere they are not Vords’ at all; it is not as a word that an 
utterance can have a function unless it has a meaning established in a different kind of 
context. Gaita concurs:
We do things with words—we have words to do things with—only because we do more 
with them than achieve our purposes. (Gaita p. 108)
71 Ibid. pp. 76-77.
72 Ibid. p. 77.
73 Ibid. p. 81.
74 Ibid. p. 77.
75 Gaita p. 103 ff.
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Distinguishing the sense or otherwise o f what is said — or even trying to make sense at 
all — belongs to the life that is ‘penetrated by speech’.76 And the principal manifestation of 
a life being ‘penetrated by speech’, and so of words being used ‘elsewhere’, is seen in the 
way that words are used in conversation. Conversation may of course occur either within or 
independently of concrete situations. But the important point surely is that there is a 
conversational dimension, o f which it is essential that beyond merely achieving our 
purposes we have ‘something to say’ to one another.— In language we articulate our 
thoughts and ideas, and an essential feature of that lies in the striving to make and to 
recognise sense and in ‘the connectedness of what we say to one another’.77 The growth 
of conversation is of a piece with learning Vhat it makes sense to say’78 and with looking 
for the sense in and trying to make sensible connections between remarks; it is in 
conversation that the distinction between sense and nonsense has its home.
It is essential to this account that the notions of having something to say and of 
distinguishing sense from nonsense are seen to go hand in hand with that of forming 
concepts. This also bears on what is meant by saying that language must be used ‘elsewhere’ 
than in purely purposive employments. For when we say that words are used ‘elsewhere’, 
this means not just that they have a greater quantity of use but that they have a use which 
is in important respects independent o f such employments; and one way of expressing this 
independence is to say that this use expresses not functions but concepts. This is not to say 
that the concepts we have are not in the end answerable to the contexts in which they 
have their natural home; nor that it is not essential to language that words have practical 
consequences which may indeed be illustrated in a very elementary way by Wittgenstein’s 
builders’ language-games. Rather, it says that having a concept, as opposed to merely 
having a system of signals, lies in having the kind of relation to our utterances which we 
might call the ‘articulation o f ideas’ which goes beyond the practical application in any 
given situation. Hence when we do bring words to a situation, they are brought in with an 
understanding of their sense, this having already been established in that other dimension 
o f  use. This other dimension is something that is in its nature developed within the 
conversational mode.
Understanding the central point here means recognising that there is a kind o f 
understanding that belongs with the notions o f conversation, sense, nonsense, ‘having 
something to say’, and so on, which is different in grammar to — and hence irreducible to
76 Ibid. p. 103.
77 Ibid. p. 103.
78 Rhees3 p. 79.
52
— any notion of understanding that can be explained in terms of the grasp of functions 
alone. Once this is realised and accepted, the main point has been made. Giving a 
satisfying rendition of this difference, on the other hand, is — for reasons already given — 
elusive and necessarily highly circular. So some more effort in this direction may be 
warranted.
When the child learns to speak he is not just imitating what the adult is doing; he is 
learning to speak back at the adult. In taking from the adult he is feeding what we might 
call his own Vill to speak’. Watching a child learning to speak is watching the emergence 
of a person, not the development of a skilled activity. From the start he is trying to speak 
for himself; and his trying to tell us things and his trying to make sense of the things that 
are being said to him emerge spontaneously out o f his efforts to relate to other speakers.79 
Rhees mentions the connection between language and thinking in his Preface to the Blue and 
Brown Books,m and it might make more vivid the general point being made here if we 
remind ourselves that the child is learning to think — to think about itself, to think about 
what is going on around it, to think about others and to tell others about these things. All 
of this belongs to the circumstances in which the child is trying to make sense of the 
world about it and to engage coherently with the constantly changing environment in 
which it finds itself. The child’s learning to speak and its coming to find its place in the 
wodd are the same.— The use of language is expressive of and integral to being a 
thinking, willing subject.
In coming to have things to say, the whole o f the child’s orientation towards the people 
about him is under transformation. He is acquiring the attitude towards the adult which is 
not the attitude towards someone showing him how to get things done but is the attitude 
towards someone who is telling him things. And when the child himself speaks, he expects 
a response in kind from the adult;—he is treating the adult as someone who is listening to 
what he has to say. More generally, we may say he is acquiring an attitude towards 
himself, or a sense of himself, as someone to whom others can speak and expect a 
sensible reply and who can speak to others and expect the same.81
The way in which inter-personal attitudes illuminate ‘having something to s a /  might be 
made clearer by considering an objection. The connection between trying to make sense 
and the notion that the use of language is an expression of the life of a person is
79 Ibid. pp. 79 & 82.
80 Rush Rhees, ‘Preface’ to BB, pp. v-xiv. (RheesBB)
81 Rhees3 p. 79; Rush Rhees, ‘Can there be a Private Language?’, in Discussions of Wittgenstein, (London: 
Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1970), p. 67.
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characterised again by Gaita in terms of the way that the individual’s ‘humanity’ shows in 
his relation to language. His way of expressing this point arises out of his criticisms of 
Normal Malcolm’s attempts to show that, in spite of the impoverished nature of their 
language’, Wittgenstein’s builders are talking sense after all.82 Without increasing their 
vocabulary, Malcolm attempts to circumvent the criticisms of Wittgenstein by painting a 
picture o f the builders which shows them more as people with a life than as the 
‘marionettes’ that Rhees judges them to be.83 Gaita’s response is to agree that injecting 
humanity into the situation is needed, but that this must manifest itself in their having 
things to say and in their trying to talk sense. Gaita concludes:
He [Malcolm] gives some eloquent examples of their humanity, but he fails to connect 
their humanity to their speech: it remains external to it. Everything that displays their 
humanity fails to enter their supposed speech and vice versa. The chuckling, the head 
slapping and so on in Malcolm’s example, do not alter the unrelievedly purposive 
character of the builder’s utterances of ‘Slab’, ‘Beam’, etc. That is the deep lesson of 
Malcolm’s failure. (Gaita p. 108)
Gaita then develops this thought by considering whether a machine might ever 
speak.— Unless a machine has a life like ours in which speech has a comparable place, 
then whatever they may do they are not speaking. In the course of the discussion he refers 
to Wittgenstein’s remark: ‘My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not 
of the opinion that he has a soul’.84 Wittgenstein introduces this in a discussion of how 
psychological concepts have a place in our lives. But it may be generalised, for one 
manifestation of the attitude towards a soul is the recognition of others as fellow speakers 
in the way that we engage with them in our speech, in our trying to understand them in 
what they have to say to us.
I started by saying that Rhees followed two closely woven themes. If we are using a 
genuine language and not merely a system of signals, then we have things to say. This has to 
do with that fact that the use of language is not just a tool which we become skilled in the 
use of, but is integral to our constitution as persons; having things to say is a primary 
expression o f this. In the second place, it is essential to this that what we say has 
sense,—which is different from merely having a function. This goes with the fact that in 
language we form concepts and express thoughts and ideas. There is sense and meaning 
only when words run through our lives in every direction and in all kinds of
82 Norman Malcolm, Tanguage game (2)’, in Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars, eds. D. Z. Phillips & P. 
Winch, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 35-44.
83 Rhees3 p. 83.
84 PI p. 178.
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circumstances, when they are used in all kinds of connection with one another, and when 
this is at the service of ‘having something to say’. Making sense is not merely a matter of 
determining what is allowed in the language or with ‘the correct use of various 
expressions’:85
But Vhat it makes sense to say’ is not ‘the sense that expressions have’. It has more to 
do with what it makes sense to answer or what it makes sense to ask, or what sense 
one remark may have in connection with another. (Rhees3 p. 80)
Recognising that a child is growing in its having things to say, and not just signalling its 
wishes, desires or intentions, goes with the observation that it is getting to be able to 
handle just such connection making between sensible remarks.86 And the context for 
recognising this lies in seeing the way that the development o f language goes with the 
development of the life of the child. Gaita sums it up: ‘having something to say* is ‘living 
a life and speaking out of it’.87 When we have grasped the difference between this and 
what we observe in the efforts of the builders on Wittgenstein’s building site, we will see, 
firstly, how ‘our lives are penetrated by speech’ and, secondly, how it is not speech unless 
it does penetrate our lives in this way. Only then do utterances have sense and are there 
relations of sense between utterances.
3 ~ Speaking and Knowledge of Grammar
Speaking a language is not the same as being in command of a technique, or of 
communicating by signals alone. Armed with a richer understanding of what this 
observation amounts to, we may now return to the question of how we make clear to 
ourselves in philosophy the grammars o f our concepts.
Earlier I argued that the conception of language as a purely functional system of signals 
lends itself to the incoherent idea that the workings of language may be completely 
described from an external point o f view — just like any other fact in the world. On the 
contrary, whereas the grammars of our expressions and language-games do have aspects 
which may be described externally, the understanding of the grammars of our concepts 
that we wish for in philosophy is one which takes for granted that the language-game and 
its concepts are already understood. Therefore a different kind of relation is involved,—one 
which is not reducible to the external relation of observer to fact Hence, I distinguished
85 Rhees3 p. 80.
86 Ibid. p. 80.
87 Gaita p. 110-111.
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between external and internal accounts of the grammars of our concepts and the 
expressions used to articulate them.
Now this ‘different kind of relation’ applies not only to the philosopher’s relation to 
language, but to the speaker’s relation to language and its concepts too. But here we must 
be careful not to suppose that all we have to do to complete the account, and to avoid 
the error of thinking that the use of language is just the operation of a technique, is to 
argue that language really is essentially a system of rules or propositions but one having a 
special place in our lives,—one that penetrates our lives and is operated ‘from the midst’, 
unlike any other skill. On this basis, the ‘understanding’ that the philosopher presupposes 
would simply be a knowledge of the linguistic rules ‘from the inside’ (i.e. the ability to 
apply them) to supplement to the knowledge of their external manifestations. Rather, we 
will see that it follows on from the previous discussions that different concepts stand in 
quite different relations to us as speakers according to how the grasp of them enters our 
speech and our lives. It will then follow naturally that if concepts belong to our 
understanding in different ways, then the treatment of them in philosophy should reflect 
those differences. This will apply most markedly to those concepts — and their congeners 
— that are directly to do with the use of language. I shall argue that the grasp of their 
grammars lies not so much in the grasp of the use of any words in particular but in our 
whole relation to language. Hence we will need to acknowledge a different conception of the 
knowledge of the grammar of a concept than we are used to in philosophy,—one that 
will amount to much more than an understanding of the rule governing the use of any 
one or set of expressions.
Again we may approach this by taking a step back, beginning with Rhees’ treatment o f 
it in his Preface to the Blue and Brown Books, where he traces right through to the Investigations 
the transitions in Wittgenstein’s views of the nature of language and of what 
philosophical difficulties have to do with language.
Over the course of this period Wittgenstein’s views on these topics underwent 
considerable development. And yet much of the motivation behind Rhees’ attack on the 
examples of language-games in the Investigations comes from his feeling that they show 
that Wittgenstein has still not completely shaken off those earlier attitudes towards 
language, and hence towards the nature o f philosophical problems themselves. Rhees’ 
concern is with the continuing resurfacing of this remnant o f the earlier view in the later 
work, and so for the sake of making the clearest contrast I shall focus on the most 
unequivocal expression of it which is to be found in the Blue Book.
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In the Blue Book Wittgenstein has arrived at the idea of philosophical confusions as 
confusions of the grammars of particular expressions. These confusions may take 
different forms. For instance, the idea of the meaning of a word as a mental entity is an 
example o f the confusion of looking for a ‘thing’ to correspond to a substantive, whilst 
the difficulties we feel about time may come from confusing the grammar of measuring 
time with that of measuring length. Words that give rise to special difficulties are often 
what Wittgenstein calls ‘odd job’ words, of which ‘meaning’ is again an example. These 
cause trouble because we do not recognise the irregular way in which they function but 
see a law in the way they are used.88 Roughly speaking, then, the conception of 
grammatical confusion here is on the model o f entanglement in the rules governing the 
moves within a game or technique.89
These are, o f course, illustrations of philosophical difficulties that are confusions to do 
with language, but Rhees notes that when Wittgenstein asks what leads people to treat 
expressions in these ways his answer is ‘the craving for generality’. This attitude manifests 
itself, for example, in ‘the tendency to look for something in common to all the entities 
subsumed under a general term’,90 or in the way we are tempted to employ the methods 
of science in responding to philosophical questions.91 And the point of Rhees’ drawing 
attention to this is to suggest that Wittgenstein has not advanced beyond thinking of the 
root o f philosophical difficulty as lying in an attitude that is not in itself ‘specially 
connected with language’.92
The reason why Wittgenstein is not able to make this step, I would suggest, lies directly 
in the influence o f the functional view of language and in the technical perspective on the 
grammars of expressions that is closely relate to it. For if language is conceived of as an 
operating system which we ‘confront’ — that is, as essentially an empirical object — then it 
is perhaps natural to suppose that confusions about these expressions originate in some 
general habit of thought rather than in something intrinsic to our relations to language, 
i.e. intrinsic to how our lives are ‘penetrated’ by it.
Now we do not have to deny for a moment that many philosophical problems have 
their origins with particular expressions, and that we can examine these troublesome 
expressions from the point of view of the techniques for using them — as Rhees himself
88 BB pp. 43-4.
89 Cf. PI 125.
90 BB p. 17.
91 BB p. 18.
92 RheesBB p. xi.
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does.93 What we find problematic may often be satisfactorily exposed and disposed of in 
this way. But one consequence of observing the difference between the ‘technique centred’ 
and the ‘person centred’ conceptions of speaking is that we can no longer assume that 
the grammar of a concept can be reviewed merely by reference to the rules governing the 
application of the expressions corresponding to it. For this will depend on the relation 
between any such rules and those larger relations to language exhibited in the life of a 
person who can speak. A clearer view of what it is to speak a language will show us that 
lying behind such confusions with linguistic expressions is a confusion about language 
that is not grammatical confusion in the narrow sense94 but is a confusion stemming from 
a rather more direct kind of misapprehension of what our relation to language is and of 
how it penetrates our lives. It is here that we do find a source for our perplexity that is 
‘specially connected with language’.
Rhees remarks that ‘misunderstandings of the logic of language’ — by which he does not 
just mean problems with the technique for using its expressions — express perplexity ‘as 
to whether something can be said or not’, and he goes on:
It is a confusion or uncertainty connected with being able to speak, and so perhaps 
with learning to speak: a confusion in connexion with what it is that one was learning 
as one learned to speak: with what saying something is and what understanding is.
This sort of confusion or uncertainty (which is not just a confusion of the grammars 
of particular expressions) has led men to the scepticism which runs in one way or 
another into all the big questions of philosophy. (Rhees3 p. 74)
This is spelled out again in Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse:
If language really were a technique, then the problems of philosophy might seem to be 
confusions between different parts of the technique. And it is plain that it is not that.
If it were, there would be no connexion between philosophy and scepticism. You 
should not understand what was meant by the notion of the distrust of understanding.
And certainly we could not understand why philosophy should have been thought as 
important as it has; or why the problems of philosophy should have distressed people 
in the measure that they have. (Rheesl p. 112)95
The difference between this kind of confusion and what he calls ‘the confusion of the 
grammars of particular expressions’ is one that may be observed especially in our 
relations to the concepts that are to do with language and speaking, the contexts in which we 
can be said to have these and related concepts, and how having these differs from having
93 Rhees3 p. 80.
941 say ‘not grammatical confusion in the narrow sense’, since, as I shall argue, the confusion I am trying to 
give some account o f may also, from certain points o f view, be called ‘grammatical confusion’.
95 See also Rheesl, Chapter 13, “Philosophy, life and language’.
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others. So we need to focus our attention now on the nature of our possession of these 
concepts.
If a child can speak at all, there all kinds of observations we might make about him. 
Here we may recall some of the responses characteristic of being able to speak: we see 
that he recognises that he is being spoken to; we see that he is trying to tell us something; 
we see that he believes or is doubtful about something he is being told; we see that he 
knows that he is being told to do something; we see him express frustration at being 
misunderstood or with his inability to express himself clearly; we may see that he is not 
sure what we mean by saying something; or again, we may see his recognition that what 
someone says doesn’t make sense. In each case we are thinking of various modes in the 
child’s relations to language; but importantly we are not thinking expressly of his grasp of 
the technique for using any particular expressions.96 Now although we are not thinking of 
his competence in the use o f any such expressions, I shall argue that there does remain a 
sense in which, in talking of these relations to language, we are talking of something that 
is integral to the child’s grasp of the concepts we are using to characterise those relations, 
namely the concepts of speaking, telling, believing, meaning, etc. In the child’s very entry 
into sensible discourse, and in its ability to handle conversation, it shows that it is 
beginning to get hold of these concepts. Getting hold of them belongs to ‘being able to 
speak’.
One may feel uneasy with the suggestion that the first steps in understanding these 
concepts is constituted in forming such relations and being able to handle language in these 
ways. But the sense in speaking in this way lies in the fact that their formation is not just 
part o f the development of a competency but clearly belongs to the understanding of 
language taken as a whole.— It is integral to the ‘making sense of the world’ that is 
emerging in the child’s coming to have things to say about it. There are also important 
continuities between the formation of these relations and a more typical notion of what 
having such concepts amounts to. Indeed I will argue that there is a priority here. 
Forming these concepts begins in the way that we make these distinctions as part of 
coming to be able to speak, and only shows itself secondarily as something articulated in 
speech — in their explicit application. For one can surely only begin to employ expressions 
such as ‘speaking’, ‘meaning’, etc., as an extension of circumstances where the kinds of 
relations to language that I have referred to are already in evidence. What I shall refer to, 
therefore, as our primary understanding of these concepts is presupposed.
96 Rhees3 p. 82.
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I should perhaps emphasise again here that I do not mean to diminish the part played 
in having these concepts that the various expressions like ‘sense’, ‘nonsense’, ‘speaking’, 
‘meaning’, etc., are worked into conversation, and that many of the activities of correcting 
their use, which are shared with any other word or expression, will be present. I am 
arguing that what we leam when we acquire these concepts cannot be made intelligible 
from the point of view alone of a mastery of a technique for applying such expressions 
within a language-game.— In these respects having these concepts differs from, say, 
having the concepts ‘game’, or ‘lemon’, or ‘sitting down’ — to use Rhees’ examples.97 
There is a different concept of understanding here, and I believe it is this that he has in 
mind when he says:
We could say that someone knows the grammar of ‘language’, or knows what 
language is, if he has learned to speak. (Rhees2 p. 47)
This is where the analogy between explaining games and explaining language comes to 
an end. And it suggests that we may find the root o f philosophical perplexity about 
language, and the like, as being to do with this primary understanding, to which 
‘confusions of the grammars of particular expressions’ may be only secondary.
To develop this argument further, I should like to say a little more about the nature of 
this primary understanding of our concepts, firstly by looking more closely at an example, 
and then by relating this to the question o f how the expressions corresponding to the 
concepts (‘meaning’, ‘speaking’, etc.) do in fact have meaning. The concepts that I wish to 
give special attention to here are belief 2nd time.
4 ~ The Grammar of ‘Belief
A child learns to express beliefs as he learns to speak In learning to talk in elementary 
ways about things in his life, and in learning to follow the things that are said to him, the 
child is beginning to express beliefs and to recognise others’ expressions of belief. The 
expression o f belief is a mode in the use o f language that the child acquires spontaneously 
as he is learning to speak. We might say that the use o f words to express beliefs is primitive 
to the use o f language.— Clearly there could be no such thing as the child beginning by 
having belief explained to him; the child could only follow an explanation if he were 
already in some command of this way o f using words. Neither could belief emerge
97 Ibid. pp. 46 & 49.
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directly out of training. No doubt there are functional relations between utterances and 
actions which are relevant to understanding what belief is. But, as I have argued, the child 
is not just learning to perform certain operations: learning to express beliefs belongs to 
the emergence of the child’s having anything at all to say, and to seeing others as having 
things to say. It is in the context o f these growing connections that it makes sense to say 
— and indeed I think we would say — that the child who is learning to express beliefs is 
coming to know or to understand what belief is and is beginning to form a concept of it 
in a way that we would not say that one of Wittgenstein’s builders is coming to know what 
signalling is.
This will emerge more clearly if we look at the way that these surroundings lie behind 
the explicit application o f the concept. For it is here that the continuity I spoke of earlier, 
between this understanding and understanding ‘the grammar of particular expressions’, 
becomes important.
It is certainly true, as I have said, that much of what we might call ‘knowing the 
grammar of “belief” might be understood in terms of knowing the techniques for 
applying the concept. It will lie, for example, in being able to make elementary checks of 
whether someone really does believe what they are saying, or in knowing the grounds for 
challenging and questioning beliefs, or in being able to say why a belief is unreasonable, 
and so on. Much of this might be taught — or certainly developed — by explanation. But 
learning to apply the concept in these ways depends on and is pervaded by the kinds of 
relations to language that I have been trying to illustrate.
This dependence is internal. For a start, any applications of the concept will depend on 
the things that are said being understood,,98 and that already means standing in a relation to 
them as to expressions o f belief. In certain circumstances we may, o f course, be unsure 
whether a proposition is being used to express a belief. These are the circumstances in 
which we may resort to criteria to make a decision. Moreover, because we may 
understand the proposition before we ask whether as a matter of fact it is being used to 
express a belief, this may suggest that the grammars of the concepts o f proposition and 
belief are not shared but ‘fif one another — to use one of Wittgenstein’s metaphors." But 
it does not follow from the fact that we may often find ourselves in such circumstances, 
that we can understand propositions in general independently of what it is for them to 
express beliefs. For the circumstances in which we apply such criteria cannot be the 
circumstances in which the concepts ‘proposition’ and ‘belief are determined. For
98 Ibid. p. 83.
" P I 136.
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example, we cannot introduce belief into the life of the child, or convey to him what 
belief is, by introducing him firstly to propositions (and explaining their sense) and only 
later showing him how to use them to express beliefs, if only because unless that is 
grasped at the same time he will not have been introduced to propositions and in making 
‘utterances’ he will not be saying anything.
What is central to recognising an utterance as an expression of belief is already achieved 
if we have understood what is said. It is therefore fundamental to our primary 
recognition o f expressions o f belief that we do so without making a judgement that ‘here is 
a belief, or, in the primary instance of where we do make such a judgement, without the 
employment of criteria. Without the primacy of such recognition, the application of the 
concept would in any case be empty; or at least it would only be the concept of an 
external property o f utterances, and therefore of an external or functional relation 
between utterances and actions. Hence it belongs to my grasp o f the meaning of the 
word ‘belief that I can express beliefs when I speak and that I understand what I am 
being told when I am spoken to. This is why I say that the relation between the two is an 
internal one, and it justifies the claim that the relations to language that come directly 
with my ability to speak constitute part of my primary understanding of the concept of 
belief.
I believe that Wittgenstein is touching on a similar point when he remarks:
One does not leam to obey a rule by first learning the use of the word “agreement”.
Rather, one learns the meaning of “agreement” by learning to follow a rule.
If you want to understand what it means “to follow a rule”, you have already to be
able to follow a rule. (RFM p.405)
Being able to follow a rule here is not merely a condition without which you would not 
be able to leam that expression,—in the sense of needing to have an outward 
acquaintance with the thing to which the word applies. Nor is it meant in the trivial sense 
that learning any expression means being able to follow rules. Rather, ‘already to be able 
to follow a rule’ — having that relation to language — is itself partly constitutive of having 
the concept o f a rule. That is why we leam the meaning of ‘agreemenf by learning to 
follow a rule.
Similar considerations apply, I would argue, to recognising that one is being spoken to; 
or being unsure what something means; or recognising that one has failed or succeeded 
in understanding something, etc. Again our primary understanding of the respective
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concepts shows in the overall manner of our linguistic responses rather than in the 
employment o f the corresponding expressions as such.
In conclusion, we may contrast this kind of understanding — which in an important 
sense still belongs to an understanding o f the grammar of the concept — with what Rhees 
calls ‘the grammars of particular expressions’, which, roughly speaking, refers to anything 
that might be imparted by means of definition, training or demonstration, or through any 
account o f the grammar o f the concept that takes for granted our primary understanding 
of it.100 Knowing the grammar of ‘belief — and related concepts — has a dimension that is 
significandy lacking in the case of ‘games’, for example, which arguably amounts to litde 
more than knowing in what circumstances we call things games and the difference it 
makes to other things that are said and done that we call something a game.
5 ~ The Grammar of *Time ’
I have suggested that parallel to what is particular in the way we possess the concepts to 
do with language are differences in how the expressions corresponding to them have 
meaning.
The kind of relationship that holds between the ability to speak and the use of 
expressions like ‘belief or ‘rule’ carries with it that their meanings are related in a quite 
different way to the employments of language in connection with which we use them 
than is the meaning of ‘game’, for example, to the playing o f games (and the language 
that goes with it). To illustrate this, Rhees contrasts the grammar of ‘reading’ — one of 
Wittgenstein’s own examples101 — with that o f ‘sitting down’. In the case of ‘reading’ we 
cannot point to examples o f it and hope thereby to explain its meaning. He remarks:
And it is true that we cannot point to what is really meant. But not because it is 
hidden from us. It is hard to give an account of ‘reading’, for instance, because its 
meaning lies in the language-game in which we use it. As one cannot say this about 
‘sitting down’. All the puzzling words we study here are words having to do with the 
grammar of ‘language’. (Rhees2 p. 49)
Here I am going to assume that what Rhees calls ‘lying in the language-game’ would 
encompass the relations to the language-game that I have been describing in connection 
with belief, and would apply generally to the concepts to do with language that I have 
been discussing. However, the principle also applies, mutatis mutandis, to those other kinds
100 See Rhees2 pp. 48-49, for example.
101 PI 156-171.
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of concepts that I have referred to such as cause, time and psychological concepts. So we 
may examine the example that Rhees himself refers to: time.™2
When a child is learning to express an intention, hope or expectation, or to anticipate 
an event; or if we see that it knows it has to wait for something to happen or for 
someone to do something; or if it is learning to recall and recount something that 
happened the day before, or is learning to tell the time; or if it is remembering it has to do 
something;—in all o f these things, and many more, it is learning the various ways of 
expressing temporal relations and is on the way to forming a concept of time. This does 
not stop, of course, with these isolated situations; and if all that we describe is its 
engagement in such language-games conceived of as complete units in themselves, we 
will not have described its grasp of the concept of time proper. That would only come in 
the way the child showed itself capable of talking continuous sense expressing 
appreciation of past, future and present. For example, if the child’s ability to make 
connections between different remarks in different contexts in respect of their temporal 
content were constantly breaking down, then I think we would say that this represented a 
fault in the child’s grasp of the concept time. We might express the general point by saying 
that possession of the concept of time is manifested in the ability to pass freely between 
the various language-games in respect of their temporal content. Our grasp of the 
concept is pervasive of our speech, so pervasive in fact that it enters our speech just 
about every time we open our mouths.
Turning to the use o f the word ‘time’, I show that I know the full import of its meaning 
in the way that I am able to use it in connection with the fact of my talking continuous 
sense in contexts where temporal conceptions are embedded. If you can talk sense in 
such circumstances then you can follow the sense that I talk and see whether I am able to 
use the word ‘time’ correctly in these connections. This, I think, is the only kind context 
in which we can talk in any comprehensive way of my having grasped what the word 
‘time’ means, and so it follows that the word’s meaningful use is responsible to the 
concept as it is thus grasped and expressed. It cannot be done merely by pointing to 
something or giving a rule or definition for the use of the word; none of these would be 
of any use unless the concept had already been grasped.
The expression o f the concept time in general conversation is prior to the meaningful 
use o f the expression ‘time’, just as those relations to language which constitute our 
primary understanding of the concepts generally to do with language are prior to our
102 Rhees2 p. 49.
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employment of the corresponding expressions. So it is only by connection with these 
manifestations of the concepts in our speech that we can speak of the expressions having 
meaning; and it is the office of these expressions to bring into the foreground, and to 
articulate, concepts which are already at work in our speech or in the way we handle 
language. The accountability o f the use of the word ‘time’ to what is already established in 
our speech is, I think, reflected in Rhees’ remark:
It may never have struck me before that some form of language—say geometry— 
does or could belong to the ‘meaning’ of ‘time’. (Which helps to show the sense of 
T)on’t look for the meaning, look at die use.3) This is not like the uncertainty of 
borderline or doubtful cases—Would you still call that a dwelling house?’. Would you 
still call that a fruit?’—where the answer may be: ‘As you like.’ (Rhees2 p. 49)
The meanings of the words ‘fruit’ and ‘dwelling house’ would be learnt by explanation 
of one sort or another. As far as the meanings o f these expressions are concerned, they 
lie essentially in the way they are employed within language-games,—in the making of 
judgements or in our general talk about houses and fruits. Explanations can of course be 
reviewed, and any difficulties we get into with these concepts will not go deep. But in the 
case o f time and similarly deeply rooted concepts, I have tried to show that the way they 
form part of our relations to reality is not in their origins as concepts that are applied in 
the making of judgements; for having them is structural to discourse. In the case o f time we 
have a concept which belongs to the sense of much o f what we say. In the cases of belief 
and meaning, or the other concepts to do with language, we are looking at something lying 
in our whole relation to language. In the cases o f the words ‘time’, ‘belief, ‘meaning’, etc., 
we are dealing, therefore, with expressions whose introduction into the language does not 
so much determine as reflect boundaries between concepts — boundaries that are taken for 
granted in the very course o f speaking and which pervade our speech. Failure to adhere 
to these limits would mean, in the case of the concepts to do with language, a loss of grip 
on language; or, in the case of time or cause, a profound disturbance of our ability to talk 
sense and not merely an uncertainty or muddle in their specific application. If it did make 
sense to speak of moving these conceptual boundaries, then this would represent not 
merely a shift in the judgements we make, but wholesale changes in the way we speak, or 
wholesale changes in our relations to language.— Or rather, it would no longer be clear 
that we were speaking or making sense. It is therefore the very coherence o f our lives as 
conceptual agents that supports the meaningful use o f these expressions, not merely the 
adherence to a definition or explanation.
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6 ~  Philosophical Problems and Grammar
This brings us back to Rhees’ original characterisation of ‘misunderstandings of the 
logic of language’ as:
....confusion or uncertainty connected with being able to speak, and so perhaps with 
learning to speak...[and]..(..not just a confusion of the grammars of particular 
expressions)... (Rhees3 p. 74)
The deep difficulty in philosophy is not just difficulty in the face of the complexity, the 
variety or the confusing appearance of the rules governing particular expressions, but a 
confusion or uncertainty that arises out o f a failure to acknowledge the understanding 
that lies in our broader relations to language — in our ability to speak and converse. It is, as 
it were, perplexity in the face of being able to make sense. This is perhaps why Rhees is 
wary, or at least equivocal, about speaking of this misunderstanding as being 
misunderstanding of the grammar of a concept, since this might suggest something 
relatively trivial, i.e. ‘confusions between different parts of the technique’.103 On that 
interpretation we would not be able to understand scepticism if philosophers were 
interested only in the grammars o f concepts. A similar sentiment is expressed by Rhees 
where he attacks the idea — sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein — that philosophical 
problems are no more than linguistic confusions:
Such reflection may help us to understand how it is that language—thinking and 
speaking and the understanding that there is in life among men—has led men to 
wonder what things are. A start from ideas of ‘linguistic confusions’ may issue in 
philistinism; and generally has.
If we look only at usages, we cannot understand how it is that language may express 
ideas.
We cannot understand the central ideas of philosophy—such ideas as reality, truth, 
things, intelligibility, understanding—we cannot understand the role they play in 
language unless we try to understand what language is. We cannot understand how it 
is that puzzlement about them and puzzlement about language (about what ‘saying 
something’ is, for instance) are so run into one another that we can hardly distinguish 
them. So that scepticism regarding them is scepticism regarding the reality of 
discourse.104
I am in full agreement with Rhees’ underlying thought here. If I do depart from him —
as I have already been arguing — it is that I believe that it is still valid, and indeed valuable,
103 Rheesl p. 112.
104 Rush Rhees, ‘Art and Philosophy’, in Without Answers, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.
134-135.
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to characterise the root of philosophical problems as arising out of difficulties with the 
grammars of our concepts,—even in the cases which we might characterise as arising 
directly in connection with ‘being able to speak’ rather than with the use of particular 
expressions. For as Rhees himself is at pains to argue, having concepts at all belongs with 
the idea of having ‘something to say’, which is ‘living a life an speaking out of it\ We 
should therefore expect the grasp of the grammars of the concepts which are most 
intimately connected with ‘being able to speak’ to be something very deeply seated in, 
and indeed structural to, our lives. So it seems to me that we should not abandon the 
notion of grammar in these cases but, if anything, expand it to include them. It does not 
trivialise ‘scepticism regarding the reality o f discourse’ to express it as puzzlement over 
the grammar of ‘discourse’.—-They are the same. Likewise, the difficulty we experience in 
seeing clearly into the grammars o f the concepts to do with language may equally be 
expressed as the feeling of uncertainty or discomfort in our relations to language,—and 
to ourselves and to the world.
Given that the primary understanding of these concepts is such a pervasive feature of 
our speech and our lives, one might wonder how it is that we are so easily distracted 
when we come to reflect on their grammars in philosophy. The origin cannot reside in 
confusing similarities in the outward manner of language-games, or in ‘pictures’ lying in 
surface grammar.— Such causes are the province of ‘confusions of the grammars of 
particular expressions’. Neither can it be a failure to be struck by facts (on account of 
their great generality).— It has already been argued that the recovery of facts will only play 
a secondary role in the elucidation o f the concepts that are at the bottom of philosophical 
difficulties. Rather, it has its root in the intimacy of our relations to these concepts, in the 
way that the very fabric o f our lives, as persons who can speak, is constituted in these 
relations. These form part of our grasp of the concepts without explicit acknowledgement, 
for they are prior to the explicit acknowledgement of anything. Our understanding o f them 
shows not in the way that we acknowledge these relations, but in the very fact that we 
can speak to one another. There is, therefore, no natural context for their 
acknowledgement, and so when we do turn our attention to them, we inevitably pass as a 
matter of course to those dimensions of their grammars which are handled explicitly,— 
dimensions in which we may indeed give definitions, explanations and demonstrations, 
and may employ criteria in their application. In this way our reflections on the concepts 
fail to attach to the circumstances in which they were determined, thus exposing 
ourselves to reconstructing them in ways that are almost bound to be distorted.
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We may turn to an example provided by Wittgenstein to illustrate this last point:
....it looks as if the definition—a proposition is whatever can be true or false— 
determined what a proposition was by saying: what fits the concept 'true’, or what the 
concept ‘true’ fits, is a proposition. So it is as if we had a concept of true and false, 
which we could use to determine what is or what is not a proposition. (PI 136)
In the apparent absence of any other way of showing our relations to the concepts truth 
and proposition, it may look as if the question ‘Can this be true or false?’, in providing the 
criterion for judging that ‘here is a proposition’, showed how the concept proposition might 
be determined. It would then be original to having the concept proposition that we are able 
to make such a judgement using this as a criterion: having a concept o f truth would be 
prior to having the concept o f a proposition. This falsifies the relation between the 
concepts truth and proposition. Now as Wittgenstein remarks:
....a child might be taught to distinguish between propositions and other expressions 
by being told “Ask yourself if you can say ‘is true’ after it. If these words fit, it’s a 
proposition.” (PI 137)
In other words, we can perfectly well imagine circumstances in which we might apply 
‘is true’ as a criterion, and no doubt this does form at least a part of having a concept of 
it.— In the surface handling of these concepts we treat them as pieces that ‘fit’ one 
another. This is fine. But these are not the circumstances in which the concept is 
determined, for clearly the child could only follow this instruction if he already 
distinguished propositions — both in their truth and in their falsity — in his own speech or 
in responding to the speech of others. In other words, in the sense in which I have 
described, the child will already have the concepts truth and proposition.
Wittgenstein rectifies this false relation by saying:
And what a proposition is is in one sense determined by the rules of sentence 
formation....and in another sense by the use of the sign in the language-game. And the 
use of the words “true” and “false” may be among the constituent parts of this game; 
and if so it belongs to our concept ‘proposition’ but does not ‘f i t  it. (PI 136)
And of course nothing short o f a rounded exposition of what speaking a language is — 
which must include how language belongs to our engagement with the world and with 
the people with whom we share it — will do to illustrate what the use of the propositional 
sign is and of what the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ mean.
Such an exposition will not try to explain what speaking is (or what belief is, or what 
truth is) from top to bottom; rather, it will bring what can be made explicit in the 
grammars o f the concepts — or in the techniques for using them — into contact with the
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understanding of the concept that lies embedded in our relations to language. An 
important part of giving presence to this understanding will be to describe the 
circumstances in which these relations exist — some attempt at which I have made. But 
they will not be the descriptions of the life with language that we require if they do not at 
the same time engage with those relations in which that understanding lies,— otherwise 
they would remain an external account. As Rhees remarks:
Suppose I describe what the two men are doing while they are building, as 
Wittgenstein does in the Investigations (pp. 3 and 5). If this does illustrate speaking for 
you, then you must not only understand what they are doing, but you must 
understand what they say. My description must show that they speak a language which 
each of them understands, and which you also understand, if the illustration is to help 
you. (Rhees3 p. 72)
The description can only show this to the extent that we already recognise them as 
persons who are speaking — that we already stand in that relation to them — and that 
means that our understanding of the concepts of a person and of language are already up 
and running and determining our perception of the illustration.
What Wittgenstein’s example shows is how a preoccupation with what can be made 
easily explicit in how the words ‘true’ and ‘proposition’ are employed, e.g. in the kinds of 
thing we might say to a child, can conceal from us the deeper connections between these 
concepts. And it is just this sort of dislocation that is at the root of the problems of truth, 
language and scepticism
7 ~ Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to move on from the idea o f the use of language as the 
operation of signs according to a rule to a richer conception o f speaking as a manifestation 
o f the life o f person,—these concepts being mutually constitutive. In the previous chapter, 
I gave an account of how one manifestation of the instinctive nature of language use is 
captured in Wittgenstein’s remark that ‘I obey the rule blindly’,105 i.e. that the application 
o f linguistic rules are ultimately groundless. This account has to be to be qualified in the 
light of the transition towards the richer conception of the nature of language use. For 
what that brings to light is that, with regard to the possession of certain of our concepts 
that are especially to do with language, the roots of the understanding of these concepts 
is lies not so much in the application of the rule for the use of the corresponding
i05 n 2i9.
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expressions (‘belief, ‘meaning’, ‘time’, etc.) as in more pervasive features of our relations 
to language,— of our relations to language as a whole. Attention to these features also brings 
in its wake a notion of understanding that is perhaps not so comfortable when thinking 
merely in terms of getting the hang of the application of a technique. And yet I do not 
think that this requires us to abandon the principal insight of language as grounded in 
instinct. The underlying principle is preserved, for ‘living a life and speaking out of it’ no 
more presupposes a rational process at a more elementary level — or even at a 
transcendental level — than rule-governed behaviour does, and so it remains ‘blind’ and 
instinctive in this sense. When Wittgenstein remarked W hat has to be accepted, the 
given, is— so one could say—forms of life’,106 ‘the given’ is also an expression of the 
groundlessness o f the form of life,—which is the form of life of a person having things 
to say.
In the next chapter I shall begin to examine the relation between instinctive behaviour, 
conceptual content and concept-formation.
106 PI p. 226.
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Chapter 5 ~  Language as Arising out o f Instinctive Behaviour
1 ~ Introduction
Wittgenstein’s remarks on instinctive behaviour and its relation to concept-formation 
have received much critical attention, and so in developing this discussion I will pay 
special attention to these critical voices and to what I believe to be significant 
misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s standpoint. I shall direct myself primarily towards 
recent comment by Elizabeth Wolgast,107 who raises most of the difficulties generally 
experienced with these remarks. Much of what I have to say will be in agreement with 
positions put forward by Rush Rhees;108 however he too has expressed anxiety about 
certain of Wittgenstein’s remarks, and so this will also need to be addressed.
The remarks in question have given rise to problems not just as a the result o f their 
paucity — which has allowed varied interpretation — but specifically because they invite 
interpretation as advancing a theory o f the genesis of our concepts from instinctive forms 
of behaviour. And of course, this is problematic for Wittgenstein’s avowed philosophical 
method just because V e may not advance any kind of theory’.1091 have been at pains to 
emphasise that, for Wittgenstein, to speak of the instinctive nature of language is essentially 
a grammatical insight, speaking may be pre-meditated on any particular occasion but we 
cannot conceive of speaking as such as something pre-meditated — thus establishing the 
link between the concepts of speaking and of instinctive behaviour. The problem with his 
remarks on instinctive behaviour and concept-formation is that their grammatical nature 
is not always as obvious as one might wish. It is this which has allowed Wolgast, amongst 
others, a platform from which to claim that Wittgenstein makes assertions about 
concept-formation that are both speculative and not entirely intelligible.
2 ~ Wolgast*s Interpretation of Wittgenstein
The remarks that trouble Wolgast are those where Wittgenstein speaks of ‘primitive 
reactions’ as if they gave direct rise to our language-games and the concepts embedded in
107Elizabeth Wolgast, Trimitive Reactions’, Philosophical Investigations, 17:4, October 1994, pp. 587-603. 
(Wolgast2)
108 Rush Rhees, ‘Language as emerging from instinctive behaviour’, Philosophical Investigations, 20:1, January 
1997, pp. 1-14. (Rhees4)
109 PI 109.
71
them. Moreover, she observes that we do not find Wittgenstein talking in this way in the 
Philosophical Investigations (except in a limited way, which I shall refer to later) but only in 
scattered remarks elsewhere — which were apparently not intended for publication.110 This 
fuels her feeling that this idea is really spurious to his central insights and should be 
dispensed with.111 Her analysis of Wittgenstein’s position, as it emerges in these remarks, 
is roughly as follows:
Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that our concepts are generated from pre-linguistic forms of 
behaviour. Typical examples of him in this mood are the following:
The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this 
can more complicated forms develop.
Language—I want to say—is a refinement. “In the beginning was the deed”. (C&E 
p. 395, see also CV p. 31)
But what is the word ‘primitive’ meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of 
behaviour is pre-linguistic. that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of 
a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Z 541)
Wittgenstein’s most developed example o f this process is to be found in his treatment 
of the concept of causality in his notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’. Here he 
speaks at length of how the concept cause might have emerged out o f instinctive 
behaviour. His idea is that the language-game is generated from our spontaneous 
reactions to events impinging upon us. He illustrates this by reference to reactions such 
as the response to receiving a blow,112 or feeling the pull on a string.113 Language ‘draws 
on’ such reactions for its concept of cause;114 they are the foundations on which the 
concept is grounded.115 This is not merely a conjecture as to how our concepts might 
have arisen out of certain forms of behaviour, but is something upon which the very 
possibility o f forming such concepts depends. As she says:
We could not have the concept of cause if we did not react as we do, and the same 
applies to other concepts. (Wolgast2 p. 591).
Wolgast clearly takes Wittgenstein — against the better judgement to be found in the 
Investigations — to be espousing a foundationalist account of language;—not, perhaps, in the 
traditional sense of wanting to provide a rational justification for our concepts, but in the
110 I say ‘apparently* for it is now known that Wittgenstein willed his literary editors to publish his writings 
‘as they think fit’, which means that we are not in a position to dismiss any o f his extant remarks (see Rush 
Rhees, ‘On Editing Wittgenstein’, Philosophical Investigations,, 19:1, January 1996, pp. 56-57).
111 Wolgast2 pp. 588, 601 & 603.
112 C&E pp. 409-410.
113 Ibid. pp. 416-417.
114 Wolgast2 p. 591.
115 Ibid. pp. 601-602.
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sense o f there being at least some kind of necessary pathway of derivation from primitive 
behavioural reactions to the concepts as they come to be embedded in language. The 
thrust of her argument against this ‘thesis’ is that what is presented as a philosophical 
account of concept-formation is at best only speculation about historical facts of which 
we know nothing; at worst it is incoherent.116
The heart of her anxiety lies in her concern over the apparently ambiguous nature o f the 
primitive reactions in question. In her discussion of the example of cause, she remarks:
In the situation described, let us agree that I’m angry and look for the one who hit me.
But is this a reaction to the blow, to cause of the blow, to the pain, or the anger? How 
can one determine which? Once such questions are raised, it becomes clear that the 
reaction itself is ambiguous. If, for instance, someone inarticulate or an animal were to 
react in similar circumstances, we would have trouble distinguishing one from 
another. (Wolgast2 p. 592)
Her conclusion is:
The crucial difficulty with the account is....the ambiguity that surrounds the question 
what language game they ground. Does pulling back from a hot object give rise to the 
concept of cause, of fear, of caution? What would show us which of them originates 
with it? (Wolgast2 p. 597)
A more precise understanding of the significance of this ambiguity may be obtained by 
examining the instance in which Wolgast is prepared to accede to Wittgenstein. She 
accepts his claim that, without its characteristic expressions, the language-game with 
‘pain’ would lose its point.117 I also assume that, as far as the concept-founding 
mechanism is concerned, she would approve Wittgenstein’s suggestion that the teaching 
of the concept is effected through the replacement o f pain-behaviour by the use of the 
word.118 By attaching the word ‘pain’ to natural expressions of pain, the child learns both 
new pain behaviour and the concept, for the word belongs to the language it is learning. 
All this is possible because of the clearly unambiguous nature of expressions of pain, so 
that the use of the word can, in an important sense, be identical with the reaction. To cry 
out and to use the word ‘pain’ are the same to the extent that they are both driven in the 
same measure by one’s being in pain; the difference being that ‘pain’ also belongs to a 
language, so that its use may also be a move in the game. On the principle that the 
ontogeny of the child’s formation of the concept repeats the phylogeny o f the concept, we 
may imagine that the origin of the concept pain lay in some process by which ‘pain’ came
116 Ibid. p. 591.
117 Ibid. p. 593.
118 PI 244; Wolgast2 p. 600.
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to replace pain behaviour.— By such a process of replacement we cannot but have formed 
the concept
By contrast, if the reaction is ambiguous it cannot be identical with any one of its 
possible interpretations. For if a form of words were to enter the language just by 
replacing the reaction, the resultant language-game would be obliged to embody all o f the 
possible interpretations all together, as it were.119 The alternative concepts that seem to be 
anticipated in the reaction could then only be separated out from one another by their 
being further determined in some other way. But of course this is to destroy the whole 
point of invoking primitive reactions in the first place. Hence, an ambiguous reaction 
cannot of itself be the foundation for, or explain, the genesis of any one of the possible 
language-games. If the language-game is imagined to emerge ineluctably out of a 
primitive reaction, then the ambiguous nature of the reaction shows that it cannot.
Wolgast concludes that the case of pain is exceptional; ambiguity amongst primitive 
reactions is the rule. Therefore any attempt to model a general account of concept- 
formation upon them will be incoherent.120 This is a conclusion with which I can agree. 
What I refute is that Wittgenstein held, or that his remarks imply, any such theory of 
concept-formation,—or indeed any theory at all
3 ~ The Ambiguity of Primitive Tractions
In order to begin to clear a path out of Wolgast’s difficulties, we may begin by restating 
her account o f the ambiguity of primitive reactions in a more perspicuous form.
One circumstance in which we might say that a piece of behaviour is ambiguous is 
where we recognise that, for a proper interpretation, the behaviour requires to be placed 
in a larger context. For example, we could easily imagine a situation where we are unclear 
whether a crouching cat is resting or hunting; and we could equally easily imagine what 
would setde this. The ambiguity arises here because, in an important sense, we just do not 
see enough of the action; it is solved by observing the larger course of action to which 
the episode we observe belongs.
It is important to note here that it is not merely a contingent fact that our interpretation 
requires viewing the behaviour in the larger context. Resting and hunting are concepts of 
a course of action. To this extent the concepts determine what is to count as seeing enough of
119 Wolgast2 p. 592, bottom of page.
120 Ibid. p. 599.
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the action for the purpose o f making such a judgement So the problem of interpretation 
arises because the perspective demands conceptually that we see more of the behaviour 
than in fact we do see. In such cases, we might say that the ambiguity is not an intrinsic 
property o f the phenomenon we are observing; rather, it is a feature arising out of a 
conflict between the context we are offered and the larger context demanded by the 
concepts we wish to apply.121
The ambiguity that Wolgast has in mind, however, is of a different kind. In her 
argument the reactions appear to be intrinsically ambiguous. This is because we appear to 
be able to ask whether, for example, the child’s reaction is to the pain, the blow, or the 
cause, even though the larger context which would settle the issue, i.e. language-games 
within which the separate concepts might be expressed, does not exist. I repeat her 
remark:
But is this a reaction to the blow, to cause of the blow, to the pain, or the anger? Once 
such questions are raised, it becomes clear that the reaction itself is ambiguous. If, for 
instance, someone inarticulate or an animal were to react in similar circumstances, we 
would have trouble distinguishing one from the other. (Wolgast2 p. 592) (my 
emphasis)
But this surely is to understate the difficulty — unless Wolgast is simply being ironic — 
for the lack of the larger context makes the attempt to make the distinction meaningless, 
not just troublesome. What we are dealing with here is the kind of difficulty that arises 
when we try to force primitive behaviour into categories for which — in the lives o f such 
creatures — the context does not yet exist; where to describe the creature in those terms at 
all is already to presuppose an appropriate linguistic capacity. Unlike the case of the cat, it is 
not that we are not in a position to know whether the reaction is to the blow or to the 
cause; rather, making such a distinction makes no sense.
The underlying logic of Wolgast’s criticism, therefore, is not merely that, in an ordinary 
sense, the primitive reactions are ambiguous and so admit of a variety of interpretations; 
it is rather that there is no question of an ‘interpretation’ until we provide precisely the 
linguistic context which they are supposed to explain; we then find that the same reaction 
might just as easily be at the root of a variety of such contexts. This logical circle shows 
us that primitive reactions cannot ground concepts: the genesis of such concepts cannot
121 Wolgast does refer to one example that seems to be o f this type, namely a suggestion by Cockbum that 
a baby has fundamentally different reactions to humans than to objects. Her concerns about the apparent 
ambiguity of a baby’s reactions seem to me to stem from her only being willing to consider the narrowest 
time-slice from the baby’s reactions. (Wolgast2 p. 595)
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be explained merely in terms of the dressing up of primitive reactions in Svords’. On this 
principle, I am in agreement.
4 ~ Primitive Linguistic Reactions
A rather different matter, which should also be cleared up straight away, is what I 
believe to be a substantial misunderstanding by Wolgast o f Wittgenstein’s intentions in 
his notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’. Wolgast takes it for granted that when 
Wittgenstein spoke of primitive reactions and the like he was always speaking of pre- 
linguistic behaviour. Leaving aside for the moment what Wittgenstein might have had in 
mind when he did speak of pre-linguistic reactions — which is a matter that I shall deal 
with in due course — it is highly questionable whether he intended the examples he gave 
in these notes to be understood in this way. Even a cursory examination should show 
that he was imagining reactions that, in an important sense, already belong to language- 
games.
Wittgenstein wants to distinguish the cases where we ‘recognise a cause immediately’ 
from the ones where we recognise a cause as a result o f ‘repeated experiments’.122 
Regarding the first o f these, he describes various situations in which we ‘react to a 
cause’,— for example, when we react to a blow, or to a voice in the cinema, or to 
someone pulling at the other end of a string. Now to be sure, he speaks of these reactions 
as instinctive, but there is nothing to suggest that they are being thought of as anything 
other than belonging to an ‘up and running’ language-game. What he is trying to do, 
clearly enough I would have thought, is to clarify one particular form of the language- 
game in which the concept cause enters and to dispel some myths that surround it. 
Specifically, he is attacking Russell’s attempt to interpret this instinctive use as a kind of 
intuition. Wittgenstein is saying that what we have in such instances is not some kind of 
direct insight into a causal relation, but just an instinctive reaction: in certain 
circumstances we unhesitatingly speak in causal language. This is a direct reaction to 
events which does not demand explanation in terms of an intuition, that is, in terms of 
some subjective state accompanying the use o f the expression.
122 C&E p. 409.
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The examples he gives, therefore, are clearly intended to be elementary forms of the 
language-game,123 not ‘pre-linguistic’ reactions which must lead ineluctably to a language- 
game of a particular logical structure. In another context, as I have indicated, 
Wittgenstein does indeed speak of the ‘pre-linguistic’ prototype of ‘a way of thinking’,124 
but in the present notes he explicitly speaks of the prototype of a language-game as the 
most elementary form in which the game is played:
The simple form (and that is the prototype) of the cause-effect game is determining 
the cause, not doubting. (C&E p. 397)
There is every reason for supposing, therefore, that this is how we should take the 
examples he cites in these notes. Indeed in another very important remark he states:
The basic form of the game can’t include doubt.’ What we are doing here above all is 
to imagine a basic form: a possibility, indeed a very important possibility. (We very often 
confuse what is an important possibility with historical reality.) (C&E p. 377)
This tells us that Wittgenstein conceives of what he is doing as an investigation into the 
logical structure of our language-games, not natural history, i.e. not an explanation of the 
origin of the language-game.
Let us see how this interpretation fits the following passage, and then consider 
Wolgast’s reaction to it:
Certainly there is in such cases a genuine experience which can be called ‘experience 
of the cause’. But not because it infallibly shows us the cause; rather because one root 
of the cause-effect language-game is to be found here, in our looking out for a cause.
We react to the cause.
Calling something ‘the cause’ is like pointing and saying: ‘He’s to blame!’
We instinctively get rid of the cause if we don’t want the effect. We instinctively look 
from what has been hit to what has hit it. (I am assuming that we do this.)
Now suppose I were to say that when we speak of cause and effect we always have in 
mind a comparison with impact; that this is the prototype of cause and effect? Would 
this mean that we had recognised impact as a cause? Imagine a language in which people 
always said ‘impact’ instead of ‘cause’. (C&E p. 373)
Wittgenstein is thinking o f simple situations in which we react instinctively to being hit, 
etc., by using expressions such as Tie’s to blame’. In other words he is describing an
123 Wittgenstein uses the expression basic forms. We might equally adopt Hertzberg’s description o f them as 
independent reactions. Hertzberg gives a fuller account of the logical status o f primitive linguistic reactions 
within our language-games (Hertzberg p. 30). I shall be returning to a discussion o f Hertzberg’s position in 
the next chapter.
124 Z 541.
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elementary language-game,—the kind of prototype language-game (in the sense described 
above) out of which the more complicated forms might develop. Even where he speaks 
of a reaction being at the ‘root’ of the language-game, we may interpret the reaction as a 
linguistic one. Using an expression like cHe’s to blame!’ is a direct reaction that itself 
expresses the concept cause. We do not have to suppose that the possibility of using such 
a phrase with this meaning depends upon a prior conception of causality,—one derived 
from intuition or repeated experiment. Similarly in the case of ‘impact’. We do not have 
to posit a further step: an act of recognising the impact as a ‘cause’ (i.e. by an act of 
intuition). The concept of a cause is already manifest in such elementary, instinctive uses 
of language;—they are primary expressions of it. Having the concept o f cause is 
comprised, partly at least, in being able to employ such expressions in these ways — and 
other ways too, of course, such as when making repeated experiments. Wittgenstein’s 
discussion belongs to his attack upon the idea that having concepts depends on having 
some kind of internal representation accessed by intuition; he is not theorising about the 
origin of the language-game.
This interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks seems to me to be fairly obvious, which 
makes Wolgast’s reaction to Wittgenstein’s first remark at best puzzling:
Wittgenstein says, ‘Calling something the cause is like pointing and saying: “He’s to 
blame!’” And one wants to say, yes, but that doesn’t say what the reaction concerns, 
the blow, its cause, the pain or something else. The point isn’t trivial for Wittgenstein.
If the cause of the blow isn’t distinct from the blow or the pain, the reaction one has 
isn’t clearly ground for the concept of ‘cause,’ but might be the ground for ‘wondering 
what happened’, or even ‘pain’. Or nothing. (Wolgast2 p. 592)
But Wittgenstein does not refer to a non-vocal reaction that grounds the concept, he 
describes simple linguistic reactions as being elementary to the language-game and giving 
it its character.
Things also go wrong where she seems to think that Wittgenstein has lapsed 
momentarily into an empiricist theory of concept-formation when he remarks:125
Certainly there is in such cases a genuine experience which can be called ‘experience 
of the cause’. But not because it infallibly shows us the cause; rather because one root 
of the cause-effect language-game is to be found here, in our looking out for a cause.
(C&E p. 373)
She points out, correcdy, that an empiricist account of concept-formation is at odds 
with the whole tenor of the Philosophical Investigations1, but again, in the present context
125 Wolgast2 p. 593.
78
there is no reason for thinking that Wittgenstein has lapsed. In Part II of the Investigations 
Wittgenstein discusses ‘continuous aspect* perception: we perceive the world under the 
aspect o f the concepts we have.126 The point about such experiences is that they go together 
with the playing of language-games;—they do not precede them. Hence it belongs to the 
playing of the language-games deploying causal concepts that we perceive ‘causes’ — and 
especially so where our most direct linguistic reactions to reality are concerned (i.e. where 
they are most closely linked to overt behaviour). If we treat Wittgenstein as speaking 
about basic forms of language-games rather than pre-linguistic reactions, then it is 
entirely consistent that he should also speak of the experiences that accompany them 
without our needing to suppose that he is making an empiricist assumption.
The principal message of Wittgenstein’s notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’ 
is that one point of articulation of the language-game of causality — and hence of the 
concept of causality — is a spontaneous or independent reaction occurring in the context o f 
our daily routines, which does not have to be explained at a more fundamental level by a 
further intellectual process of intuition. These behaviours neither give rise to nor are 
made intelligible by the concepts but belong to the circumstances in which the language- 
game has the sense that it does have. Their primitiveness therefore speaks of the structure 
of the language-game, not its origins.
One of the achievements of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy lies in its breaking down 
the picture of the relation of language and thought to reality as ‘a view from the 
boundary’. Rather, language has sense, and thought is of the world, in the multifarious 
ways that words move in concert with human activity and social intercourse. Language is of 
‘the midst*. Talk of primitive reactions, by drawing attention to the integrity o f certain 
linguistic reactions and forms of activity within the language-games, belongs to saying just 
this.
Wolgast’s use of these notes to try to show Wittgenstein as struggling to give an 
account o f concept-formation in terms of y>fl?-linguistic behaviour is therefore misguided. 
Wittgenstein does speak elsewhere of ^ -linguistic prototypes of language-games — as I 
have noted previously. So if we are to comment on what he might have had in mind in 
these other contexts, we must divorce any such treatment from the way he speaks in the 
notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’.127
126 See especially PI p. 194; and for a full discussion see S. Mulhall, On Being in the World., (London: 
Routledge, 1993).
127 Though o f course, not only in these notes.
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5 ~ Language as Extending Pre-linguistic Behaviour
Wittgenstein did occasionally speak of language-games as ‘extensions’ of pre/non- 
linguistic primitive behaviour. The following remarks are perhaps the most emphatic:
But what is the word ‘primitive’ meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of 
behaviour is pre-linguistic. that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of 
a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Z 541)
Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many 
natural, instinctive kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language 
is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is 
an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct) (Z 
545)
These and other similar remarks may superficially be construed in ways that are 
consistent with Wolgast’s interpretation. Certainly the remarks appear to say something 
different from what he says in the notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’, and at 
the very least he appears to allow primitive behaviour a role in concept-formation that 
does not show up in those notes.128 However it seems to me that one can give plausible, 
intelligible and illuminating treatments of the notion of /^-linguistic behaviour, and of 
the idea o f language-games as extensions of primitive behaviour — in certain cases at least, 
which still need not draw us into unwarranted a priori speculation about the origins of our 
concepts or into foundationalism. Indeed, in a remark from the Philosophical Investigations 
(which I think has been overlooked in this debate), Wittgenstein both expresses the idea 
o f language-games as extensions of non-linguistic behaviour and explicidy rejects a 
foundationalist interpretation of the relation:
For think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering the words “it makes 
me shiver” are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I 
utter them, this belongs among the rest of those sensations. Now why should the 
wordless shudder be the ground of the verbal one? (PI p. 174)
128 The second remark does appear to speak inconsistently in as much as being sure that someone is in 
pain’ and ‘doubting whether he is’ do not obviously qualify as />re-linguistic behaviour, so that when he 
speaks o f the language-game as an extension o f primitive behaviour, a more consistent sense would have 
emerged if he had said that the rest o f the language-game is an extension of primitive linguistic behaviour. On 
the other hand, one may still wish to retain the continuity with the first remark and explain away the 
inconsistency as merely an unfortunate choice of example. Rhees favours the former interpretation; 
however in the course o f his argument he does not quote ‘our language is merely an auxiliary to, and 
further extension of, this relation’, which is precisely that part o f Wittgenstein’s remark that favours the 
alternative interpretation. Rhees does not comment at all on Wittgenstein’s use o f the term ‘pre-linguistic' -  
the significance o f which I shall discuss later in this chapter. I am less nervous than Rhees in adopting 
Wittgenstein’s terminology and with speaking of language an extension o f primitive behaviour, because I do 
not think that these ways o f speaking necessarily imply a theory of concept formation. (Rhees4)
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Clarifying the sense in which some language-games can be described as extensions of 
primitive, pre-linguistic behaviour is important to commanding a clear view of them. No 
doubt one has to be careful to express the point in a way that avoids foundationalism, but 
it remains important that this way of looking at the matter be preserved.
Central to this issue is achieving a proper conception of the relation between our use of 
words and the rest o f our lives. Happily, this takes us straight to the heart of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Wittgenstein defines a language-game as language and the 
actions into which it is woven’.129 Part of what he is trying to do with this notion of a 
language-game is to wean us off the idea of language as an autonomous activity whose 
essentials lie apart from the way that it is woven into our everyday lives and into our 
actions. Such apartness is visible, for example, in mentalistic accounts of concepts such as 
meaning. On the contrary, it is in the way in which language goes together with our active 
lives (and taking into account the points made in the previous chapter on the nature of 
speaking) that our intelligent engagement with our environment is constituted and which 
identifies us as thinking, speaking, conceiving things. It is the engagement taken as a 
whole that shows what it is to speak and to have concepts.—This is our starting point.
There is a variety of contexts in philosophy in which we speak of the dependence of 
language on behaviour. We may have in mind the way that the use of language depends 
upon constancy and agreement amongst our verbal and perceptual responses and 
reactions. These form what have been called the ‘framework conditions’ which make 
language use possible. Or, we may be thinking of the way in which certain activities form 
the context for a language-game, and so belong to the provision of its sense. However the 
kind of relation that I have presently in mind is where the use of language is bound up 
rather more intimately with the natures of the activities themselves. This obtains most 
obviously where the language-games, in the way in which they become part o f our lives, 
are constitutive o f ourselves as persons.— I am thinking here, for example, of hoping, 
intending, believing, knowing, etc. This could be expressed by saying that the concepts of 
hoping, intending, etc., are concepts of aspects of our form of life130 into which language 
use is woven in a characteristic way. Moreover, true accounts o f these aspects — and 
hence o f the concepts — will be accounts o f both language use and non-linguistic features 
(actions),—and of the relations between the two. With these thoughts in mind I shall
129 P I 7
130 The use of the phrase form of life is problematic in Wittgenstein since it is not closely defined — see 
Chapter 3 for a definition. To recap, I use the phrase to refer either to the form o f life as a whole or to an 
aspect o f that form o f life — an aspect which will comprise behaviour (or a dimension o f behaviour) and 
language.
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refer to hoping, intending, etc., as phenomena, in order to emphasise that they are gross 
features o f human life and not aspects of our lives whose reality resides only in the verbal 
arena.
Consider the example o f greeting. Verbal expressions of greeting are embedded in the 
patterns o f interaction between people. These patterns of behaviour are not merely the 
staging for what is otherwise a purely linguistic exchange. To say that two people are 
greeting one another adds up to more than can be explained simply in terms of the use of 
a form of words in a given context and their further linguistic consequences. For if, when 
people encountered one another, the verbal exchanges were not a part of patterns of 
behaviour expressing acknowledgement of one sort or another, I do not think we would 
be inclined to call this greeting in the sense in which we normally mean it. So the concept 
is o f a form of life comprising linguistic expressions and — independently, as it were — 
other patterns of behaviour. This is the phenomenon o f greeting. Hence, that what I say is a 
greeting is partly a function of how it hangs together with larger features of the ways in 
which we are disposed towards one another.— Language use and a certain way of life are 
internal to our concept of greeting.
Now it is true that, on the one hand, language is the medium within which concepts are 
articulated. But my main concern here is to draw special attention to the role that the use 
of language has as a component o f these phenomena of human life. This distinction is 
crucial to what I have to say. Put rather more formally we may distinguish between:
1) The use of language to express or articulate the concepts of hoping, greeting, 
intending, etc. Here the criterion for possessing the concept would lie, for example, in the 
ability to apply the concepts in judgements, or to talk about the phenomena during 
conversation; and,
2) The use of language as a component in the expression of hope, greeting, intending, etc. 
Here the use of language belongs to the way in which the phenomenon is manifested. To 
emphasise this contrast, we may note that where language does enter into the 
manifestation o f the phenomenon it may not actually involve the direct articulation o f the 
concept o f the phenomenon at all. For example, we could easily imagine utterances 
expressing hope in which the concept of hope is not articulated; for instance, someone is 
sitting impatiently waiting for a train to leave saying ‘come on! come on!’. He certainly 
hopes that the train will leave very soon, and this shows in what he says.
This relates to the distinction, developed in Chapter 2, between the expression of a 
concept within a language-game and the concept of the language-game. We are now
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enlarging our perspective on the latter, and moving from the concept of the language- 
game to the concept of the phenomenon within which the language-game is a component.
Similar considerations apply, I believe, to the other phenomena (or aspects of our form 
of life) listed above. In the following section we shall examine in more depth another 
example of a language-game in which this distinction may apply: intention. My reason for 
this choice is that the phenomenon of intention has a significant, indeed an essentially, pre- 
linguistic dimension. It is also interesting because it is ‘ambiguous’ in Wolgast’s sense; for 
whilst being pervasive of human activity, intention not uniquely expressed by any one 
reaction. It is therefore a genuine instance of a primitive feature of human life o f the kind 
that one might suppose could generate a concept in the way that Wolgast finds 
objectionable. For just this reason it is also well suited to elucidating Wittgenstein’s 
notion of language-games as extensions o f primitive behaviour, whilst observing this to be 
neither theory laden nor attracting the problem of ambiguity.
6 ~ The Language-game of Expressing Intention as an Extension of Primitive Behaviour
Intentionality is a phenomenon of human life. It belongs amongst our concepts of a 
course of action; it is part o f our concept o f an agent. For these reasons it is rooted in an 
elementary way in our concept of action, and so it relates to our lives in a rather more 
fundamental way than do concepts relating specifically to ourselves as speakers. At the 
same time it is linked to speaking because of the way that speaking is related to action 
through the formulation and expression of intentions. So we might say that, for a 
speaker, intentionality is comprised both through there being courses of action and in the 
way that such courses o f action may be expressed in language.
It is important to keep these two aspects apart and not to subordinate the notion of a 
course of action to the relation between expressions o f intention and actions in 
accordance with those expressions. One mode of intentionality is where a course of 
action is initiated by pre-meditation. Here one is certainly tempted to say that the action’s 
being intentional lies in its being in accord with the expressed intention; that its being an 
intended act consists in its standing in an internal relation to the linguistic expression. But 
pre-meditation cannot be sufficient to an account of intentionality in general, since it 
takes for granted the notion of a course o f action. Moreover, the fact that the notion of a 
course of action has a dimension that is intelligible independently of the relation between 
actions and verbal expressions o f intention is manifest in the observation that the
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concept of intentionality clearly applies more widely than to premeditated actions. We 
may even speak of natural expressions of intention in dumb animals. As Wittgenstein 
remarks:
What is the natural expression of intention?—Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or a
beast when it wants to escape. (PI 647)
So the notion of being on a course of action, and therefore o f intentionality, cannot be 
reduced to the relations between actions and verbal expressions of intention. Moreover, 
if there is an order of priority, then it is surely the other way around: natural or ‘primitive’ 
intentionality is in an important sense a pre-requisite for the language-game of expressing 
intentions. This belongs with what I meant by saying that pre-meditation takes for 
granted the notion of a course of action. I shall try to explain this in more detail.
The notion of a course o f action is quite fundamental to our concept of a 
person;—more fundamental, it may be argued, than that of s'peaking and therefore of the 
verbal expression of intention. The reason for this ought to be obvious: speaking 
presupposes acting, whilst acting does not presuppose speaking (although undoubtedly 
certain kinds of action do). In the first place, speaking itself is behaviour and the use of 
words is intentional, so that anything done in language presupposes acting. Secondly, 
language is a form of behaviour whose nature lies in the way it is woven into other such 
forms: what makes anything language is at least partly a function of its relations to other 
forms of coherent behaviour (i.e. courses of action). The possibility of speaking depends 
upon a coherent life. Intentionality belongs to this coherence; and the life of a child that 
is learning to speak is pervaded by intentional acts. The child learns to speak and it learns 
to formulate intentions, but it would be nonsense to say that acting intentionally as such is 
learned.131 For if the child can be said to be learning anything at all, then it is already 
engaged in intentional acts (in the primitive sense).
So, intention qua being on a course of action is more elementary to the concept of 
intention, i.e. to the phenomenon of intentionality, than is the expression of intention in 
words.— An individual can only express intentions if he can already act. The concept of 
expressing intention in words presupposes and contains the concept of intention in the 
primitive sense. We might also express this by saying that, in its primitive form, intention 
is /^-linguistic: it is a pre-requisite for being able to participate in language generally and in 
the language-game of expressing intentions in particular.
131 I do not think that in a new-born child the progression from incoherent movement to increasingly 
coherent behaviour could be described as learning in the sense in which language is learned.
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In this respect intention differs from greeting. Here too we may conceive of a 
primitive/animal form of greeting without speech — there are plenty examples on the 
animal world that we might wish to call greeting. However — and this is the important 
point — there would be no conceptual difficulty in imagining there being no characteristic 
primitive behaviour expressing greeting prior to the formation of the language-game. By 
contrast, what is interesting about intention — just because it is so fundamental to human 
life — is that the verbal expression of intention is inconceivable except in so far as it is 
embedded in a life pervaded by intentionality in the more primitive sense. It is in these 
contexts that it is philosophically ihuminating to speak of the use of language as an 
extension of primitive behaviour; for it is a grammatical remark on the concept of the 
human form of life.
Consider how the language-game of expressing intentions might be ‘grafted onto’ the 
life of an infant. For example, we might imagine a child getting up to leave the room and 
being asked what he is doing. He answers, ‘I am going outside’. Perhaps the adult will 
encourage him to say this by asking him if he is going outside. Or, we might imagine a 
child being taught to express intentions retrospectively. For example, he might be asked 
whether or not he meant to act in the way he did; or he may be encouraged to say what he 
intended to do. Alternatively we might imagine situations where a child is being taught to 
formulate intentions: an adult asks ‘what are you doing today?’, and so on. Obviously 
these are gross caricatures of the process of learning; the important point, however, is 
that we can imagine the child engaging in various forms of behaviour and the adult 
encouraging him to respond with appropriate verbal expressions of intention. The child 
is either being encouraged to say things expressing the intent of contemporaneous 
courses of action, or he is being prodded into using language to initiate a course of 
action.
Now, it is important to note that, in imagining this grafting o f language onto the life of 
the child, we do not have to imagine that a reaction — i.e. a primitive expression of 
intention — is being replaced by a verbal expression. Rather, in the right context, the 
expressions are woven into the fabric of the life o f the child, either by encouragement or 
on the child’s own initiative. Neither does the criterion o f the child’s having learned to use 
the expressions correctly lie in him being seen to have successfully ‘replaced’ anything.—  
It lies in his being able to go on to use the expression appropriately in future contexts, 
both in connection with his own actions and in the way that the expressions are used in 
connection with other things that he says.
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Similarly, when the child is learning to use the expression, there is of course no 
guarantee that he will take it in the way intended by the adult. This may be explained 
partly by the vagaries of the process of learning generally, but also by the ‘ambiguity’ (in 
the sense explained earlier) of the life of the pre-linguistic child. In these same 
circumstances the child might be learning to express wants or hopes or any number of 
other uses of language. But this does not mean that it is wrong to speak of the 
expressions as being ‘grafted’ onto the natural behaviour/reactions. Again, we do not 
have to interpret this in a literal-minded way as substituting a verbal expression for a 
specific reaction. If the child takes the expression ‘wrongly’ then the adult carries on until 
the child starts to use it correcdy. Certainly the child is learning new reactions which 
cannot be reduced to pre-linguistic ones; but the important point is that these new 
reactions derive much of their character (their role) from their relations to pre-existing 
ones. This is what it means to say that the language-game is grafted onto the reactions of 
the infant. They bring the child into new relations to his own actions; they bring the child 
into new relations to himself as an agent The adult is there to ‘guide’ this new dimension 
of expression into a life that already exists; and the new expressions take their place 
amongst the pre-linguistic modes of behaviour.
All this adds up to one sense in which we may say that the language-game of expressing 
intention is an extension to the life of the pre-linguistic child, or that the pre-linguistic 
behaviour of the child forms the 'basi for, or is ‘at the bottom o f\ the language-game — to 
use Wittgenstein’s phrases. It adds a further dimension of intentionality to its life: it 
introduces new modes of intending. This conception of language as extending primitive 
behaviour conforms to what seems to me to be the most natural interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s own remark from Zettel, which I repeat:
Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many 
natural, instinctive kinds of behaviour towards other human beings, and our language 
is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is 
an extension of primitive behaviour. (For our language-game is behaviour.) (Instinct) (Z 
545)
I draw attention to the way that Wittgenstein speaks o f the language-game as an 
extension of our relations to other people, emphasising that the language-game is itself 
behaviour. This shows that he is not thinking o f a mechanism of concept-formation, but 
of how the role of the language-game in our lives comes from the way it is seated 
amongst ‘natural’ forms o f behaviour — forms which, at the very least, we are not obliged
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to conceive of as being ‘the result of thought’,132 or which, in cases like intention, cannot 
be so conceived.
7 ~ Rhees on Behaviour as the "Prototype of a Way of Thinking'
I have mentioned Rhees’ misgivings about some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on these 
topics. These I shall now examine in more detail. The doubts are expressed in two letters 
to Norman Malcolm in response to Malcolm’s essay Wittgenstein: The relation of 
language to instinctive behaviour’, in which Malcolm expresses enthusiasm for the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein as wishing to explain the genesis of concepts directly out 
of primitive behaviour.133
Rhees is as keen as I have been to deny that Wittgenstein was promulgating such a 
theory. Indeed he expounds his own version of Wolgast’s argument against the theory on 
the grounds of the ambiguity o f primitive reactions,134 though this time the argument is 
identified as originating from within Wittgenstein’s own writings — one more reason for 
thinking that Wittgenstein did not adopt the theory himself. Most o f the first letter135 is 
devoted to examining the role of primitive reactions — linguistic or otherwise — within 
language-games. He argues persuasively that when Wittgenstein spoke of primitive 
reactions he generally had in mind the kind of primitive linguistic reactions described in 
the notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’,—this being in accord with my own 
interpretation of these notes. However, Rhees is less keen on the notion of language- 
games as extensions of primitive behaviour, or on talk o f ‘pre-linguistic’ behaviour; so 
much so, in fact, that he does not mention at all Wittgenstein’s use of the latter phrase in 
his discussion of Zettel 541. This is surprising given that this is the phrase that is most 
strongly suggestive of a theory of concept-formation from roots outside language, and so 
ought to call for special comment. My feeling is that Rhees is intent on steering away from 
these ways of speaking because he can only see in them the tendency towards a ‘theory’. 
Let us trace the course of his argument.
Rhees is cleady uneasy about Zettel 541 as a whole. He begins by warning against 
speaking of behaviour as a ‘prototype of a way of thinking’ (‘a way of thinking’ is not
132 Z 541.
133 Norman Malcolm, ‘Wittgenstein: The relation of language to instinctive behaviour’, Philosophical 
Investigations, 5:1, January 1982, pp. 3-22. (Malcolm 1)
134 Rhees4 p. 7.
1351 shall concentrate here on the first o f these letters which is most directly concerned with the topics in 
this chapter. The topics dealt with in the second letter will be treated in Chapter 7.
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equivalent here to a concept— as will emerge). He argues that a form of behaviour is only a 
prototype of a way of thinking when seen as already having a place within the language- 
game; hence it would not be a prototype in an animal since there is no further issue.136 I 
think he has in mind here that in the animal the equivalent behaviour is not ‘a way of 
thinking’ of a prototypical kind, whereas in a person it belongs with our ways of thinking. 
Thus, what would be regarded as ‘mere behaviour’ in an animal is treated as a component of 
the articulate expression of thought in a person. Rhees expresses this by speaking of such 
behaviour as ‘something akin to a gesture’, to emphasise its belonging to the field of 
meaning.™
What Rhees is trying to do here, or so it appears to me, is to treat the primitive gestural 
behaviour — for which we may find analogues in the instinctive responses of animals — as 
having similar status to the prototype language-games, i.e. as instinctive reactions giving 
character to the language-games. But I think the comparison can only be taken so far. I 
agree that such behaviour is not the same thing in the life o f a person as its equivalent is 
in the life of an animal, just because it does stand in a relation to the use of language in the 
person in a way that it does not in the animal. That makes it more like language,—more 
akin to a gesture. But there remains an important difference between prototype language- 
games and such behaviour even within the language-game just because the prototype 
language-games can stand on their own (or can be conceived of as standing on their own) 
as primitive forms of language.— That is why it makes sense to call them prototypes. But 
this will not work with primitive behaviour o f no intrinsic linguistic content. Outside the 
context of language, the behaviour is not articulate and is not a ‘gesture’; inside language 
its being a ‘gesture’ depends on its relations to ways of speaking and so cannot be 
conceived o f as a prototype for them. The behaviour may be ‘primitive’ to the language- 
game — but that is different. From this perspective, then, it is not obvious why we should 
want to call primitive behaviour of this type a prototype of a way of thinking at all. So let 
us try another tack.
Rhees’ interpretation of ‘the prototype o f a way of thinking’ conflicts with other 
phrases in Zettel 541 and with his own treatment of them. Firstly, that Wittgenstein has in 
mind something coming before language shows in the fact that ‘a prototype of a way of 
thinking’ is clearly intended to be understood in the light of the remark ‘that this sort of
136 Rhees4 p. 2.
137 Ibid. p. 2.
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behaviour is pre-linguistic. Matters get more confused in Rhees’ conclusion. Criticising 
Wittgenstein’s use of another phrase in Zettel 541, he says:
...and we should not say “daft ein Sprachspiel aufiht beruht” (“that a language-game is
based on it”): you wouldn’t know what was meant by that. (Rhees4 p. 2)
Here he does seem bothered that the phrase is suggestive of a theory of concept- 
formation, and yet it is surely intended by Wittgenstein to be understood in the same way 
as ca prototype of a way of thinking’. My feeling is that Rhees is over anxious to make 
Wittgenstein’s talk of ‘prototypes’ in this remark consistent with the way he uses it 
elsewhere to refer to primitive linguistic reactions (primitive to language-games). This goes 
with the fact that he insists that Wittgenstein’s use of the phrase, ‘[o]ur language-game is 
an extension of primitive behaviour’ must refer to an extension of an existing language- 
game, in spite o f the fact the Wittgenstein has just spoken of this behaviour as pre- 
UnguisticP8 But he cannot cover up the loose ends. I think we can make more consistent 
sense of Zettel 541 along the lines I have been developing earlier in this chapter. Let me 
begin with a fresh example.
I think one can safely assert that running is, as a matter of fact, a natural, primitive 
behaviour for humans. We might then suppose a wide variety o f sports or games to be 
based on this behaviour. I am not treating the primitive reaction here as itself a game, but it 
is an activity around which games may be formed, so we may say that they are ‘based on it’ 
in that sense. This would not be to presume that the game of football, for example, was 
generated out of the primitive reaction; it does not mean that that instinctive behaviour 
must lead to a certain game — any number of different games might grow up around it in a 
spontaneous and unpredictable way. Furthermore, we even might say — and again without 
suggesting any kind of inevitability — that the primitive reaction partly determines the 
character of the game,—in the sense in which it does not determine anything in the game 
of chess, for example. In other words, running lends itself to the formation of some games 
and not others but does not of itself take any responsibility for generating any of them; 
no game could be predicted just from the primitive behaviour. This seems to me to be a 
perfectly natural sense in which we might speak of a game being based on primitive 
behaviour.
Now in this particular example we would probably not wish to speak of the primitive 
reaction as the prototype for the game, since running about is not in itself a game. If one 
thing is a prototype for another then it ought at least be something of the same or similar
138 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
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kind — of which games and merely running about clearly are not. If, on the other hand, 
the primitive behaviour did show elements of being ‘game-like’, then we might be more 
inclined to speak of it as a prototype. For example, if it were a natural instinct for young 
children to kick things about between themselves (comparable with a dog’s instinct to 
retrieve, or the game-like behaviour that young animals often show), then we would be 
more inclined to call this behaviour the prototype of the game of football (here we might 
also say that the game is based on the reaction in a rather more substantial sense). What we 
are looking for in a prototype, then, is primitive behaviour that merits description, to at 
least some degree, in terms characteristic of games proper.
Turning our thoughts again to language, we might say that this is precisely the point in 
the argument that creates the most difficulty: the gulf in kind between primitive behaviour 
and language is just too great. But in fact this depends very much on the dimension in 
which we are looking for the connection. We certainly cannot bridge it by looking for an 
analogue in primitive behaviour to the articulation of concepts.— So much is agreed. But as 
I have argued earlier in this chapter, language and primitive behaviour show connections 
in kind in quite another dimension, namely in the role that they have in our lives. And I 
would suggest that it is this that Wittgenstein has in mind when speaking of a ‘prototype 
of a way of thinking’.— He does not speak of primitive behaviour as the prototype 
articulation of a concept.
This interpretation is suggested, though not developed, by Winch in his own comments 
on Malcolm’s essay:
If we look at the crying, etc. of a small child as the prototype of the adult’s use of pain 
language, we are seeing it -  the crying — from the vantage point of our mastery of pain 
language.139
Elsewhere, he makes the same point more explicitly with reference to PI 244 — again 
responding to Malcolm:
Words are said to be substituted for the original, natural expression of sensation. The 
reaction is a reaction to being hurt. What the child is taught is newpain-behaviour, i.e. this 
replaces an earlier form ofpain behaviour:140
139 Peter Winch, ‘Norman Malcolm, Wittgensteinian Themes Essays 1978-1989, Philosophical Investigations, 20:1, 
January 1997, p. 61.
140 Peter Winch, ‘Discussion o f Malcolm’s Essay’, in: Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein: A  Religious Point of 
View?, ed. P. Winch, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 123. (Winch)
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And then with reference to Wittgenstein’s notes ‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’:
And here too the primitive reactions with which Wittgenstein compares our language- 
game are themselves described in terms taken from that language-game; they are seen 
from the point o f  view o f  that language-game. They are ‘reactions towards a cause\XAX
Rhees himself makes a remark that is suggestive of this. Commenting on Wittgenstein’s 
use of the phrase ‘a way of thinking’, he cites as a possible example someone saying ‘I 
can’t help thinking about the man we saw on the street I wonder if they were able to 
help him’.142 The example illustrates that ‘a way of thinking’ is not just ‘concepts put 
together in a certain order’, as it were, but has to do with the way in which what we say is 
a response to the events around us. In what he says, the man shows how he is preoccupied 
about an event, and it is the preoccupation that characterises the way o f thinking. Now this, 
and here I may depart from Rhees, bears comparison with an adult animal’s 
preoccupation with its injured offspring, for example. To say that the behaviour o f the 
animal is the prototype of ‘a way of thinking’ (in us, of course, not in the animal) would 
have sense not because the behaviour is the prototype for saying these words — it is not a 
prototype for language — but because of the way that both are expressions o f certain kind of 
preoccupation. The way in which the animal responds on a purely behavioural level is (or 
could be) the prototype for the kind o f response that we express in language. And of 
course the two expressions of preoccupation are not merely analogous: what makes what 
the man says an expression of preoccupation is determined in large part by the way that 
the use of words belongs with the kind of behaviour shared with the animal.— It is an 
extension of primitive preoccupation. We might express the point grammatically by saying 
that it belongs to the grammar of ‘preoccupation’ that it may be expressed either in 
natural forms of behaviour or in language.
We may apply these thoughts again to my principal example: intention. For we may say 
that the use of language to express intentions is ‘a way of thinking’. Primitive 
intentionality and primitive expressions of intention have lent themselves to the 
formation of the language-game of expressing intentions: it is based on them; it has 
grown up around them. We might also say that primitive intentionality partly determines 
the character of the language-game, just because if the language-game were not woven 
into primitive intentionality it would just not be the language-game of expressing 
intentions.—-The concept o f intention constrains what would count as a language-game of
141 Ibid. p. 123.
142 Rhees4 p. 2.
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expressing intentions. And so we may speak of ‘natural’ expressions of intention as the 
prototypes for verbal expressions, not because they are verbal expressions ‘in the making’ 
but because they are part of the phenomenon around which the language-game of 
expressing intentions has grown up and within which the language-game has its role. The 
natural and verbal expressions are both expressions of intention,— and in that sense are 
things of the same kind. It belongs to the grammar of ‘intention’ that it may have both 
natural and linguistic expressions, of which the former are more elementary.
8 ~ Returning to Wolgast
Rhees is worried about certain ways of speaking about language because he sees in 
them, and often rightly so, a tendency towards theorising on how language and concepts 
generated themselves out of pre-linguistic behaviour. The fact he sees no other 
possibilities in these ways of speaking may stem from an inclination to speak only from a 
perspective within the language-games. This allows him to illustrate how such behaviour 
has a fundamental but non-generative role to play in the game, but without him having to 
make the observation that the language-games may also be regarded as forming part of 
the larger phenomena of human life. As a result, these larger connections between 
linguistic and primitive dimensions o f our forms of life go unrecognised. Wolgast’s failure 
to acknowledge these same connections is rooted in a similarly too narrow focus on what 
language does for us.
The immediate cause of the shortcoming in her account — which I have already hinted 
at — lies, I suspect, in her confusion of the different conceptions of the ‘use’ of language 
referred to earlier, i.e. 1) to articulate concepts, and 2) as part of the phenomena of hoping 
intending, etc. Because she does not recognise this second conception, she takes it for 
granted that whatever is at stake when we inquire into the relation of language-games to pre- 
linguistic behaviour always amounts to the same issue of how our concepts are rooted in 
pre-linguistic behaviour, i.e. concept-formation. Hence she allows herself no room for 
manoeuvre to entertain the kind of alternative I have been expounding. The ease with 
which she makes the transition from language-game to concept, and then to concept- 
formation, is clearly visible. For example, commenting on Xettel 541:
But what is the word “primitive” meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of 
behaviour is pre-linguistic. that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of 
a way of thinking and not the result of thought.
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She says:
‘Language is a refinement’ and not the original form o f  expression, which is action 
(C&E p. 395). Thus the concepts of language begin in ‘behaviour that is pre- 
linguistic’ (Zettel 541) and in situations where doubt and verification are not 
applicable. (Wolgast2 p. 600) (my emphasis)
Similarly:
Acting with certainty is the original of the concept of certainty, the language game 
of certainty (Wolgast2 p. 599).... The crucial difficulty with the account is....the 
ambiguity that surrounds the question rvhat language game they ground. D oes pulling 
back from a hot object give rise to the concept of cause, of fear, of caution? What 
would show us which of them originates with it? (Wolgast2 p. 597) (my emphases)
And:
...I want to explore the way he proposed that primitive reactions could account for 
concepts....(Wolgast2. p. 588)
Wolgast seems to start from the idea that it is the concepts — or their possession — that are 
imagined to be extensions of primitive behaviour. This leads naturally to the picture of 
primitive behaviour as if it were in some sense already the expression o f an idea, where the 
‘original of the concept’ is already embedded or represented in some way in the primitive 
behaviour. The invitation to a theory of concept-formation is now irresistible, for if we 
then imagine attaching words to these primitive expressions, or replacing the primitive 
expression with words, this cannot but lead to the concept being represented in words.
Wolgast argued correctly that this model cannot work, if only because the behaviour or 
reaction cannot be uniquely related to any one concept and so cannot take responsibility 
for generating it. But what she has destroyed is a myth of the genesis o f language that is 
of her own creation, not Wittgenstein’s. And as far as the actual origin of language is 
concerned (either of linguistic behaviour or the concepts embedded in it), there is nothing 
in my account that is alien to Wittgenstein’s own remark on these origins,— a remark 
quoted approvingly by Wolgast but from which she wrongly thinks him departing:
Y ou must bear in mind that the language-game is so to say something unpredictable. I 
mean: it is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable).
It is there — like our life. (OC 559)
The source of Wolgast’s assumption — that what is at issue is the relation between 
concepts and behaviour — may be traced to her own view of language. My criticism of 
Wolgast has been founded principally upon grammatical observations on the relations 
between language and action, both in respect of Wittgenstein’s definition of a language-
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game as language and the actions into which it is woven’ and in respect of the notion 
that certain phenomena of human life, such as intention, comprise both language and non- 
linguistic behavioural components. Language is a component of these phenomena. It is 
significant that these considerations play virtually no part in Wolgast’s discussion. The 
reason for this appears to be that, although she does acknowledge at one point ‘the 
change that language makes in their lives’,143 she seems inclined to view language rather as 
an independent addition to our repertoire of behaviours;— independent in the sense that its 
character does not come especially from the way that it is woven into the rest of our lives: 
we have non-vocal behaviour, and then, in parallel to that, we have vocal behaviour.
This conception is evident in her account of language as something developing out of 
spontaneous vocalisations:
The reactions I mean are the spontaneous vocalisings o f  humans — the babbling 
sounds infants make long before learning to utter words. Such vocal noise-making 
truly is one source o f  language, and together with the ability to mimic sounds, it is a 
crucial requirement o f  mastering a language. (Wolgast2 p. 597-8)
The instinct to vocalise shows language itself as a kind o f  doing, a noise-making that 
later connects with making stylised designs on paper. Seen in this way, we have no 
purchase on the thought that language is separate from activity: it is activity, even a 
whole family o f  activities — greeting, expressing feelings, reporting, telling stories, 
joking, many more. (Wolgast2 p. 601)
Speech belongs to humans in the way that mimicking sounds belongs to parrots, it 
grows spontaneously out o f  the creatures we are; and that is all one need say o f  
language’s basis and explanation. One does not need to ground particular concepts in 
particular kinds o f  reactions. (Wolgast2 p. 601)
So using language is an activity — one amongst a variety o f activities. It is the activity of 
producing vocalisations. It is vocal as distinct from  non-vocal behaviour. Vocal behaviour 
has a character of its own — as do the babbling of the child, or making ‘stylised designs on 
paper’, or the mimicry of parrots. It is within this activity that we have all that we need to 
‘explain’ language. In other words what we seem to have is a new version of the view of 
language that Wittgenstein was trying to get away from, namely the view of language as a 
kind of autonomous activity whose nature can be grasped without bothering to look at 
how the sense of what we say has to do with the way that language is woven into our 
actions;—that what we say is a constituent of our actions.
As I have noted, Wolgast does indeed speak of ‘the change that language makes in their 
lives’,—which does suggest a connection with other activities. But the lack of emphasis 
that this is given leads one to suppose that such connections are to be conceived of only
143 Wolgast2 p. 601.
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as a consequence of using language (the changes that follow from our grasp of concepts), not 
something to which reference must be made if we are to understand what it is to use 
language at all. Against this I would argue, as I believe Wittgenstein would, that 
Vocalising’ is only language in the way it is woven into other activities. Thus it is legitimate 
to inquire about these connections; and it is as part of this inquiry that the notion of 
language as an extension of primitive, non-linguistic modes of behaviour has its place.
Weighed down with her conception o f language, it is not difficult to see how it leads 
Wolgast to the interpretation o f Wittgenstein as holding that concepts are extensions of 
primitive behaviour. For Wolgast a sufficient account of language is an account of how 
concepts are embedded in it, of how we articulate concepts in it;—language only as the 
servant of the intellect, one might say. This makes it difficult to see how language is a part 
of the phenomena of intending, hoping, believing, knowing, greeting, etc. Hence any 
account of the use of language in terms of its relations to, or dependence on, pre- 
linguistic behaviour will almost inevitably be construed as an attempt to explain the origin 
of its concepts in primitive behaviour.144
Wolgast cites as an example o f Wittgenstein’s leaning towards Voundationalism’, the 
following: ‘I want to say: it is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which 
it grows consists in steady ways of living, regular ways of acting’.145 But in the case of 
remarks such as these, we should surely begin not by assuming that Wittgenstein is 
engaged in a transcendental speculation — i.e. from some supposed vantage point outside 
normal discourse — but by assuming that this is a grammatical remark, and then asking 
oneself how it is a grammatical remark. In this case, the remark is saying that the concept 
o f language is the concept of something in the life o f a creature whose life is made up of 
regular ways o f acting which do not themselves depend on linguistic activity.— It is a 
remark connecting the grammar of language’ with the grammar of ‘acting’. We should 
not be stopped in this interpretation just because his statement has the outward form of a 
factual speculation, since it is a commonplace for grammatical remarks to take on the 
clothing of empirical propositions.146 Indeed, Wittgenstein himself takes pains to remind 
us of just this point For example, in Zettel (as quoted earlier), after a series of remarks 
which outwardly are descriptions of how a child might learn to doubt, he remarks:
144 Wolgast may well be right that the spontaneous babbling of infants is as a matter o f fact ‘one source of 
language’.— Certainly this is how an adult treats them. This is not a point o f contention.
145 C&E p. 397.
146 This was discussed in Chapter 2. It is just natural to articulate grammatical relations in factual language. 
This is harmless as long as it is recognised.
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A m  I doing child psychology?— I am making  a connexion between the concept o f  
teaching and the concept o f  meaning. (Z 412)
I began the chapter by referring to the conflict Wolgast felt between the Philosophical 
Investigations and the remarks on primitive reactions scattered elsewhere. I have argued 
that the schism is not real but is the product of a limited conception of the framework 
within which the philosopher studies language,—one that fails to recognise that the role 
of language in our lives is itself something of which we have a conception, and hence is a 
legitimate object for grammatical investigation in its own right.
9 ~ Having Something to Say*—Again
Returning to Gaita’s having something say’ is living a life and speaking out of it’, it will 
be part of an understanding of this to see how coming to have things to say may also be 
regarded as an extension of our life from its pre-linguistic form;—how the growth of a 
person’s having things to say is a constitutive extension of the self. For this to be a 
substantial claim, grammatical connections will have to be shown between the notion of 
having something to say and what is manifest in the life of a pre-linguistic child. There 
will have to be an analogue to having something to say’ in the life of the pre-linguistic 
child, just as there are natural expressions of intention to complement the expression of 
intention in language.
We may note first of all that what we are looking for here is not so much prototype 
utterance, but the prototype o f having something to say’. These are different. For we saw 
in the previous chapter that having something to say’ is not to be understood merely as 
exercising one’s command over the techniques for using words; rather it is seen in the 
way that speaking is an essential manifestation of person-hood.— Otherwise it is not 
hving a life and speaking out of it’.
We need to recognise how the child’s understanding of what is going about him (and 
within him) shows in the way that he engages with and addresses the people around him. 
Part o f our understanding of what it is to have something to say’ will be through the 
ways in which the child’s primitive understanding of its environment — the coherence in 
its life — emerges in how it addresses itself to other people. I do not think it is difficult to 
imagine the circumstances in which we might say of a pre-linguistic child — or of a dog, 
even — that he is ‘trying to tell us something’. This is the prototype for having something
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to say’; and of course these are the very kinds circumstances in which we will be 
expecting the child’s first use of words to emerge.
For another slant on this we can return again to the example of belief. In this chapter I 
have explained how the use of language can be regarded as part of the phenomenon of 
belief. It will be remembered that I also used this example in the previous chapter to 
illustrate how the possession of a concept may not lie solely in the ability to apply it, since 
the ability to express beliefs in language is itself integral to having the concept of it. Taking 
these together we may say that the phenomenon o f belief — belief itself — enters into the 
possession of the concept of it. This means that the growth of the person’s grasp of the 
concept o f belief may be regarded as an aspect o f the way that the self is extended in the 
development of speech. Here, the formation of the concept can be seen to be more 
closely entwined with the notion of language as an extension of primitive behaviour’ — 
thought still not in any foundationalist sense — than the more general case where our 
understanding of a concept lies rather more squarely upon what we grasp when we grasp 
its application.
We are a long way now from the simplistic conception of the relation between language 
and instinctive behaviour modelled just on the blindness of the application of a rule. But 
in saying that we must look at the having of things to say and the possession of the 
concepts to do with the use of language as manifestations of our humanity, we have not 
departed from the fundamental principle. For these too are conceptions at the bottom of 
which is ‘the given’,—the bedrock of human activity which ‘is not reasonable (or 
unreasonable)’ but is ‘there — like our life’.147
7 ~ Conclusion
My main task in this chapter has been to distinguish more clearly the different senses in 
which the character of a language-game may be determined in the way that instinctive, i.e. 
ungrounded, modes of behaviour contribute to it. On the one hand, we may speak of the 
primitiveness of certain linguistic reactions within language-games, these being 
determinants of the grammars of the concepts embedded in them. On the other hand, 
however, we may speak of instinctive, pre-linguistic modes of behaviour as the 
framework out of which linguistic modes of behaviour emerge;—the grammatical nature 
of this observation lying in the fact that our conception of the language-game includes the
147 OC 559.
97
concept of the pre-linguistic behavioural context, or — to broaden the context — where 
the linguistic mode of expression is conceived of as a component of a larger dimension 
of our form of life which includes pre-linguistic, instinctive behaviour.
We also looked at the situation that arises especially with concepts to do with language, 
where the fundamental element in the grasp o f the concept lies not just with specific uses 
of words, but in the relation to language as a whole,—this relation including pre-linguistic 
elements. Thus, in the example of belief, the grasp of the concept belief is dependent on 
and interwoven with our capacity to engage in that whole mode in the use of language, 
the nature of which is itself determined in the way it is a part of the larger phenomenon of 
belief within our form of life. This illustrates another principle, namely that our grasp of 
certain specific concepts cannot be understood merely in terms of operating with signs, 
not just in the sense (expounded in the previous chapter) that it also has to do with 
having something to say’, but in the sense that our grasp o f these concepts is a function 
of the way that the very constitution of our person-hood is extended in the emergence of 
these language-games — extended out of our instinctive modes of life, not out of some 
prior mode of reasoning.
In the following two chapters I shall develop this latter dimension with further 
examples, firstly by looking at how the fact o f our being subjects of experience enters 
into the formation and possession of subjective, or psychological, concepts, and then, in 
Chapter 7, by examining how the roots of the concepts of knowledge and certainty are to 
be found in action.
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Chapter 6 ~  Subjective Concepts and the Extension of
Subjectivity
1 ~ Introduction
If we want to judge whether a child has the concept o f colour, beyond the ability merely 
to make correct judgements, we will look firstly at the way that the concept is woven into 
the child's use of language as a whole: at its ability to talk sense with the concepts and to 
distinguish sense and nonsense in the way the concept is used in conversation generally. 
We would also look at the way that the child shows appreciation of the subjective qualities 
of coloured objects: the way it makes comparisons with other colours, expresses likes and 
dislikes, reacts to harmony and disharmony between colours, etc. We would also look at 
the way that the child reacts to other people’s judgements about, and reactions to, colours. 
These all belong to the child's possession of the concept o f colour, and they show 
whether the child has got hold of the grammar of ‘colour'. But what they also show is 
that the child's having a concept o f colour involves not just linguistic competence but 
engages with its subjective relations and responses to coloured objects. I believe that 
similar considerations will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any concepts in which subjective 
reactions such as these play a part, including, for example, our reactions to the pain and 
suffering of others. It is the role that the individual’s subjectivity plays in the possession 
of psychological concepts that I wish to discuss in this chapter.
It has become a commonplace for critics of Wittgenstein, in the light of his 
preoccupation with the operational use of language, to complain that he ignores what has 
often been called ‘the subjective character of experience' and, moreover, that in his 
‘private language argument'148 he attempts to eliminate the relevance of subjective 
experience to the formation of concepts by a reduction of psychological states to external 
behaviour. He was aware o f this criticism himself:
Back to ‘neglecting’! It seems that I neglect life. But not life physiologically understood 
but life as consciousness. And consciousness not physiologically understood, or 
understood from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience, the 
appearance of the world, the world. (NFL p. 255)
148 PI 243-315.
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Wittgenstein seems to deny the reality of subjective experience because the essential 
feature of his private language argument is precisely that meaning cannot be (i.e. it makes 
no sense to speak of it being) determined by reference to our own subjective states. It is 
then concluded that the supposed subjective quality of experience must fall outside the 
linguistic equation, and any reference to it that cannot be analysed into outward 
behaviour (or, in other philosophies, into ‘physical states’ such as brain states) may 
therefore be dismissed as ‘metaphysical’. This conclusion has been felt distasteful within 
the philosophical community because, historically, one reason for of the demand for a 
philosophy of mind has been precisely in order to accommodate the evident reality o f the 
subjective qualities of experience. It is the nature of these qualities that we most wish to 
understand, and so the struggle in philosophy has been to overcome the difficulties of 
finding a place for them, not to agree to their elimination.
The first response to this conclusion must be to say that the private language argument 
is, in any case, being misused if it is used to sanction such a reduction; for it is concerned 
only to refute certain conceptions of how words refer to subjective states,149 not to deny 
that they refer to them — still less to deny them absolutely or to deny their qualities. 
Certainly the argument has a bearing on our understanding of the dimensions within 
which subjective qualities exist — their grammar — but that is all. And once the confused 
conceptions have been dealt with, the remainder of the grammar of subjective concepts 
stands intact and awaits elucidation. It is here that we will find the accommodation we 
seek.
We may start by asking how Wittgenstein’s ‘neglect’ becomes an issue at all. From what 
point of view, or in what circumstances, does it matter that the subjective reality o f our 
subjective states is being ignored? The answer surely is that our preoccupation with 
subjective states is not something that arises only as a problem in the ‘abstract5 but is 
prompted by introspection; in other words, it is something arising as a reaction to our own 
subjective experience. Given this, it is perhaps not surprising, indeed it is understandable, 
that the subject’s reaction to his own subjectivity should strike him as a reaction to a 
‘something’, the essential nature of which is independent of its outward expression — and 
indeed as only accidentally connected with it. After all, if the concepts of subjectivity 
really are not reducible to concepts of external behaviour, then it follows that the 
experience we have of ourselves under the aspect o f those concepts will be an experience 
of the mind as independent of its outward conditions.—A consciousness of itself as a
149 See, for example, Winch pp. 122-123.
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detached entity is perfectly intelligible in this light. This experience is captured in a 
remark by Wittgenstein:
It seems that I can trace my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body. And 
the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body, the 
identity of my mind. (NFL p. 270)
So it is the reality which we attribute as subjects to our subjective experience that we find 
puzzling and which we wish to do justice to. For this reason, I believe that the root of the 
problem really lies with our understanding of the general nature of subjectivity, of which 
the more direct question of how words referring to subjective qualities get their meaning 
should be treated as only a facet. This approach to the philosophy of mind through the 
general concept of subjectivity is not novel. It was introduced into the philosophical 
debate in recent times in a most striking way by Thomas Nagel in his controversial paper 
W hat is it like to be a bat’,150 which has continued to provoke comment and 
consternation. It has been argued by Patricia Hanna,151 for example, that Nagel’s 
conception of subjectivity remains vulnerable to the private language argument. This has 
been disputed by Mounce,152 who argues that Nagel is rightly defensive of the 
irreducibility of subjectivity to objective concepts. For myself, I am not convinced that 
Nagel is innocent of the confusions that Hanna finds in his paper. However, my 
sympathies are with the understanding of subjectivity as Mounce develops it, and I am in 
agreement with his criticisms of accounts of mental concepts typified by Hanna and 
others such as Hacker153 — especially on the issue of the application of mental concepts, and 
on the use of criteria. Both of these issues will be pursued.
In developing an understanding of subjectivity, we will examine some aspects of the 
private language argument as they apply here; we will look at some of the difficulties 
inherent in Nagel’s notion that ‘there is something that it is like to be a bat’; and we will 
also examine some of the confusions surrounding the role o f criteria in the deployment 
o f concepts in general and mental concepts in particular. More generally, we will develop 
a critique of some of the ways that objectivity has been invoked as a condition of the use of 
language. This will lead to the core of this investigation, which will concentrate on the 
relation between subjectivity and primitive linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour, an
150 Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, Philosophical Review, 83,1974, pp. 435-450. (Nagel)
151 Patricia Hanna, ‘Must Thinking Bats be Conscious?’, Philosophical Investigations, 13:4, October 1990, pp. 
350-356, (Hanna); see also Patricia Hanna, ‘If You Can’t Talk About It, You Can’t Talk About It — A 
response to H O Mounce’, Philosophical Investigations, 15:2, April 1992, pp. 185-190.
152 H. O. Mounce, ‘On Nagel and Consciousness’, Philosophical Investigations, 15:2, April 1992, pp. 178-184. 
(Mounce 1)
153 P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). (Hacker2)
aspect of which will be the conception of the language-games of subjectivity as extensions 
of our lives as subjects. Finally we will examine how this bears on our relations to these 
concepts within philosophical investigation, which will be treated in ways I have already 
employed with the concepts belief 2nd time.
Before continuing, I should add a caveat regarding the use of the term ‘subjectivity’ and 
related terms. Unless otherwise stated, ‘subjectivity’ should not be taken in these 
discussions to refer to subjective judgements as to how things appear, rather it refers to the 
properties of the subject qua subject. For example, ‘I am in pain’ is a manifestation of the 
subject, not a judgement as to how things seem to the subject. Where I do speak of 
subjective judgements, this should be taken to refer to judgements as to how things 
appear.
2 ~ The Objectification of Subjective Experience
The change in philosophical perspective — which I have argued for earlier — from the 
conception of language as a view of the world ‘from the boundary’ to being a view of the 
world ‘from the midst’ is the same transition that we require in order to judge properly 
the place in our lives of the concepts of subjective phenomena. The ‘view from the 
boundary’ may be expressed in the idea that concepts are, as it were, ‘intelligible in 
themselves’, i.e. as carrying a sense that is determined transcendentally to the 
circumstances o f the language-game in which they are employed (and in which we would 
otherwise say they were determined). At the heart of this conception has been the 
tendency to objectify the subject’s own subjective relation to his experiences and 
perceptions. We might call this the objectification of the subject qua subject. The most 
characteristic expression of this tendency is to be seen in the notion of private ostensive 
definition. The essence of private ostensive definition is the idea that there is a mode of 
judgement whose terms are defined wholly subjectively, i.e. in terms of how things appear; 
but which nevertheless yields judgements that are, for all that, objective. Hence one may 
seem to be able to lay down a rule for ‘naming’ a sensation subjectively and then go on to 
make sensible uses of the word which are objectively guaranteed even though this guarantee is 
wholly dependent on a subjective judgement that one is using it in the same way as in the original ostensive 
definition. Even within the confines of purely subjective judgement making, then, the 
subject is presented as standing in a kind of ‘Archimedean vantage point’ upon his own 
experiences. The whole of the egocentric, empiricist epistemology is based on this
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conception. The private language argument is designed to show that this is not an 
intelligible position. Let us outline the argument
It has been pointed out that ‘the’ private language argument is not one but a complex of 
arguments.154 For present purposes we may consider it as having two principal struts. The 
first is that in defining a word ‘privately’, i.e. subjectively, all one can ever obtain is the 
impression that one is following a rule, and so, for all that, one is not following a rule. It can 
make no sense to speak of a language founded on subjective judgement, for the only 
connection between the private ostensive definition and the subsequent use is the further 
subjective judgement that it is being used in the same way.—In other words, the 
subjective judgement that the word is being used ‘in the same way’ is internal to the 
subsequent use. The second is that any act of naming must take for granted a technique 
(convention) within which there is such a thing as naming.— There must be both a rule and 
a linguistic role.155 Both o f these are important to Wittgenstein and are, in any case, 
strongly connected; for in an obvious sense we cannot get so far as to make judgements 
at all (subjective or otherwise) if there is no linguistic framework for them, and it cannot 
make sense to speak of such a framework being established within the confines of purely 
subjective circumstances. The over-arching principle, then, is the demand for objective 
circumstances, since only then can the judgement that a person has learnt a rule, or 
grasped a concept, make any sense. The conclusion of the private language argument is 
that the necessary investment o f objectivity into the language-games expressing subjective 
states must be by means of their outward manifestations, not in their purely introspective 
modes. Expressed grammatically, the concept of a language-game is the concept 
something rooted objective circumstances and that this holds also for the concepts 
embedded in it.
At this point it may be helpful to remind ourselves of a distinction made in Chapter 2. 
Amongst our concepts are the concepts of the language-games in which other concepts 
are expressed. My principle example was intention', we have the concept of the linguistic 
expression of intention, and we also have the concept of intention per se. Hence we may 
distinguish between the elucidation of a given concept and the elucidation of the concept 
of the language-game o f which that concept is a component. In the latter case, the
154 For example see David G. Stem, ‘A new exposition of the “private language argument”: Wittgenstein’s 
“Notes for the Thilosophical Lecture’”, Philosophical Investigations, 17:3, July 1994, pp. 552-565.
155 I have already argued that speaking a language must amount to more than operating a rule in the 
exercise o f a particular function. But that does not mean that such operational features are not necessary 
components of speaking. So it remains legitimate to criticise conceptions of language that conflict with 
these conditions.
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concept of the language-game is the concept of the circumstances in which a person may 
be said to have the concept. And belonging to these circumstances will, of course, be 
features relevant to the judgement that the person is following a rule. One root of the 
demand for objectivity, therefore, arises out of the grammar o f the concept language-game, 
and it is in supplying the facts that surround the language-game, and which are essential 
to it, that this demand is satisfied.
Now there will be cases where, when describing the circumstances of the 
language-game, our description will contain facts that function as criteria for the 
application of the concepts embedded in i t  For example, if I am to give an account of 
the language-game of investigating symptoms and attributing diseases, I may include a 
description of, say, the symptoms of measles and hence the criteria for employing the 
concept measles. In this kind of case the description of the circumstances which justify the 
application of the concept of the disease does not take for granted the concept itself: we 
can understand the description of the symptoms without assuming that we already have 
an understanding of the concept measles. In this instance, then, we easily satisfy the need 
for the circumstances of the language-game to be seen to be objective.—The objectivity 
of the account lies straightforwardly in the ability to give an account of a set o f factual 
circumstances. In other situations, however, the objectivity o f the language-game may not 
be quite so easily located.
I am thinking particulady of the situation where the employment of the concepts 
embedded within the language-game may also be essential to the description of the 
circumstances o f the language-game. For example, a description of the circumstances in 
which colour concepts are employed will take for granted an understanding o f the colour 
concepts. In this situation there will be no such thing as an independent description of 
the criteria for applying the concepts, since there are no criteria for the application of 
colour concepts. So although the concepts enter into the description o f the circumstances 
o f the language-game, no further facts are adduced in support of them (just because they 
have no criteria); hence the description as such is circular and so may be said not to have 
established the objectivity of the language-game. But this does not mean that there is no 
demonstrable objectivity in the circumstances o f the language-game. For in this kind of 
case the objectivity of the language-game lies just in the agreement in linguistic reactions 
amongst participants, not in any agreement over the facts that the language-game is based 
on. Hence the demonstration of its objectivity will rest on a recognition of this agreement. 
We may also note -  as I have argued in Chapter 2 — that the determination of concepts
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through (shared) practice is more fundamental than by reference to facts, hence the 
agreement in reactions is at the bottom of the objectivity o f #//language-games, including 
those where facts do enter into the determination of concepts.
Now the important point here, for our present purposes at least, is that the objectivity 
lies in the agreement rather than in the kind o f reaction. There is therefore nothing to 
exclude subjective reactions from amongst those that can go to determine concepts,—as 
long as they are shared,\ This is why there is no essential conflict between the demand for 
objectivity and the possibility, as we shall see, that the grasp of the concepts embedded 
within the language-game may, in an important sense, be an expression or outgrowth of 
our lives as subjects,—the limiting factor here being that the subjective component may 
not function as a ground or justification for the concept. Nevertheless, the kind of 
subjective reaction will also be a determining feature of the grammar or sense of the 
concept of which it is a component.
The main thrust of the private language argument, then, was to make a case against a 
particular and pervasive conception of how words refer to subjective states. The positive 
account of how these words refer begins with the argument that what is required is an 
established technique or practice forming the substratum of the practice of speaking, this 
being an outward manifestation of our form of life. But a full account of the establishment 
of mental concepts will need to demonstrate the role of the subjective dimension of our 
form of life as a determinant of these referential relations. I shall return to this later in the 
chapter. Firsdy, however, we need to re-establish confidence in the very notion of 
subjectivity, which the confused responses to the private language argument have tended 
to undermine.
3 ~ Nage/’s Impasse
The destructive effect o f the private language argument on private ostensive definition 
— and hence on empiricism and egocentric subjective epistemologies generally — was 
taken in many quarters to be a denial that the formation of the concepts of subjective 
experience can itself incorporate subjective phenomena in their determination. Moreover, 
it was commonly felt that Wittgenstein must be some sort of behaviourist since this 
seemed to follow directly from the argument that the rules for the use o f mental concepts 
must be laid down in the objective circumstances of outward human behaviour and
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transparent to any independent objective observer.156 As I have intimated, it was hardly a 
step at all — or so it seemed — from this condition to the belief that whatever mental 
words mean must be exhausted in the objective behavioural phenomena constituting 
those circumstances. The bland defences that it just is written into the language-game 
that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with and without pain, or that ‘pain’ 
simply does not mean ‘behaviour’, but without at the same time giving a full account of 
how that difference is supposed to be constituted, seemed just to avoid the issue and were 
not on their own very reassuring.
An attempt to break out o f this impasse, which simultaneously claimed to acknowledge 
the force of the private language argument,157 was made by Nagel. By observing that 
wherever we recognise an animal as being conscious ‘there is something that it is like to he 
that organism— something that it is like for the organism’,158 he returned the notion of the 
subjective character o f experience to centre stage, and in a way that could not easily be 
denied since it seemed to be a genuine grammatical insight apparently making no direct 
appeal to private ostensive definition. In the case of the animal, the question of private 
ostensive definition just does not arise at all; in human beings the language-game of 
expressing subjective states and what they are like is, after all, a language-game that is played 
and evidently not reducible to any other language-game. Unfortunately, Nagel’s attempt 
to use this formulation to defend the irreducibility of subjectivity is, in my view, a failure. 
As we shall see, he simply does not distance himself sufficiently from, indeed he shares, 
the underlying assumption of the physicalist reductionists. His view is also a view ‘from 
the boundary’.
Nagel objects to those who would wish to make an essential translation of the subjective 
mode into an objective mode of discourse about physical states, i.e. a translation that 
effectively eliminates or analyses away subjective concepts as a distinct class. His own 
aim, however, is not so much to deny the possibility of a physicalist theory but just to 
demand that such a theory must do justice to subjectivity by recognising it as retaining 
some distinctive characteristic of its own. However, in order to make subjectivity 
compatible with physicalism, an account of subjectivity is required which involves at least 
some kind of objective re-presentation of the subjective — otherwise it will not be 
possible to marry it to the objectivity of a physicalist theory. Nagel believes that we are
156 The limitation to this view, o f course, is that observation o f the external transparency of a rule is not 
necessarily sufficient to the grasp of the concept. This has already been discussed and will be further 
developed later.
157 Nagel p. 441.
158 Ibid. p. 436.
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not yet in a position to do this, nor is it clear how it might be achieved; hence we are not 
ready to embrace a physicalist account159 In his concluding remarks, however, he does 
come up with one possibility: he speculates upon the idea of an ‘objective 
phenomenology5, that is, a system of universally intelligible concepts for describing Vhat 
it is like5 to have any given subjective experience, even to those to whom the experience 
is profoundly alien. He concedes that this language might not be able to convey everything 
but unfortunately he does not say what remaining kinds o f thing might continue to be 
objectively inexpressible — or how we should treat that fact.160
Regardless of what other merit we might find in his attempt to defend the subjective, 
the fact that he entertains the possibility of such a phenomenology at all shows, I believe, 
that he is not in the end prepared to let go of the idea that the individual's relations to the 
qualities of his own subjective states can still be modelled on a grasp offacts (as to ‘what it 
is like5) that is independent of the individual's mode of life as manifested in his outward 
being. This must be the correct interpretation of his view otherwise the intelligibility of 
the phenomenology would be relative to the mode of life, in which case it could not 
transcend the differences between modes o f life. This does not make Nagel strictiy a 
reductionist, in as much as it does not reduce subjective concepts into concepts o f some 
other kind o f object; but it is difficult to see how it can avoid being just another objectivist 
reconstruction of subjectivity and a re-emergence of the inner ‘Archimedean vantage 
point5 against which the private language argument is directed.
The objectivist reconstruction of subjective concepts (i.e. that knowledge of Svhat it is 
like5 is knowledge of a fact) is a pervasive and insidious influence, and so it will be helpful 
to trace how it is wound into Nagel's analysis. This will help identify the critical points 
that will need to be made to defend the integrity of the concepts o f subjectivity. Nagel 
founds his account on a factual belief that animals, as well as humans, have experiences: 
we are ‘of the opinion'161 that they have experiences. In a footnote discussing the 
attribution o f experiences to robots, he remarks:
Perhaps anything complex enough to behave like a person would have experiences.
But that, if true, is a fact which cannot be discovered merely by analyzing the concept 
of experience. (Nagel footnote p. 436)
159 Ibid. pp. 446-448.
160 Ibid. pp. 449-450.
161 cf. PI p. 178.
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And then:
I assume w e all believe that bats have experience. After all, they are mammals, and 
there is no more doubt that they have experience than that mice or pigeons or whales 
have experience. (Nagel p. 438)
It is very important that Nagel’s account qua philosophical account begins with the 
attribution of subjectivity to other creatures (if creatures they be) as a factual matter 
which does not raise conceptual problems.—This already implies that the exercise of 
mental concepts is not primary but is essentially162 secondary to other modes of discourse 
which begin by considering whether something is the case or n o t In other words, his 
conception of the language-games in which subjective concepts are articulated is that they 
belong to those that, in the relevant respects, are founded on fact, not practice. This 
predetermines the form of his account by presenting as the central issue how we 
accommodate this fact o f subjective experience, and it diverts attention from the real 
issues which are: 1) the form of our understanding of creatures as fellow subjects, and 2) 
the nature of the acknowledgement that the experience of alien creatures may fall outside 
our understanding. This shortcoming in his account emerges in the way he treats what is 
the central example in his paper: the understanding o f the subjective lives of creatures of 
a form of life fundamentally different from our own: bats.
Having stated that bats have experiences, Nagel argues that, given the well-known 
peculiarities in the way that they perceive their environment, the experience that bats 
have of the world must be radically alien from ours. His conclusion on the nature of a 
bat’s experience is expressed by saying that ‘there is no reason to suppose that it is 
subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine’;163 and since this is in the nature 
o f a supposition, it leads to 1) the conclusion ‘the we cannot know what it is like to be a 
bat*,164 and 2) the idea that since the bat certainly does have experiences ‘this implies a 
belief in the existence of facts beyond the reach of human concepts’.165
The first o f these — that we cannot know what their experience is like — is notoriously 
difficult to fix. This difficulty is mainly due to a tendency to fluctuate between two quite 
different interpretations: on the one hand, we may be dealing with the platitudinous 
observation166 that since we do not share their mode of experience, we are not in any
162 I say “essentially” here, since there is no doubt that in particular instances we will attribute experiences 
on the basis o f evidence.
163 Nagel p. 438.
164 Ibid. footnote p. 442.
165 Ibid. p. 441.
166 See Mouncel pp. 178 & 182.
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position to follow any introspective reports that emerge out of it,—we just do not share 
their form of life. Alternatively, we may understand the phrase on the model of the claim 
that one can never really know how another person sees colours — an interpretation 
which delivers us once more into the hands of the private language argument.
Turning to the second conclusion, the idea that the experiences of alien creatures may 
be beyond our comprehension evidently belongs with the more frequendy discussed 
question of how we may fail to understand the beliefs and concepts of a radically alien 
society.167 Certainly the two questions share the essential feature that the way to mutual 
understanding is barred as a result o f the incommensurability of aspects of our lives. The 
present case,, however, introduces a new element insofar as it relates the 
incommensurability specifically to their mode of natural perception and not so much to 
their social structures and systems of belief—which are the usual examples discussed.168
I think it would be true to say that when faced with a radically alien society it would not 
be the most natural way of expressing what we fail to comprehend in them by saying that 
there are facts available to them to which we have no access. I think that would be 
regarded as secondary to the essential difference, which would be a difference in the way 
that they construct the world, as evidenced in their behaviour and concepts. It would be 
more natural to say that they stand in a different kind of relation to the world (and to 
themselves) and that we are excluded from this relation. No doubt there will be instances 
where we would wish to say that here is a people who have a knowledge of the world 
which is unavailable to us; certainly there are any number of facts that are inaccessible to 
me — in physics, for example — because I simply do not have the concepts (think of a 
child learning a language also).—But in all these latter sorts o f cases, it is statements 
about the world that we do not understand.
Now from one point o f view the understanding of bats is o f the latter kind. And in fact 
in an important sense we do understand bats’ relations to the world: they perceive the 
world using a perceptual system employing echo-location. Moreover, the facts of what 
they perceive will also be intelligible to us,— for example that they can detect or ‘observe’ 
the position o f a flying insect in complete darkness. But of course these are not what 
Nagel has in mind when he speaks of facts about the subjective qualities of a bat’s
167 Winch has extended this same philosophical principle even to failures of understanding within our 
society. See P. Winch, ‘Can we understand ourselves?’, Philosophical Investigations, 20:3, July 1997, pp. 193- 
204.
168 See, for example, P. Winch, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, in Ethics and Action, (London: Routledge 
and Keegan Paul, 1972), pp. 8-49.
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experience that are beyond our ken,169 which are facts that would distinguish the qualities 
of a subjective realm. The supposed realm of facts here surely belongs to that species of 
‘knowing what it is like’ that Wittgenstein criticised in the Philosophical Investigations as part 
o f his private language argument:
“I know how the colour green looks to m i’—surely that makes sense!—Certainly: 
what use of the proposition are you thinking of? (PI 278)
Imagine someone saying “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top of 
his head to prove it. (PI 279)
It seems clear, then, that trying to give an account of the nature o f subjective qualities 
as a realm of subjectively graspable facts o f experience is going to lead us into difficulties. 
We must therefore follow a different path.
Nagel passes as a matter of course from the notion that ‘there is something that it is like 
to be a bat’ to talk of knowledge of what it is like. But these are not coextensive. The 
original purpose, in the context of the philosophical debate, of the statement that ‘there is 
something that it is like to be a bat* was, as I have indicated, to emphasise that ‘[t]he 
subject too is real’ 170 — where ‘real’ means that the concept of a subject is irreducible. 
Moreover, in addition to reminding us o f the reality of the subject, it also reminds us that 
it is essential to consciousness that it has a form which is expressed outwardly in different 
ways. But when we speak in the way that Nagel does of knowledge of what it is like to be a 
bat, i.e. knowledge of fact, then the first of the above formulations — i.e. that ‘there is 
something that it is like to be a bat’ — has been narrowed down and its more fundamental 
aspect overlooked. For the fundamental form of our experience is yielded up by means of 
concepts (or modes of behaviour) which are not themselves comprised o f any subjective 
knowledge of fact. In other words, the essential ‘there is something that it is like to be a 
baf is expressed in the way we differentiate experiences by means of concepts, not by 
individuating facts (and in the analogous case of animals, it is expressed in the form of 
their behaviour). And so if we do still wish to speak of ‘knowledge’ in this context then 
this has to be interpreted in terms of the understanding o f the form of our experience 
that lies in our ability to use the concepts that we have acquired. Here we should recall a 
point made in Chapter 2, that it is not just in the grasp o f facts that we grasp what the 
world is like, but in the formation of our concepts. So we should not insist that every
169 Nagel might have cited a case where we came across a creature whose relations to the world just baffled 
us, where we had no obvious insight at all into the nature o f its perceptual relations to the world. Here too, 
in the face of almost complete incomprehension, it would seem spurious to emphasise the issue o f what
facts we do or do not know as against the issue o f the sheer unintelligibility o f their form o f life.
170 Mouncel p. 178.
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subjective difference that we are aware of must correspond to describable differences 
between states of affairs.
The distinction between differences in concept and differences in fact may be a 
confusing one to apply when reflecting on the nature of experience. It is no doubt very 
natural, when reacting to differences in the subjective qualities of colours, sounds, etc., to 
feel that here are differences which ought to be describable. In such a situation I am trying 
to interpret the concept rooted in practice as one rooted in fact, which I am then puzzled 
to find I cannot put into words. But if the difference is one of concept rather than fact, 
then it is put into words just in the way the difference shows in how the different 
concepts are deployed.— It shows in judgement pure and simple, not in articulated 
differences between facts.
It may be worth reflecting here that if we are to form subjective concepts at alj then it 
would be the oddest thing if when making judgements (e.g. ‘this green is not the same as 
that’) we did not also report that this green looks different from that one, etc., or have other 
subjective responses to colours such as attraction, dislike, and so on. But now as soon as 
we begin to use phrases such as ‘these look different’ we have introduced all that we need 
in order to introduce the concept of subjective qualities. It is a confusion to hold that 
below the threshold of what is captured in our concepts is a realm of fact that is not 
expressible.
What is most lacking, then, in Nagel’s account is any acknowledgement that the root of 
the incommensurability between alien experiences or perceptions lies in the form and 
practice of the modes o f life and accompanying concepts. The preoccupation with 
unknowable facts obscures these elements.
4 ~ The Subjective and the Objective Modes and W hat it is Like to be a....*
My intention now is to look more closely at the mechanics of how subjective concepts 
operate and are seated in our lives. To this end we might begin by developing a more 
sympathetic view of ‘knowledge of what an experience is like’.
Nagel’s use o f ‘there is something that it is like to be a bat’ was seized upon and 
criticised by Norman Malcolm,171 who took it to be just another proposition resting on a 
belief in private ostensive definition. I have argued that it is probably right to find Nagel
171 Norman Malcolm, ‘Consciousness and Causality’, in: D. M. Armstrong & Norman Malcolm, 
Consciousness and Causality, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 45-66. (Malcolm2)
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guilty of this fallacy; but I believe that there is a narrowness in Malcolm’s view that causes 
him to overlook other important contexts in which we may intelligibly speak of "knowing 
what it is like’ to have a particular experience.
The essence of Malcolm’s position is that if we do wish to speak in this way, then it can 
only legitimately mean 1) that we can, in an ordinary way, describe what the experience is 
like (he cites the case o f the experience of being a lorry driver,172 where we may refer to 
the various individual experiences that go to make up the composite experience o f being 
a lorry driver), or 2), in the more fundamental case of knowing "what it is like to see\m 
that we have "the ability that a sighted adult has of making visual discriminations, reports 
and judgements’.174 Generally we may say that in Malcolm’s estimation the meaning of 
"knowing what it is like to have an experience’ is coextensive with the ability to describe 
what we see or with the ability to make perceptual judgements. This approach is popular 
amongst those believing that they are defending a Wittgensteinian position. Thus we find 
Hacker concluding as follows:
We are no doubt tempted to say that such a person does not know what pain is like.
But what is it to know what pain is like? Does the yelping dog whose paw has been 
trodden on know what pain is like? No, for whatever "knowing what pain is like’ 
means, it does not mean the same as "being in pain’. Is it to have "knowledge of certain 
kinds of experience’? But what does that mean? If I have toothache, do I have knowledge 
of a toothache? Am I acquainted with toothache? Do I know nausea or cramp? These 
are slightly curious, quasi-poetic expressions. They are either philosophical nonsense, 
or they signify no more than having had the sensation. One can indeed say "I have 
known fear’ or "I am acquainted with grief, but this simply means that I have been 
afraid and have grieved. So too for knowing toothache or being acquainted with 
headache. What then do I know when I know what pain is like? Either I can say or 
display what it is like, or it is ineffable. But if it is ineffable, then knowing what pain is 
like amounts to no more than to have or to have had a pain. But then the thesis that one 
can possess the concept of pain only if one knows what pain is like merely reiterates 
that someone who has mastered the use of ‘pain’ but has never had a pain does not 
know what the word ‘pain’ means, which is absurd. The criteria for possession of a 
concept, for mastery of the use of a word, consists in one’s correctly using and 
explaining an expression, not in one’s medical history.175
My concern with these approaches is that they stop with the criticisms that I have 
already made of Nagel and do not allow for how we react to and reflect on our 
experiences, nor for how these responses ramify our lives. These are also constitutive of 
our concepts of experience; they are components in the determination of the concepts of
172 Malcolm2 p. 46.
173 Ibid. p. 53.
174 Ibid. p. 54.
175 P. M. S. Hacker, Appearance and Reality, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 146-7.
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subjective quality and knowledge of their qualities,—and they are not reducible to the 
formulae offered by Malcolm and Hacker.
At the most elementary level, the concept of subjective quality is determined in the 
distinction we make between the judgement that an object is such and such a colour and 
the judgement as to how the colour strikes us. These two modes of judgement betoken 
different conceptual relations to objects, and so there really ought to be no objection to 
characterising the latter as a relation to a subjective quality. The only condition that we 
must insist on is that this kind of response determines the concept,— such that it would 
make no sense to say that the response depended on some prior appreciation of subjective 
quality, i.e. on a judgement originating under some other regime, namely private ostensive 
definition. The responses are therefore primitive to the determination of the concept of 
subjective quality.
The notion of subjective quality is perhaps most evident when we make comparisons 
between the appearances of colours, sound, textures, etc. These comparisons may often 
be expressed using colour words themselves: ‘This is pinker than that’; or by using other 
terms which also have a literal use in the language-game: ‘This is brighter than that’. But 
there is also another very characteristic use of language that often comes into play here: 
the ‘secondary’ uses of words, such as ‘The sound of this clarinet is brighter than that’. 
These uses are figurative, but in an important sense they are not metaphorical:
The secondary sense is not a ‘metaphorical’ sense. If I say “For me the vowel e is 
yellow” I do not mean: Yellow’ in a metaphorical sense,—for I could not express what 
I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea ‘yellow’. (PI p. 216)
These uses of words are the product of a need to find a means of expressing a 
subjective quality, a need that can only be satisfied by taking, without justification, a word 
from an alien context. Moreover, since they have no justification their entry into 
discourse is also primitive. And just because they are primitive we may say that they 
determine a concept of description and thereby a concept o f subjective quality also. 
Furthermore, whereas these secondary uses depend on a primary use, in an important 
sense they are subjective;—they are not governed by any rules in the way they are 
projected into the new context. Hence they can only be understood as qualitative 
responses to our subjective states, and they acquire currency within the language-game 
just because they are shared amongst language users.
There are other dimensions within which the subjective qualities of experience may 
emerge. For example, a person might have seen other people receive electric shocks and
m
observed their reactions but never experienced a shock themselves. On receiving one for 
the first time, we might imagine their surprise: ‘I didn’t know it would be like 
that!’— perhaps they had expected it to be more like touching something hot, or like a 
muscular spasm, or hitting the ‘funny bone’ in their elbow (perhaps it is a bit like that!). 
So ‘knowledge of what it is like’ may be an expression of expectation and may lead to the 
conclusion that we had never experienced the like before. Again it should be emphasised 
that this notion of what the experience is like is not intended as an explanation of the 
expectation — which would return us again to the private language argument — rather, that 
we have expectations of such sorts is part of what determines a concept o f subjective 
quality.
We may also find more complex examples. It is a commonplace for people who have 
experienced profound depression, for instance, to insist that unless others have 
experienced it themselves they cannot really know what it is like because it is not really 
comparable with anything in ordinary life. They will have been struck by the fact that it 
was not like anything they had known, nor could it have been anticipated from their own 
previous experience. Perhaps they will have tried to convey it to others, but realised the 
futility of it. ‘Knowing what it is like’ in this sort of case goes beyond being merely a 
sense of the uniqueness of a sensation, for it goes together with a multitude of other 
changes in the thoughts, feelings and beliefs of the sufferer and is pervasive of his life. It 
is in these sorts of circumstances that the sufferer becomes aware that another does not 
know what it is like to experience depression; and the point of speaking in this way is to 
draw attention to the fact, not just that the other has not had the experience, but that, in 
his behaviour and in what he says, he shows that he does not understand the experience. 
The sufferer finds himself at a distance from the comprehension of others.
This case differs, I think, from both kinds of case cited earlier, i.e. o f not being able to 
understand a foreign culture and of not ‘knowing what it is like to be a bat’. On the one 
hand, it is not like failing to understand the alien culture if that ju st means not being able 
to follow the ideas and beliefs of the culture (it might mean more than that). And it is not 
like the case o f the bat; it is not just the lack of a shared system o f perception. Rather, it is 
an inability to understand a pervasive quality of their state of mind having to do with the 
failure to make connections of thought and feeling,—of not being able to understand 
how the sufferer might be driven to certain thoughts and actions, for example. Two 
people who share the experience will understand one another in the things they have to 
say, in being able to follow each other in the connections of thought and feeling, in the
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way that their beliefs undergo changes, and in their responses to the problems of life. ‘He 
knows what it is like’ says that he has an understanding that has evidendy grown naturally 
out of his own personal experience.
In all these sorts of contexts, it is natural to want to characterise the responses in terms 
of the appreciation of, or indeed the knowledge of, the subjective qualities of the 
experiences. By contrast, it would, I suppose, be possible to imagine a people who made 
all the perceptual judgements of the kind that Malcolm and Hacker refer to, but who did 
not compare their experiences and who lacked the widely ramified kinds of responses of 
the kind I have been describing. Here I think we would have the right to say that there is 
no room in the lives of such people for any notion of the subjective quality of experience, 
for they lack subjective responses to their own experiences. But these are not the kind of 
people we are dealing with, and would hardly be recognisable as human beings.
The kind of understanding that I have described in these last paragraphs may be 
described as inter-subjective understanding. It is realised in the way that people are able to 
compare experiences and share their understanding, and it provides a genuine context for 
speaking of a knowledge o f what the subjective state is like. It is in the nature of inter- 
subjective understanding, then, that it arises out o f the way that people engage with one 
another and not from purely external observations of the other. This brings us to the 
difficult question of the role of criteria in the application of mental concepts.
5 ~ Concepts and the Application of Criteria
An understanding of the role of criteria in the possession and application of a concept 
is central to an understanding of its grammar. It is a matter which is also directly related 
to a question which we have already dealt with at length, namely the extent to which a 
concept is constituted through definitions referring to facts rather than in the 
establishment of a practice. So it will be illuminating to approach the question of criteria 
with this distinction in mind.
In the decades immediately following the publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, it was commonplace to allot criteria a central role in Wittgenstein’s account 
o f the employment of concepts. We may follow P. M. S. Hacker in Insight and Illusion as 
exemplifying this trend. Hacker states the position quite unequivocally:
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Criteria, then, can be seen as those conditions which non-inductively justify the 
assertion of a sentence and in terms of which the sense of the sentence is to be 
accounted for. (Hacker2 p. 283)
And then:
In the Investigations he [Wittgenstein] suggests that the criteria for cp’ are the 
circumstances which would justify one in saying that p (e.g. PI, §182). His numerous 
investigations into specific psychological and dispositional terms employ the concept 
of a criterion extensively in precisely this sense. (Hacker2 p. 288)
We find a similar sentiment expressed by Hanna:
Concepts require criteria of application; and if a concept is to be applied to others, 
one must be able to say from an objective standpoint whether these criteria are 
satisfied. If this cannot be done, there is no justification for such an application. To 
persist in doing so puts one in the position of claiming to give a “subjective” 
justification, which as Wittgenstein notes (PI, I: 265), is no justification at all. (Hanna 
p. 352)
Firstly we may note that — according to Hacker’s first remark at any rate — the criteria 
for applying a concept are the determinants of the meaning o f the concept in as much as 
they determine the sense of the sentences containing them. This does not mean that 
there is a simple equation between the presence of the criterion and the fact of the thing 
for which it is a criterion; for, as Hacker points out elsewhere, in any given circumstance 
the relation between the criteria present (or absent) and the fact asserted (or denied) is 
not one o f entailment (Hacker2 p. 289). For example, a person may show pain behaviour 
but not be in pain; that is, he may be pretending. This has the virtuous consequence, 
within the criterial account of mental concepts, of enabling behaviourism to be avoided — 
at least on the formal level — for it will be a part of the grammar of mental concepts that 
in particular circumstances the absence of the state of mind will not follow from the absence 
of criteria (and vice versa), showing that it cannot be identical with its outward expression.
Secondly, criteria are identified as the circumstances justifying the application of a 
concept. Identifying these circumstances is an operational part of the application; they are 
not just facts which may be referred to retrospectively or by a third party in explanation 
o f the application of the concept:
Learning language involves learning to recognise (but not necessarily to describe) the 
circumstances justifying the use of an expression. Thereby one acquires tacit intuitive 
knowledge of the criterial rules justifying the employment of the expression. Thus one 
test for whether p’ is a criterion for ‘<f is whether one could come to understand 
without grasping that the truth of cp’ justifies one in asserting c<f. (Hacker2 p. 292)
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According to Hacker and Hanna, then, the application of a concept is based on the 
observation of facts — either as stated explicitly or recognised as such — that justify its 
application. No doubt there are very many situations in which the application of concepts 
will operate in more or less the way that Hacker describes — I have already argued that 
facts are often integrated into concepts — but such an account, as I have also intimated 
previously, will not do as a general account of the use of concepts. Whether the criteria are 
applied implicitly or explicitly, in either case it is supposed by Hacker that the criterion 
must be conceptualised. But this can only mean that the application of the criterion is itself a 
conceptual act which must itselfbe. based on criteria, and so on ad infinitum.176 Clearly there 
is something wrong here.
First of all, we should not be fooled by this notion of the ‘tacit’ application o f criteria, 
which is ambiguous. When we apply a criterion explicitly, the recognition of the criterial 
circumstances will obviously not involve the application of the concept for which those 
circumstances are the criterion — which would obviously be circular. For example, if the 
criterion for a disease is a rash of a certain sort, then the description of the rash cannot 
depend on employing the concept of the disease for which it is a criterion. Now in the 
case where the criterion is applied explicitly, any circularity of this sort ought to be obvious 
enough. But in the situation where the criterial concepts are only applied tacitly, it may not 
be so easy to distinguish the genuine case from the circular one.
A genuine case of tacit application, for example, would be where an experienced 
ornithologist is able to identify a bird by its ‘jizz’, whilst the justification for the 
identification would demand a specific account of identifying plumage features. On the 
other hand, ‘This is red’ may, to the unwary, also be taken to be a judgement based on a 
tacit criterion. A typical formulation may be that we perceive the essence of the colour, 
which is used as the criterion that this is red; or perhaps it is believed that the judgement 
is, as it were, the criterion for itself.177 In these sorts of cases, the temptation will be to 
assume that wherever it is not evident that a criterion has been explicitly applied, then 
sure enough there will have been an implicit application. But this is surely an empty 
conception. We may certainly agree that whenever a criterion is applied, the criterial 
circumstances are conceptualised (logically) prior to the application and, moreover, that 
this remains the case whether the criterion is applied explicidy or implicitly (it will always 
be possible to produce criteria). But in order to prevent the infinite regress, we will need to
176 Mouncel p. 184.
177 cf. Ibid. p. 182.
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acknowledge that, at bedrock, criteria are not applied at all, and that in these cases 
conceptualisation begins with the judgement itself.
The alternative to Hacker’s and Hanna’s account of criteria will begin, therefore, by 
acknowledging that many concepts are, to a greater or lesser degree, founded on facts 
and that to this extent their application does involve identifying these facts (implicitly or 
explicidy) and employing them as criteria. But it will also have to acknowledge that a 
general account of the application of concepts must recognise that ultimately it is not 
founded on the recognition of facts but in the exercise of linguistic practices that are not 
criterion based.178 This applies both to the application o f concepts and also to their 
determination. In other words, to the extent that the exercise of a concept is rooted in a 
practice and not founded on facts, the sense o f the concept cannot, contra Hacker, be 
accounted for by reference to such facts. This is essentially the same point that I argued 
for in Chapter 2, that the establishment of practices is in the end more fundamental to 
the constitution o f concepts than the embodiment of facts. Hence, where the exercise of 
a concept is not by the application of a criterion, its exercise will be rooted in a primitive 
reaction. In what follows I shall try to show how this principle operates in the case of the 
third person employment o f mental concepts.
The extent to which, and the mode in which, individual concepts may embody facts is 
highly variable. An important part of the elucidation of mental concepts that follows in 
the next section will therefore comprise an examination of the balance between the 
factual and practical components of these concepts, and the way that these are 
interwoven. Developing out of this will be an examination of the nature of the practice of 
mental concepts. This is not straightforward for, as was noted in earlier chapters and in 
the above remarks on depression, understanding a concept is not merely a matter of 
being able to operate a sign correctly for a particular purpose; rather, the concept that is 
expressed through a given practice is a function o f the way that the practice is related to, 
or is a component of, our form of life; and so the whole character of that form of life will 
also have to be taken into account. This is the point of view from which it can be 
illuminating to look at how the possession of the concept may be regarded as an extension 
of our form of life.
178 Ibid. p. 184.
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6 ~ Mental Concepts: Criteria or Primitive Reactions?
In his Cast Writings on the Philosophy of Pychology, Volume 2, Wittgenstein felt that there 
was something wrong with trying to give an account of a mental concept merely by 
describing the circumstances which are the direct context for judging that a person is in a 
given mental state:
I am trying to describe the laws or rules of evidence for empirical sentences: does one 
really characterise what is meant by the mental in this way?
The characteristic sign of the mental seems to be that one has to guess at it in 
someone else using external cues and is only acquainted with it from one’s own case.
But when closer reflection causes this view to go up in smoke, then what turns out 
is not that the inner is something outer, but that “outer” and “inner” now no longer 
count as properties of evidence. “Inner evidence” means nothing, and therefore 
neither does “outer evidence”.
But indeed there is ‘evidence for the inner’ and ‘evidence for the outer’.
“But all I ever perceive is the outer” If that makes sense, it must determine a concept.
But why should I not say I perceive his doubts? (He cannot perceive them.)
Indeed, often I can describe his inner, as I perceive it, but not his outer.
No evidence teaches us the psychological utterance. (Last2 pp. 61-63)
Wittgenstein is suggesting here — in the first and last remarks at least — that mental 
concepts are not rooted in the facts that might count as evidence for a mental state in a 
particular instance. Moreover, treating observed external cues as evidence for the inner is 
not in any case central to our encounter with the mental lives of others. These views 
seem to be an advance upon the view he expressed in the Philosophical Investigations and 
which is summarised by his dictum: ‘An “inner process” stands in need of outward 
criteria’,179 which appears to be a slogan for the ‘evidential’ account and which, I think it 
is fair to say, has determined the most commonly held interpretation of Wittgenstein on 
this matter.180
Now in the light of this, consider the following picture o f the language-game of pain. 
Mental concepts are amongst those — in their third person applications, at least — which
179 PI 580.
180 This remark is often taken to be evidence of Wittgenstein’s commitment to a theory of the meaning of 
psychological concepts based on criteria. But I am not so sure that the remark should be treated in this way 
in any case. “Inner process” is in scare quotes, which suggests that he might have meant just that if we are 
to think in terms o f an inner process then we are committed to a notion o f outward criteria, not that he 
approves of construing the relation between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ in this way.
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are determined to a large extent by facts, the observation of which therefore count as 
criteria for their application. Hence, our judgement that a person is in pain is based on 
our observations of his pain-behaviour, the typical manifestations of which we could of 
course describe. These third person attributions evidently differ from first person 
avowals which are not based on criteria. It is therefore the latter and not the former 
which constitute the instinctive root of the language-game, and it does so in this way: ‘the 
verbal expression of pain replaces crying....V181 Hence, ‘I am in pain’ is a primitive 
reaction within the language-game; indeed its utterance is itself one of the facts that, in 
the third person context, would be taken as a criterion for the judgement Tie is in pain\ 
‘I am in pain’ also supplies the subjective component o f the language-game; for it is both 
a cornerstone of the language-game and is recognised as a direct expression of the 
individual’s subjective state. First person utterances may, moreover, be taken as central to 
the idea that whereas the language-game of attributing pain to others is based on 
‘outward criteria’ mental concepts are nevertheless not equivalent in meaning to the 
outward facts of behaviour. For the fact that manifestations of the subjective state are 
incorporated into the language-game, 1) by the concept being articulated by means of non­
criterion based first person utterances, whilst 2) it clearly belonging to the grammar of the 
concept that it does not express a state only existing whilst being expressed, is evidentiy 
connected with the concept having a component which is not reducible to outward facts. 
This ties in with Hacker’s observation that the relation between the fact of the criterion 
and the fact of the pain is not one o f entailment;182 for the fact that the concept has roots 
in both the objective circumstances and the subjective response shows that the reality of 
the phenomenon of pain is not exhausted in what is revealed of it by any one root. The 
presence of criterionless first person judgements reinforces the inequality between being 
in pain and the outward manifestations of pain, for the first person expression of pain is 
an articulation o f the concept in its own right — and without reference to or describing 
behaviour.
This, roughly speaking, is how the Wittgensteinian position has often been presented 
and there is much that is correct about it. But such a simple dichotomy between the 
inward and the outward components of the determinants of the concept of pain is false. 
We will shortly try to correct this picture by examining Hertzberg’s account183 of the 
inter-relations between the primitive reactions which characterise the language-game. But
181 PI 244.
182 Hacker2 p. 289.
183 Hertzberg pp. 24-39.
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we might begin by drawing attention to a closely related situation where the 
establishment of facts does play an important role in forming judgements. It will be 
important not to confuse this with the main issue at hand.
If I am concerned to see that a child is learning to use ‘pain’ properly — both in 
expressing its own pain, and also when applied to other people — then I am not thereby 
exercising the concept pain but, once again, the concept o f the language-game o f expressing 
pain and o f recognising pain in others. The latter concept is partly constituted in being 
able to recognise an array of facts, such as that the child only uses the word where the 
person of whom it speaks has given expression to pain in appropriate circumstances, or 
where the child itself is expressing its pain in appropriate circumstances. These facts 
belong to the criteria for saying that the child is using the word correctly. If the child is 
not able to react appropriately we would be justified in saying that he has not got the 
concept pain. This judgement will have been one based on the facts of the matter. But 
whereas there are criteria that a concept has been correcdy applied, it does not follow 
that there are criteria for its application, just because the concept of a language-game is a 
different concept from the concepts within the language-game.184 There are criteria that a 
child has correctly applied ‘red’, i.e. that the child calls red things ‘red’ and not other 
things, but it does not follow that the child employs a criterion in making his 
judgement.185 Further, when we judge that the child has made the correct judgements, 
either that another is in pain or that this thing is red, the determination of those facts is 
dependent on our judgement that the third person is actually in pain or that this is red. In 
other words, we have to have made the same judgement that we are attributing to the 
child. And this means that the determination of those facts is itself subordinate to our own 
judgements, which I shall argue are criterionless. It is in order to show that the 
determination of the sense of these judgements is not fundamentally by means of 
agreement on criteria that we need to examine the role of primitive reactions in 
determining the character of the language-games.
Hertzberg’s account begins with the observation — as developed in Chapter 5 — that 
within a language-game certain responses are independent. That is, they are not dependent 
on any other judgement and are therefore primitive to the language-game. His account 
has the additional virtue that its perception of the foundations of the language-game does 
not identify only first person expressions of pain as primitive but extends this to include
184 See section 2 above.
185 It also does not follow, of course, that the judgement that the child is employing the term correctly is 
based wholly on criteria.
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reactions to third persons; indeed he goes even further in identifying as primitive the 
recognition of responses of sympathy (or repulsion, or indifference) between third parties. 
This immediately releases us from the picture of the language-game as a simple 
dichotomy between, on the one hand, modes of judgement which are criterionless (first 
person expressions) and, on the other, modes of judgement based on fact (third person 
attributions). This is just because third person reactions, being primitive, must also be 
criterionless.
The logical basis of this extension is that if  the recognition of expressions of pain as 
such was not essentially primitive, then it would have to take the form of a hypothesis 
that the behaviour we observe was caused by the mental event.186 This causal model 
would require that the concept of pain be established independently of the concept of 
what constitutes its expression; and for this, it would be necessary to turn to the well- 
known argument by analogy from one’s own case. But this is an argument without 
credibility,187 since it is in any case dependent on the discredited notion of private 
ostensive definition. Now we may justify a particular judgement, i.e. that here we have an 
expression of pain, by comparing it with behaviour independently recognised as 
expressive of pain. But if this is not to lead to an infinite regress, expressions of pain 
must at some point be recognisable without recourse to such further justification.188 
Hert2berg is arguing, then, that not only are first person expressions of pain primitive, 
the recognition of behaviour as an expression of pain is also primitive. This primitiveness 
is manifested not just in the recognition of others’ expressions o f pain, but in the whole 
circle of mutual understanding. For example, it would be a primitive reaction for a person 
to see someone’s response to a third person as a reaction to their distress. He concludes:
In such cases, then, it is not as if I brought the pieces together and concluded that the 
situation is one revolving around someone’s pain. Rather, I see the situation under the 
aspect of pain, and this way of seeing it, as it were, brings the pieces together in this 
particular way. (Hertzberg p. 33)
This seeing of the situation ‘under the aspect of pain’ indicates that our recognition of 
the nature o f the particular responses is founded on something that we bring to the 
situation and within which we view it, namely an overall conception of the person as a 
conscious, sensitive agent. It is a way of looking at our fellow humans, not just a
186 Hertzberg p. 32.
187 Ibid. footnote l i p .  39.
188 Ibid. p. 32.
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readiness to make certain judgements from which to draw certain conclusions. This is the 
‘attitude towards a soul’, the nature of which we must now explore.
7 ~ Inter-subjectivity: the ‘Attitude towards a Soul’
Hertzberg is careful to avoid the conclusion that the demonstration of the independence 
of the primitive reactions within the language-game is all that is required in order to give 
an account of what is primitive to the possession of the concept pain (and of mental 
concepts in general).189 For no judgement that is defined in observational terms, even if it 
is primitive to a language-game, amounts to an application of the concept pain (or mental 
concept) unless it is at the same time a manifestation of the ‘attitude towards a soul’, 
which is also primitive to the language-game.
Wittgenstein states that we are not of the opinion but are o f the attitude towards others as 
having souls.190 This is part of an elucidation of the concept of the inter-subjective 
responses between human beings, and it says that this relation is essentially an attitudinal 
one within which judgements are made. Opinions lie too shallowly in our lives to 
characterise the essential nature of the recognition between souls, which is a pervasive 
feature of the relations between persons. The attitude provides a framework for, and 
gives sense, to opinions; it is not itself founded on opinion. Only a soul can be in pain, 
and unless I see him as a soul I am not judging that he is in pain. Behaviour, no doubt, is 
usually the immediate context for the judgement or belief that the other is suffering; but the 
possibility of such a belief depends on it being, at the same time, an expression of this 
attitude,—which is not an attitude towards the behaviour as such. Let us examine this 
distinction between attitude and opinion as it applies here. For the moment we may 
consider a different example.
The attitude towards a soul embraces not just the possibility o f a suffering soul but 
conscious life in general. For example, imagine that I am helping someone in a building 
task. In the course of the work we will employ visual signs and signals of all kinds, e.g. 
holding up a tool inquiringly or pointing. I will be watching out to see if he is watching me 
— to see that we are working in co-ordination, perhaps, or to check that we are working 
safely, etc. — and, of course, we will be talking freely about the things that are open to the 
view of us both. So it is written into everything I do that the other can see,; and the same
189 Ibid. p. 33.
190 PI p. 178.
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goes for him. My whole orientation towards him — and his orientation towards me — is 
appropriate to two persons living in a shared visual space. This orientation is not founded 
on the general belief that people can see. The mutual interaction within the visual space is 
the ‘given’ within which the language-games of seeing are established and their sense 
determined. Hence I may wonder whether he has seen this or not, or I may notice that he 
doesn’t see so well. But these judgements depend on my living a form of life in which my 
recognition of sighted-ness is an implicit and pervasive feature of my behavioural and 
linguistic relations with people, such that the judgement o f the recognition of sighted-ness 
is secondary. The ‘given’ is the inter-subjective191 mode of life; inter-subjectivity is the 
attitude. If the attitude were not given, then the application of the concept of seeing to 
third persons would have to be rooted in learned judgements based on observation; but in 
that case they would not be inter-subjective. The inter-subjective mode is irreducible; it 
cannot be derived from observation without running into the confusion of treating the 
determination of mental concepts as essentially founded on external criteria (as analysed in 
the previous section). If I say: ‘He’s seen me, I must leave’, I make this judgement on the 
basis, for example, that I see him look up and register my presence and start towards me. 
But when I say he has seen me, I do not mean the string of observations about his 
movements, nor that I now have certain expectations o f his next moves. The sense of 
what I say depends on my having a concept seeing which provides the framework through 
which I observe his behaviour; and my having the concept seeing has in its foundations my 
attitude towards persons insofar as it shows in my daily uncalculated interactions with 
them.
Turning again to ‘pain’, I recognise expressions o f pain and expressions of sympathy; 
and so in what I say and do I show that I believe that he is in pain, or that he cares about 
others in pain. But my understanding of the nature of the state that he is in — and hence 
my grasp of the sense of what I am saying in making that judgement — is dependent on it 
being a part of my attitude towards him. For we judge that the person has the concept in 
the way that its entry into his judgements and his conversation goes together with his 
attitude, which is characteristic o f our form of life. One mode in which the attitude 
towards a soul shows itself, for example, is in the expression of sympathy: ‘it is a 
primitive reaction to tend to treat the part that hurts when someone else is in pain’.192 
Indeed sympathy is woven in innumerable ways into the patterns of interaction between 
people. Again, the sympathetic attitude is not directed towards the behaviour, it is an
191 Mouncel p. 182.
192 Z 541.
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attitude towards the suffering person. We may certainly say that the belief that the person 
is in pain occasions the sympathy.— It is part of our concept of pain that it is a proper 
object for sympathy. But that is not because we have determined the nature of pain first 
and have then formed a concept of sympathy to ‘fit’ it. For the recognition of pain as 
warranting sympathy (or shock or revulsion for that matter) is part of our understanding 
of its nature. The concepts pain and sympathy are internally related: the grasp of the 
concept ympathy belongs to the grasp of the concept pain. And since sympathy is itself a 
manifestation of the attitude towards a soul, our grasp of the concept pain is partly a 
function of that attitude. Wittgenstein remarks:
How am I filled with pity for this man? How does it come out what the object of my 
pity is? (Pity, one may say, is a form of conviction that someone else is in pain.) (PI 
287)
Sympathy is not, of course, the only manifestation of this attitude providing a context 
for the determination of the concept pain. As in the case of seeing, the grammar of ‘pain’ is 
an element in that larger structure: the grammar of ‘consciousness’. Pain is a mode of 
consciousness. Only if my relation to the sufferer is part of a comprehensive relation to 
others as conscious beings am I in a position to recognise his behaviour as an expression 
of pain.193 It would be senseless to attribute pain to a creature which exhibited no other 
manifestations of consciousness. This general recognition of consciousness must be a 
pervasive feature of my engagement with him. Hence all the different kinds of responses 
— in virtue of all the different modes in which conscious life is expressed — form the 
substrate of our recognition of a person as being in pain. It lies, for example, in the way I 
point to the cause o f the pain, or in the way I shout a warning, or in the way I rub or 
protect the painful place, or in the way I inquire about his pain: what it is like, whether it 
is becoming intolerable, and so on. Our understanding of ‘pain’ is rooted in the attitude 
towards a soul, which is a primitive feature of our form of life.
8 ~ Inter-subjective Concepts as an Extension of Primitive Inter-subjectivity
The attitude towards a soul is a pervasive feature of our form of life having both 
conceptual and non-conceptual components, i.e. it manifests itself both in what we have 
to say and in natural behaviour. We may also identify the inter-subjective attitude in purely 
non-linguistic modes in the more primitive arena of the behaviour of animals — though
193 See Z 532 ff.
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we may not wish to call this the attitude towards a soul, since that usually also connotes 
features which, just because of their conceptual nature, are lacking in animals. Thus, 
when an animal calls out to another, or strikes out, or makes a gesture, or when it engages 
in play with another, the behaviour is the behaviour towards a another hearing, feeling, 
seeing, i.e. conscious, creature. I emphasise again that this is not to suggest that animals 
have even a primitive conception of the mental life of other animals; rather, it is an aspect of 
animal interactions that we can conceive of them as relations between subjects and not 
only as relations of a subject to an object. It is a feature of their forms of life that their 
relations to other sentient creatures is different in kind to their relations to inanimate 
objects — even mobile ones — and there is no obvious reason why we should not 
characterise this as an inter-subjective relation. The point I wish to make is just this, that 
inter-subjectivity is not essentially a relation between persons possessing concepts, it may 
also occur on the purely non-linguistic, behavioural level,194 as in the case of animals (and 
of course in pre-linguistic children too).
The question now arises whether this behavioural level may be demonstrated to be 
logically more primitive than inter-subjectivity on the conceptual level. Returning to the 
human form of life, the concept of inter-subjectivity is the concept of an aspect of that 
form of life that may manifest itself either linguistically or behaviourally. We may argue, 
then, that it is another of those concepts — like intention — where there is the potential to 
view the linguistic form as an extension o f the natural form. The interesting question, then, 
is whether there is an essential priority in the transition from the natural to the conceptual 
components; for if there is, then this adds greater philosophical significance to the 
proposition that the conceptual mode is an extension of the natural.
There are instances in the life of the human subject when it does seem clear, even in the 
most direct expressions o f subjective states, that there is a conceptual mode at work 
which has no behavioural analogue. Thus, the ‘secondary’ use of language to describe 
subjective qualities — which I have already touched on briefly — have no obvious non- 
linguistic counterpart. But I think that this must be exceptional. By contrast, it is surely 
impossible to conceive of a child learning the language-games of seeing and hearing, for 
example, except in circumstances where the child and the adult share a visual and aural 
space, this sharing being manifested through pervasive features of their natural modes of 
interpersonal behaviour. We may argue along similar lines with the concept pain: we may 
not conceive of the child as learning the concept except where it is fully engaged inter-
194 It might be worth emphasising here that when we speak of behaviour we are already not speaking o f  
merely physical movement. The concept o f behaviour already takes for granted mental concepts.
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subjectively with the adult right across the shared aspects o f their lives: crying for help, 
being soothed, etc. As I argued in the previous section, the inter-subjective attitude is the 
context for the formation of concepts.
Now in a great number of contexts, the employment o f a concept may itself be viewed 
as the exercise of an attitude in its own right, rather than the exercise of a judgement. And 
no doubt in many cases this attitude will not have been anticipated in any pre-conceptual 
behaviour. This surely applies in the case o f the moral attitude (that is, the treatment of 
others and oneself as moral agents195) where, in order to avoid falling into naturalism, we 
must surely say that what is characteristic in the moral attitude must arise spontaneously 
with the grasp of the concepts. The moral attitude, being primitive to the language-game, 
therefore has no analogue in non-conceptual primitive behaviour. With this kind of 
example in mind, there may be a temptation to speculate that the inter-subjective attitude 
in general might have come into being simultaneously with the formation of mental 
concepts. However, where we are concerned with the most basic features of our form of 
life, I do not think that the genesis of inter-subjective conceptual attitudes is conceivable 
except as a function of a child’s dispositions as a whole: we judge the child to have 
mastered the inter-subjective use of language in the context o f his larger modes of 
interpersonal engagement with his fellows. It is the latter which determine our concept of 
inter-subjectivity at the most fundamental level.
We should remind ourselves again here of the context for this kind of questioning. We 
are elucidating not so much the concepts of mental life196 but the concept o f the 
interrelations between subjects, of which the language-games with mental concepts form 
a part. In my discussion of intention in Chapter 5, my aim was to show that the language- 
game of expressing intentions is, in a quite fundamental sense, an extension of natural 
intentionality. This meant that the concept of the language-game of expressing intentions 
takes for granted the concept of the natural expression of intention. Now of course the 
recognition of intention in others — which is the same as the recognition of other persons 
as agents — is also a form of inter-subjective understanding: a mode of the attitude towards 
a soul. Otherwise, it would be reducible to the mere anticipation of physical movements. 
The recognition of agency is written into the whole way that the child relates to the adult.
195 One may ask what makes the difference between the moral attitude and moral judgements. I think this is 
shown in the fact that the attitude is manifested in ways of thinking, feeling and acting that are woven 
together and pervade our lives. This differs from a mere system of judgements. The point then is that these 
ways o f thinking, feeling and acting are expressed through moral concepts which are not reducible to 
concepts o f any natural phenomena.
196 And again, we are not asking whether the concept as such is an extension of primitive behaviour.
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For example, it would make litde sense to speak of the child as being, through its 
engagement with the lives of adults, in the process of learning to speak unless we already 
conceived of the child as recognising the intentionality of the adults’ behaviour towards 
him.
In conclusion, the recognition of expressions of subjective states is primitive to our 
language-games. Moreover, when we make the judgement that this person is in pain, we 
are already seeing him through the perspective of the attitude towards a soul. This form 
of judgement adds up to more than the exercise of a verbal technique based on the 
recognition of a particular phenomenal circumstance. Rather, we are bringing to bear a 
concept whose sense derives from circumstances part of which are constituted by the 
inter-subjective attitude that is fundamental to our form of life and which is extended in 
the development of the language-game. When we say that the language-game is inter- 
subjective, this is an expression of our conception of the relations between persons as 
persons, certain essential features of this language-game being autonomous of the 
language-games of describing outward manifestations of behaviour.
9 ~ Philosophical Investigation in the Subjective Mode
Finally, we may examine how these considerations bear on our relations to these 
concepts within philosophical investigation. Because the possession of mental concepts is 
not simply a matter of technique but has to do with the way that the concept is seated in 
the attitude towards a soul, our relation to the concept is complex — following similar 
patterns to intention and belief, as discussed in Chapter 4. In the case of belief we saw that 
the possession of the concept was a part of our whole relation to language; whilst in the 
case o f intention, we saw that it was partly a function of the role of language-games as 
expressions o f intention. We will also have to bring similar such background settings to 
light when considering the concepts of subjective states. In these cases, however, there is 
an additional element that may appear puzzling at first sight.
I have said that a distinctive feature of mental concepts is that our understanding of 
them engages with the subjective states o f which — in certain modes of their use, at least — 
they are an expression. To conceive of someone as being in possession of them is to 
conceive of certain uses of language as integrated into the subjective mode of the form of 
life. The possession of any concept is an aspect of the form of life of which it partakes. 
However, if the subjective mode belongs to the understanding o f the concept, then it looks
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as though the improved understanding of the concept that we look for in philosophy will 
itself partake of this subjective mode. Prima facie this is an uncomfortable position for the 
philosopher, since it seems to clash with the need for objectivity.
Now there is one apparently obvious solution to this, which I might illustrate by 
referring again to the ‘secondary’ use of language to express the quality of a subjective 
experience. As Wittgenstein points out, secondary uses o f language have their source just 
in what we are inclined to say.— It just seems right that these words fit this experience, and 
no further justification can be given (or rather, to the extent that further justification can 
be given, the use is not secondary). Understanding what is said by someone who uses 
linguistic expressions in this way depends on our sharing the reaction; there is no other 
guide. Now it is essential to such uses of language that there is also a primary use, and 
that the shared understanding of this primary use is integral to the phenomenon of 
secondary uses, i.e. it would make no sense to speak of understanding the secondary use 
if the understanding of the primary use is not also shared.197 Moreover, primary uses of 
words are governed by rules to the extent that there are, at the very least, right and wrong 
ways of using them. Nevertheless we cannot say that the secondary uses of language as 
such are governed in the same way by rules, except insofar as they have to be recognisable 
as secondary use of language. Hence, an account of the grammar of a secondary 
expression will tell us what kind o f expression it is, but it will not in itself lead to any 
further insight into what it means to say, for example, that ‘[t]uesday is learf.m From the 
point o f view of elucidating the grammar of these sorts of expressions, then, it surely 
does not matter that the subjective aspect of the understanding does not enter into the 
elucidation, since what we are concerned with is just the kinds o f propositions that they 
are. We are not concerned to improve our insight into the particular sense that the uses 
express, but only into the kind of sense that they have. Applying this to the philosophical 
understanding of mental concepts, we might feel inclined to employ the same principle: 
we can eliminate what is grasped on the subjective level, for we only wish to see more 
clearly the kind o f concepts that they are, and this can be determined by looking at how 
their uses bear on the uses o f other expressions in given concrete circumstances. But I 
think a closer examination we show that the cases are not really parallel.
I argued in Chapter 2 that in philosophy we may find accounts of concepts which 
amount to no more than delineating what propositions are allowed, what connections are
197 PI p. 216.
198 Ibid. p. 216.
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allowed between concepts, which concepts are most closely related to one another, and 
so on. This is, as it were, a purely formal conception of philosophy. I also argued that this 
is not an adequate conception, given the nature of philosophical problems, for these arise 
in response to a puzzlement emerging from within our understanding of a concept. Hence 
the elucidation we require in response to this puzzlement will be one that draws on our 
understanding of the concept and which should deepen our reflective understanding of it. 
The disturbing product of the foregoing discussion is that it now looks as if the 
philosophical understanding of mental concepts depends on what is subjective in our 
understanding of them, which therefore seems to undermine the objectivity demanded by 
philosophy.
That this appears to present a difficulty arises, I suspect, because of an inclination to 
interpret this as harking back to the idea of an understanding depending on subjective 
judgement But, as I argued in Section 1 of this chapter, this is not the notion of subjectivity 
that is relevant in this situation; for to say that the language-games with ‘pain’ depend on 
their being bound up with both my expressions of pain and my inter-subjective responses 
to other persons is just to say that together they belong to the ‘given’. Ultimately, all use of 
language is without ground, without justijication. The subjective mode just is a given 
dimension of our form of life, and is one of the channels through which we ‘follow a rule 
blindly’. Its being part o f the way in which language has a role in our lives does not imply 
the founding of language on subjective judgements.
That the demand for objectivity is not compromised by the fact that our understanding 
of certain concepts lies in the subjective mode may perhaps be illustrated by considering 
the circumstances under which we judge that a child has a grasp o f such concepts. If we 
are to give a complete account of the circumstances in which we determine the 
correctness of a child’s employment o f a mental concept, we too must understand the 
concept in all the senses that we wish to ascribe to the child. This is reflected in the 
concrete situation; for observing that a child has got hold of a concept will involve 
understanding what the child is saying — which o f course emerges out of our conversation 
with the child. Hence, if establishing that the child has the concept is a factual matter, and 
if the grasp o f the relevant concepts is bound up with the subjective mode of our lives, 
then we just have to accept that our recognition of the fact that the child understands the 
concept is partly a function of our own lives as subjects. If having the concepts at all 
involves our subjective relations to things, then our recognition of the facts that show 
that the child has the concept must engage with this understanding also. The same will
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apply at the philosophical level, where reminding ourselves of these same facts will be 
integral to the elucidation of the language-games in which mental concepts are 
embedded.
There is nothing especially paradoxical, then, in claiming that the understanding that is 
required when elucidating the grammars of mental concepts is one that engages with the 
subjective mode. For if it did not, then the philosophical investigation could not deepen 
our understanding of the concepts.
10 ~ Conclusion
In this chapter, my intention has been to explore the situation where the seating of a 
concept, or class of concepts, in our lives is inextricably bound up with the exercise of a 
fundamental aspect of our form of life, namely with our lives as subjects o f experience. 
This subjectivity enters into the possession of these concepts not just in the case of the 
subjective linguistic reactions which are amongst the primitive components of language- 
games, since it also is observed in the way that the language-games are an expression of 
subjective and inter-subjective dispositions and attitudes, and may also be seen as 
extensions of the pre-linguistic forms of these dispositions and attitudes. Our 
understanding of these subjective/psychological concepts partakes of the subjective 
states of which their deployment is an expression. The possession of any concept only 
obtains where a person can speak, and speaking is ‘living a life and speaking out of it’. But 
living a life is partly a function of our lives as subjects. Hence we are only speaking if 
there is at least a dimension of our use words that is a function of our lives as subjects. 
And this applies equally to the reflective understanding of these concepts that we seek in 
philosophy.
In the next chapter I shall explore these principles as they apply in the analogous cases 
of the concepts of knowledge, certainty and belief.
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Chapter 7 ~  Knowledge, Doubt and Action
1 ~ Introduction
In the previous chapter I examined the role of certain modes of behaviour in the 
formation of concepts. This is perhaps most easily understood where we conceive of a 
language-game as an extension of a mode of behaviour; the linguistic expression of 
intention, for example, being conceived of as an extension of natural intentionality and its 
expression. In this chapter I shall be examining some further examples, but from a point 
of view that raises questions about the foundations of language and the problems of 
knowledge and scepticism that have not hitherto been discussed in this thesis. The focal 
point will be Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and some recent comment on it.
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein is preoccupied, amongst other issues, with the status of a 
range o f propositions seeming to express certainties lying in the foundations of our 
language-games and in our behaviour, and with the relationships between these 
propositions, discourse generally, and action. Some authors have found tendencies in 
these remarks that conflict with his observations on the nature of language as expressed 
elsewhere in his writings — most especially in the Philosophical Investigations — and have 
found him failing to lay scepticism to rest. Others regard this set of notes as his most 
sustained treatment of language as rooted in instinctive behaviour, indeed as extending his 
earlier discussions. The tension between these two points of view has given rise to a 
complex discussion, which I shall make some effort to unravel in this chapter. My 
interest here will be mainly with the question of the foundations of language-games 
rather that with scepticism as such.
2 ~ Language as a System of Propositions
In his discussion paper Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics of Propositions’, Jonathan 
Levett199 claims that there are strands of thought in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of 
language that tend to undermine his equation of meaning and use. According to Levett, 
Wittgenstein is committed to ‘..a general view of language “...as a system of
199 Jonathan Levett, Discussion: Wittgenstein and the Metaphysics o f Propositions’, Philosophical 
Investigations, 16:2, April 1993, pp. 154-162. (Levett)
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propositions’”200 and to ‘an ontology of propositions, i.e. entities existing independently 
from any sentential expression they might receive in a language-game’.201 This, he claims, 
shows itself especially in the notion of ‘hinge propositions’ as it is used in On Certainty.
Levett’s interpretation of Wittgenstein has two principal components. First and 
foremost is his elaboration of the view he attributes to Wittgenstein that there are certain 
fundamental propositions that ‘stand fast for me,’202 that these propositions lie in the 
foundations of our language-games, and indeed that our daily discourse has some kind of 
logical dependence upon them. These propositions are usually referred to as ‘hinge 
propositions’. Although Wittgenstein only uses the phrase ‘hinge proposition’ three times 
to refer to these propositions,203 it is a convenient phrase which has entered general use, 
and so I shall follow this convention.204 Levett is unequivocal about the nature and 
importance of their role:
Their standing fast in certain contexts is essential to the possibility of discourse.
(Levett p. 162)
From here Levett argues as follows: Wittgenstein observes that hinge propositions do 
not express self-evident truths,205 and in that sense they do not and cannot form the 
cornerstones of a hierarchical system of propositions erected upon them. Rather, their 
foundational status is recognised in particular contexts where their immovability can be 
seen in the way in which the propositions of everyday life revolve about them.206 Perhaps 
we could express this by saying that they are assumptions of our everyday discourse which 
arise simultaneously with it and do not precede it. This has been referred to as a holistic 
conception of the relations between these propositions,—i.e. as giving each other mutual 
support.207 Moreover, it remains a conception of language as a system of propositions in as 
much as the reality of propositions is to be understood principally in terms of the way
200 Ibid. p.158.
201 Ibid. p. 154.
202 OC 152.
203 OC 341, 343 & 655.
204 It is sometimes argued that the phrase ‘hinge proposition’ is only used by Wittgenstein to refer to a 
specific class of propositions that stand fast, namely the Weltanschauung propositions that I identify in Section 
3 following. However, I do not believe that the substance o f my arguments is affected if it is used to refer 
to all ‘stand fast* propositions. Moreover, it is also used in this way by the commentators I shall be 
concerned with and certainly belongs with the issues that are in contention.
205 This point is made by Levett specifically to contradict a position adopted towards Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty by John Cook. See J. W. Cook, The Metaphysics of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, Philosophical 
Investigations, 8:2, April 1985, pp. 81-119. Cook’s paper was the stimulus for much of the discussion of On 
Certainty referred to in this chapter, however, I do not intend specifically to examine Cook’s analysis of 
Wittgenstein’s position.
206 Levett pp. 158-159.
207 See, for example, OC 225.
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they form a network with other propositions,—hinge propositions having a special role 
in underpinning this system and maintaining the integrity of the whole. I shall expand 
upon this observation later.
A most important feature of these propositions is that they are not formulated in 
everyday speech, for it follows from their status that they cannot themselves be the 
objects of knowledge or doubt; rather, they are the hinges upon which knowledge and 
doubt turn. In spite of the necessity of their remaining unspoken, however, Levett argues 
that they express truths that clearly must be grasped, and indeed grasped in propositional 
form, for only then can they fulfil their c...peculiar logical role in the system of our 
empirical propositions’,208 i.e. as hinges upon which beliefs pivot. It follows from this that 
since these propositions cannot be given sensible linguistic expression, Wittgenstein is 
committed to an ontology of such propositions as essentially ‘abstract’ entities.209 
Furthermore, because they have no actual use in those contexts, their meaning (though, 
o f course, not their trutft) must therefore be given independently of use and context.210 It 
is here that we are meant to see the deeper conflict between On Certainty and the equation 
o f meaning and use that we find in the PhibsophicalInvestigations.
Levett’s second main contention concerns Wittgenstein’s conception of the role of 
instinctive behaviour in relation to the linguistic expression of knowledge and belief. He 
contrasts his own account with a position put forward by D. J. Orr,211 who, he claims, 
takes Wittgenstein to hold that the grasp of these fundamental truths may be non- 
propositional' taking purely behavioural form.212 According to Levett, what Wittgenstein 
actually had in mind was not that primitive behaviour itself expresses belief in these 
fundamental truths — this is the point of contact with the first component o f his 
argument — for if these fundamental beliefs have any logical role in supporting our 
everyday beliefs, then they must themselves have a logical structure, which behaviour qua 
behaviour does not. As Levett remarks: ‘..only beliefs with some propositional content 
can have any logical relation to other beliefs’,213 whilst primitive/pre-linguistic behaviour 
is prior to the rational state. Apparently Orr has misinterpreted Wittgenstein’s remarks 
about primitive, pre-linguistic behaviour214 in as much as she confuses ‘our attitude
208 OC 136; Levett p. 160.
209 Levett p. 161.
210 Ibid. pp. 156-160.
211 Deborah Tane Orr, T)id Wittgenstein Have a Theory o f Hinge Propositions?’, Phibsophical Investigations. 
12:2, April 1989, 134-153. (Orr)
212 Levett pp. 159-60.
213 Ibid. p. 160.
214 Zettel 540 & 541; OC 359 & 475.
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towards these truths, and the nature o f these truths themselves’.215 The role that 
Wittgenstein does offer for instinct, by contrast, lies in the form of an attitude o f belief 
towards these fundamental propositions. This certainly manifests itself in what we do, but 
behaviour is significant only in so far as it expresses our instinctive acceptance o f hinge 
propositions: in what we instinctively do we show our certainty of the truths expressed by 
hinge propositions.216 It is this that Orr apparently muddles up with the idea that 
instinctive behaviour in itself can express a truth grasped ‘non-propositionally’,—which is 
a confusion.217 This is Levett’s position.
Wittgenstein, at times at least, evidently did acknowledge the intelligibility of the 
propositions that ‘stand fast’ for us,—though other remarks contradict this. He also 
spoke of hinge propositions as belonging to ‘the system of our empirical propositions’ 218 
— though this is an ambiguous phrase, as we shall see later. And so these remarks can 
fairly readily be made to lend support to Levett’s analysis of Wittgenstein’s position. 
Certainly he appears to be sailing dangerously close to such a conception. Nevertheless, 
whereas Wittgenstein may indeed have been equivocal in his treatment of these 
propositions, over all Levett’s is not an adequate response either to Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on the status of these propositions, or to his conception of the relation between 
behaviour and linguistic expressions of knowledge, belief and certainty. Indeed I shall 
argue that the stress Levett places on the idea that Wittgenstein held a view of language as 
a system of propositions is rooted in his own inclination to view language as such a 
system. It is this prejudice in particular that prevents a proper understanding of the 
relations between the concepts of language, belief and instinctive behaviour.
3 ~ Meaning and Use, and the Varieties of Hinge Propositions
The idea that hinge propositions, as a class, have no direct use in language-games is 
simply that in normal discourse the circumstances will not arise where these propositions
215 Levett p.159.
216 Levett acknowledges that to speak of ‘attitudes o f belief or certainty’ towards hinge propositions cannot 
be the right phrase since this would involve a claim about the proposition that would itself have to be 
propositional (Levett p.160). However I take it that Levett would agree that the way in which we are 
disposed towards, or handle, hinge propositions bears comparison with the way in which we are disposed 
towards, or handle, contingent propositions in which we believe. This is how the notion o f believing attitudes’ 
towards such propositions should be understood. It is part o f the general malady in Levett’s thinking that 
whenever we speak o f an attitude, it must be something expressed by means o f propositions.
217 Ibid. p.159-160.
218 See OC 136, for example.
135
have any employment. Except in quite unusual situations,219 one will not have occasion to 
say ‘I know this is a hand’ or ‘The earth has existed for millions of years’. We may then 
deny the intelligibility of these propositions just on the grounds that, since their utterance 
has no proper context, they can have no meaning. The problem that then arises for 
Wittgenstein is that if he allows that nevertheless they are intelligible as propositions, even 
if no additional context can be supplied, then it follows that there exists a class of 
propositions that have meaning but no use. This evidently is in conflict with the view of 
meaning worked out in the Philosophical Investigations.
On the intelligibility o f hinge propositions, Wittgenstein does appear to be equivocal. 
For example, the following remarks suggest that hinge propositions are intelligible — and 
as straightforward statements of fact:
I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast 
for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt 
and enquiry. (OC 151)
I do not explicidy learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them 
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the 
sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its 
immobility. (OC 152)
That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some 
propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
(OC 341)
Evidently there would be no sense in saying that a proposition ‘stands fast for us’ if it 
lacked intelligibility. Yet, at other times he is just as confident that such propositions have 
no sense:
My difficulty can also be shewn like this: I am sitting talking to a friend. Suddenly I 
say: “I knew all along that you were so-and-so.” Is that really just a superfluous, 
though true, remark?
I feel as if these words were like “Good morning” said to someone in the middle of 
a conversation. (OC 464)
How would it be if we had the words “They know nowadays that there are over- 
species of insects” instead of “ I know that that’s a tree”? If someone were suddenly 
to utter the first sentence out of all context one might think: he has been thinking of 
something else in the interim and is now saying out loud some sentence in his train of 
thought. Or again: he is in a trance and is speaking without understanding what he is 
saying. (OC 465)
Thus it seems to me that I have known something the whole time, and yet there is 
no meaning in saying so, in uttering this truth. (OC 466)
But if there is no meaning in uttering the proposition, in what sense can there be a truth 
at stake here? In fact this remark seems to confirm Levett’s interpretation even more
219 I.e. where a genuine context presents itself, for example where one is trying to re-establish one’s grasp of 
quite fundamental concepts following some mental disturbance or following a stroke.
136
firmly, since it now looks as if Wittgenstein accepts that there are indeed truths to be 
grasped but which cannot be formulated intelligibly. Elsewhere, however, he seems to 
reject the idea that anything is grasped (a truth or a proposition) at any level more 
elementary than normal discourse; indeed, it is out of a recognition of the difficulties with 
these propositions that he then looks for the foundations of knowledge and belief — as 
expressed in normal discourse — in behaviour.
....As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an 
ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. (OC 110)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is 
not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)
It is these last remarks that suggest the account of the relation between the linguistic 
expression of knowledge and instinctive behaviour that Orr supports. I shall return to 
this in due course, but my immediate purpose is to examine Wittgenstein’s equivocation 
over the nature and status of hinge propositions. Here I shall pursue what I believe to be 
the most sensible approach, which will be to seek the interpretation that yields the 
greatest amount of consistency between these remarks.
Whether the admission that hinge propositions are intelligible is in conflict with the 
view, generally attributed to Wittgenstein, that the meaning of a word is its use is not 
entirely straightforward. In the first place, Wittgenstein states only that the meaning of a 
word is usually though not always its use.220 Here, ‘use’ means a specific move within a 
language-game, or the specific application of a concept,—leaving it open as to whether or 
not, in special circumstances, a proposition may have meaning without having a use in 
this sense.
Alternatively we may wish to stretch the meaning of ‘use’ to include propositions which 
have no direct application, but which, in the particular circumstances o f their utterance, do 
stand in an intelligible relation to propositions having such applications. In other words, 
the meaning o f hinge propositions will nevertheless be a function o f the use that ordinary 
propositions have in everyday circumstances. In the case o f hinge propositions, this ‘use’ 
may, for a particular purpose, be specifically to reflect some aspect of the language-game 
that is not made explicit in normal circumstances. This, broadly, is the approach I shall be 
endorsing.
We should remind ourselves here of a point made in Chapter 4, that the equation of 
meaning and use should not be treated in a crudely functional way as a reduction to how 
a proposition can be used to achieve some purpose — as we observe in the simple 
language-games in the first pages of the Philosophical Investigations, for example. The 
meaning of a word or proposition is its use ‘in the language’.221 Hence, we may trace other 
kinds of relations between hinge propositions and discourse generally, without departing 
from what remains essentially a practical view of the nature of language,— and certainly 
without implying a conception of meaning that is divorced from practice.
The justification for such an approach will vary from case to case, for we will find that 
hinge propositions are not uniform in function. Indeed we should be especially careful to 
avoid dogmatism about how hinge propositions can acquire meaning. My feeling is that 
Levett’s narrow focus on hinge propositions as links within a system is an example of such 
dogmatism. So let us look more closely for a moment at his conception o f the genesis of 
hinge propositions, and at how they appear to be generated as items that are independent 
of the concrete employment of the propositions belonging to their parent language-game. 
I have stated that it is characteristic of hinge propositions that they ‘are not formulated in 
everyday speech’, but nevertheless represent truths that seem to be implied by everyday 
discourse. This view is echoed in Wittgenstein’s remark:
I do not explicitly leam the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them 
subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. (OC 152)
It is important to note that the kind of circumstance in which these truths seem to be 
implied by everyday discourse is not to be understood in the operational sense that whilst 
applying propositions in every day circumstances we are inclined to draw these truths as a 
matter of course out o f our speech. Rather, their implication is something that arises only 
when we reflect on the propositions of everyday discourse in special circumstances, Le. 
when doing philosophy — when we are forced to reflect on them by a philosophical 
sceptic, for example. In other words, it arises precisely when we are not employing 
propositions in ordinary contexts. Our ‘discovery’ of hinge propositions, then, is 
something that occurs independently of any concrete exercise of the language-game. This 
process therefore has two components: 1) in discovering hinge propositions, we are 
discovering something that is implied by our ordinary propositions, whilst 2) the occasion 
for this discovery is one that is set apart from the ordinary circumstances in which we
221 Ibid. 43.
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employ those propositions. This is the picture of the genesis of hinge propositions that is 
implicit in Levett’s account (and which I believe is also the received view).
Now it is a feature of this situation that, although the truths expressed by hinge 
propositions are supposed to be implicit in everyday propositions, there is a strong sense 
in which the hinge propositions, once extracted from normal discourse, are then taken to 
comprise a realm of propositions with something to say about the nature and/or 
contents of the world in their own right. T he earth has existed for millions of years’ and ‘I 
know this is a hand’ are evidendy treated as propositions corresponding to truths that are 
able to stand on their own feet,—even if their truth is related to the truth o f ordinary 
propositions. This is constitutive of the sense in which hinge propositions may appear as 
an extension of a system of propositions, and is supported in the idea that hinge 
propositions are implied by,222 but are not reducible to, the propositions of ordinary 
discourse. I shall return to this distinction very shortly, however my immediate concern is 
with the influence that this position has on Levett’s general attitude towards the status of 
hinge propositions.
All the varieties of hinge propositions are assumed by Levett to fit the above model. To 
be sure, he recognises that there are differences amongst them; but he claims that they 
can all be treated in the same way as far as their role as hinges’ is concerned.223 The 
reason why they can apparently all be treated in the same way is simply that they all share 
the character of being truths in their own right but which nevertheless cannot be given 
utterance because they lack a real context for their employment. However, I believe that 
this model is confused and is not the only interpretation that can be made to fit this and 
other o f Wittgenstein’s remarks. Moreover, the different varieties of hinge propositions 
depart from the model in different ways, and so cannot be treated as having the same 
roles.
To break down this model, we may begin by questioning Levett’s conception of the 
circumstances in which hinge propositions are discovered, and compare this with the 
circumstances in which they stand fast for us. I have said that hinge propositions make 
themselves manifest when we reflect, in no practical or conversational context, upon 
everyday propositions. We might then expect this also to be the circumstance in which
222 In fact Levett never says literally that hinge propositions are ‘implied’ by ordinary discourse, but he does 
say, for example, that they ‘are some way embedded in the assertions and denials that we do make’ (Levett 
p. 161). We may justifiably say, then, that there is a concept o f implication at work here. We may note further 
that, within this conception, implication is itself treated as a process that may operate independently o f any 
specific context -  this being another aspect of the idea o f language a system o f propositions.
223 Levett p. 157, footnote.
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the propositions stand fast. And of course this is how things are presented by Levett, 
who construes this standing fast in terms of a recognition by the agent that here is a 
proposition expressing a truth which is a certainty. But this seems to me to be quite 
wrong. If the standing fast is not to be merely idle, then it must surely be related to the 
actual conduct of the language-game.
First of all, we should note that the standing fast of a proposition is not a philosophical 
position. The context in which hinge propositions stand fast is not in the isolated context 
o f philosophy,—they are not standing fast for the philosopher, who is merely making 
observations o f the language-game. Anything said in philosophy is grammatical in nature. 
Hinge propositions evidently are not grammatical remarks.224 It may well be philosophy’s 
responsibility to tell us whether such propositions are intelligible and whether or not it 
makes sense to doubt them, for these judgements will follow from philosophical 
reflection on the nature of the language-game. But the actual expression of 
doubt/scepticism, or the affirmation that they stand fast, is not a philosophical position. 
To say that hinge propositions cannot be the subject of doubt, for example, is to say that 
the context for doubt does not exist — the propositions are not intelligible as statements 
about the world within normal discourse. So if it makes sense to doubt them, and if the 
doubt is real, then this doubt must arise out of discourse. Likewise, if there is to be any 
substance to the standing fast of hinge propositions, then this must occur in some kind 
of active relation to the course o f the language-game. The standing fast of the 
propositions is a phenomenon within the flow o f discourse. This is their ‘use’.
Let us approach this more closely by looking for some broad differences between the 
ways that that hinge propositions of different kinds stand fast. We may divide hinge 
propositions into three main categories:225
1) Weltanschauung propositions such as: ‘The earth has existed for millions o f years’;
2) Existential propositions about physical objects, such as: ‘This hand exists’, ‘The 
earth exists’, ‘There are physical objects’, etc.;
3) Truistic claims to knowledge such as: ‘I know that this is a hand’, ‘I know my 
name is HK’, ‘I know I have never been on the moon’, etc.
Starting with Weltanschauung propositions, it seems to me that the proposition ‘the earth 
has existed for millions of years’ is not so much a proposition implied by other
224 In some circumstances they may be ‘norms o f description’ — which comes close to being grammatical in 
nature (see later in this section).
225 See Orr p. 147; Levett p. 157, footnote.
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propositions226 — as it were, a fact deduced from them and an additional link in the system 
of propositions — but is a proposition which characterises a language-game. It is a kind of 
elliptical statement of the language-game as a whole. My reason for saying this is that, 
although it is a proposition that may have been derived from idle reflection on our 
language-games of talk about the history of the world, etc., the actual standing fast of the 
proposition is rooted in a refusal to allow a challenge to the language-game as a whole. 
This can be seen from the fact that a challenge to it  would be a challenge not just a 
proposition, nor even to the whole universe of discourse via a challenge to the 
proposition, but would have to be realised in a challenge across this whole universe of 
discourse. As a proposition that stands fast, it does not lie in a contextual vacuum; for the 
force of the proposition lies precisely in the way it is rooted in its relation to propositions 
that are employed in specific contexts. To place the emphasis on the proposition as an 
independent item corresponding to a fact derived from, but nevertheless entertainable 
and challengeable independently of the remainder o f the language-game, is surely to 
distort the relation between the proposition and the language-game as a whole. We may 
express this relation by saying that the Weltanschauung hinge proposition is not so much a 
proposition implied, by a language-game but is, in a sense, reducible to it.227
If we now contrast this with the other two categories of hinge proposition, it is not 
obvious that the latter can be treated in such a way as summaries o f a language-game. As a 
result, the connection o f sense between these hinge proposition and the ordinary 
propositions of the language-game is less clear. In fact it is not clear why they should be 
treated as being implied by ordinary discourse at all: if I say ‘I hurt my hand whilst 
gardening yesterday!’, does this, without the provision of a further context, imply the 
proposition ‘I have a hand’? I should have thought not. Nevertheless Wittgenstein did, in 
certain circumstances at least, regard such propositions as intelligible. It is true that he 
claimed that we cannot be said to know these propositions, and that Moore was wrong to 
say that we do,228 but in many remarks he also held that hinge propositions of this kind 
‘stand fast for us’, thus accepting their intelligibility. This needs to be explained.
226 Which is not to say that it cannot be derived from them.
227 I do not especially wish to raise further the question of the truth of Weltanschauung propositions. It follows 
from this paragraph, I think, that we are not concerned so much with the truth of a proposition so much as — 
what we might prefer to call — the validity of a whole way of looking at the world. Perhaps we might say that 
these propositions are at the boundary o f the conceptual and the empirical, but are not less substantially 
about the world for not being simply statements of fact (see Chapter 2). We might also note that 
Wittgenstein distinguishes Weltanschauung propositions from those I am now going on to discuss, and clearly 
acknowledges that they have to do with our understanding of Vhat the world is like’ in a way that the 
others do not (OC 613).
228 See OC 151, for example.
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Wittgenstein describes what standing fast adds up to in a variety of situations, and 
hence what accepting the intelligibility of the propositions amounts to in those situations. 
For example, what looks like an empirical proposition may actually turn out to be a ‘norm 
of description’.229 Or, it may be that the attempt to deny the truth of a hinge proposition 
results from the failure to understand properly the concepts articulated in it.230 Sometimes 
they are empirical propositions, but accepted without special testing;231—indeed there are 
‘countless general empirical propositions that count as certain for us’.232 The attempt to 
doubt hinge propositions may even be a sign o f mental disturbance.233 But none of these 
correspond to the principal (non-weltanschauung) cases of what Wittgenstein has in mind 
when he speaks of such propositions as ‘standing fast*. This, I believe, has more to do 
with the way they reflect something that remains solid in the conduct o f the language- 
games and which supports the deployment of propositions that are open to doubt or 
query.
That this represents a departure in Wittgenstein’s account of hinge propositions starts 
to become apparent in his equivocation over the apparendy empirical nature of the 
propositions,— at first saying that hinge propositions are empirical propositions, only to 
conclude that, though they take the form of empirical propositions, they are not empirical 
after all:
That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no 
doubt can exist if making judgements is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to 
believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. (OC 
308)
This passage is not puzzling if it is taken to mean that there can only be language at all 
if there are many propositions about which questions of doubt simply are not raised. But 
it is puzzling if we regard ‘no doubt can exist’ as saying the same as that the propositions 
‘stand fast’ (i.e. where this means that the truth of these propositions is recognised as 
being unassailable). For if, on the one hand, making judgements is ‘possible’, then we 
cannot but accept the relevant hinge propositions as standing fast; but if, on the other 
hand, making judgements is not possible (whatever that means!), then we could not even 
get so far as to try to doubt them since nothing would mean anything anyway. The 
problem that this gives rise to is that, since it would appear to follow from this that there
229 Ibid. 167. This may be an example of a fact that has been integrated into a concept, i.e. that has been 
used to determine a concept. See Chapter 2.
230 Ibid. 114,126, 369 & 456.
231 Ibid. 136,137, 401 but 402.
232 Ibid. 273.
233 Levett p. 157; OC 155.
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can be no such thing as an intelligible hinge propositions not standing fast (since it would 
mean nothing and so not exist), it is not clear what it can mean to say that it does stand 
fast either. So either we can step back from the idea of hinge propositions as standing 
fast and say simply that there are propositions which, if they are ever uttered, are just not 
questioned at all; or, if we do wish to hang on to the idea of the propositions as standing 
fast, then the account of ‘standing fast’ needs to be modified. The solution to this must 
surely be that the proposition’s standing fast cannot simply be that the truth o f it is in the 
circumstances recognised to be unassailable; rather: that the hinge propositions, when 
offered, are regarded as standing fast is a sign not so much of their certainty but of the 
‘force’ within our lives of the language-game to which the propositions relate. Affirming 
their certainty is, as it were, simply the last resort in affirming the integrity of the 
language-game as a whole, and that is all.
In fact, this is connected with the idea that if a person tries to doubt certain 
propositions then he shows that he does not understand its concepts. In the first place, a 
person’s grasp of a concept is manifested in his ability to make correct judgements.234 
From this point of view, the hinge proposition is the limiting case of a true proposition 
where, as it were, it coincides with a simple expression of the grasp of the concept. The 
invitation to treat the proposition as more than ju st a definition is to connect the grasp of 
the proposition’s sense with a rejection of a wholesale doubt o f the truth of the ordinary 
propositions that revolve about it. ‘If this is not true, nothing is true’ coincides with ‘I can 
talk sense about this’, so that the rejection of a challenge to the latter doubles as a 
rejection of a challenge to the former.
If we like, we can call this defence of the language-game the ‘use’ o f a hinge 
proposition. In an obvious sense it is not a normal move within the language-game of 
which it is intended to be a defence. And yet it is a move which we may find ourselves 
called upon to make in a concrete situation if presented with a sceptical challenge. Quite 
apart of whatever we may think of the intelligibility of hinge propositions, their use 
remains the instinctive defence of the language-game that most easily comes to hand. I 
shall return to this point shortly.
We may see how Wittgenstein develops this thought. His anxiety over this is worth 
quoting in full:
I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and not only
proposition of logic, form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with
234 See PI 242.
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language).—This observation is not of the form “I know...”. “I know...” states what 
I  know, and that is not of logical interest. (OC 401)
In this remark the expression “propositions of the form of empirical propositions” 
is itself thoroughly bad; the statements in question are statements about material 
objects. And they do not serve as foundations in the same way as hypotheses which, if 
they turn out to be false, are replaced by others. (...und schreib getrost “Im Anfang 
war die Tat”235) (OC 402)
To say of man, in Moore’s sense, that he knows something; that what he says is 
therefore unconditionally the truth, seems wrong to me.—It is the truth only 
inasmuch as it is an unmoving foundation of his language-games. (OC 403)
I want to say: it’s not that on some points men know the truth with perfect 
certainty. No: perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude. (OC 404)
But of course there is still a mistake even here. (OC 405)
My feeling is that Wittgenstein is trying to move towards this position: although our 
focus is directed towards the propositions, it is not the propositions as such that are 
important as what they reflect of what is lying at the bottom of the language-game. This 
is something belonging more to our attitudes and/or our actions. Indeed, if the doubts at 
the hinge proposition level are treated as real, then it is the form of life that is made 
vulnerable, not just my confidence in the propositions used to express the certainties and 
the myriad of ordinary propositions that appear to depend on them:
....But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I have 
known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it 
into chaos. (OC 613) 236 
That is to say: If I were contradicted on all sides and told that this person’s name 
was not what I had always known it was (and I use “know” here intentionally), then in 
that case the foundation of all judging would be taken away from me. (OC 614)237
It is not so much that i f  the hinge propositions cease to stand fast for a speaker, the 
language-game will collapse; rather, saying that they are failing to stand fast (insofar as it 
is possible to get so far as saying this) would be the same as saying that his handling of the 
language-game is already crumbling. For if we are plunged into chaos, then this cannot 
follow from hinge propositions having been shown to be false, since the hinge 
propositions must fall into the same unintelligible chaos and so would not remain truth- 
functional. The failure of hinge propositions to stand fast, then, will be not be a 
falsification of them; neither will the ordinary propositions that appear to rotate about 
them have been shown to be intelligible but without foundation. To say that a hinge 
proposition stands fast is to say (and this is a grammatical remark) that if we try deny it
235 Cf. Goethe, Faust I, opening scene in the Studierzimmer.
236 We might also note here that in OC 613 Wittgenstein specifically differentiates between Weltanschauung 
and truism type hinge propositions on this point,— the challenge to a Weltanschauung hinge propositions 
being less damaging to our form o f life and handled differently.
237 See also OC 370.
144
we are already losing our grip on the reality of discourse and indeed of reality itself If 
hinge propositions really are genuine propositions (i.e. spoken out of the life of a person), 
then ‘I don’t know that this hand exists or that there are physical objects’, ‘I do not know 
that this is a hand’, £I don’t know whether I have been on the moon’, etc. are not the 
propositions o f philosophical scepticism but of someone losing his ability to engage in 
sensible discourse,—where his use of language is disengaging with his active relations to 
the world (or worse, where his active relations to the world as a whole are disintegrating). 
We do not have to allow that these denials belong to a rational state; they belong to an 
irrational one, but a state nevertheless (i.e. they are not just linguistic confusions or 
mistakes,—just as we saw in Chapter 4, that the failure of the child to get to grips with 
temporal relations, for example, is not just a matter o f the failure to get the hang of the 
use of certain expressions).
In conclusion, Wittgenstein makes it quite clear that the standing fast o f hinge 
propositions has to do with how the way we instinctively act is a fundamental element in 
the language-game:
If I say “Of course I know that that’s a towel” I am making an utterance. I have no 
thought of a verification. For me it is an immediate utterance.
I don’t think of past or future. (And of course it’s the same for Moore, too.)
It is just like direcdy taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without 
having doubts. (OC 510)
And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to sureness, not to a knowing.
But don’t I take hold of a thing’s name like that too? (OC 511)
If ‘I know this is a towel’ means anything, it is not to make a knowledge claim in the 
ordinary sense;238 it is not a proposition implied by the language-game, the truth of which 
we recognise as fundamental. It is just a way of refusing to allow doubt a foothold at the 
level in the language-game where action and not reason is of the essence.
Now as a way of rejecting the sceptical questioning, asserting propositions may be 
misguided — or at least unwise — inasmuch as it invites treating the propositions as 
attempts to state genuine facts. From this point of view, it may be better to follow the 
example that Wittgenstein set in another remark:
The queer thing is that even though I find it quite correct for someone to say 
“Rubbish!” and so brush aside the attempt to confuse him with doubts at bedrock,— 
nevertheless, I hold it to be incorrect if he seeks to defend himself (using, e.g., the 
words “I know”). (OC 498)
238 Ibid. 477.
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On the other hand, all that a hinge proposition does too is brush aside the attempt to 
doubt at bedrock. As I have already said, the use of propositions to effect this ‘brushing 
aside’ is very natural, whilst being at the same time an affirmation of the language-game 
as it is played. Hence there may be greater wisdom in accepting this fact, whilst qualifying 
it with the recognition that propositions are not used only to state facts — as I have tried 
to demonstrate.
We might note, also, that since the standing fast o f a (non-weltanschauung) hinge 
proposition is at most a move made from within a language-game in defence of a sceptical 
challenge on the language-game, and is not the assertion of a fact determined by the 
philosopher, it is not in any sense a proof of the existence of the world. It is not a proof 
directed against a global scepticism, neither does it contain any acknowledgement o f the 
intelligibility o f such scepticism. ‘The earth exists’ is not a fact implied by normal 
discourse, and so is not the answer to any question that can be asked either.
A central difference that is emerging between my position and Levett’s is in my 
suggestion that the importance of action to the integrity of the language-game lies rather 
more deeply within the form of life than just in the way we handle individual propositions 
(i.e. our attitudes towards such propositions). This difference widens with Levett’s refusal 
to allow that natural behaviour, insofar as it may itself be regarded as expressive o f belief, 
can be supportive of the language-game. This will be the topic o f the next section.
4 ~ Propositional and Non-propositional Belief
One solution to the problems arising from the idea that language is a system of 
propositions, necessarily linked to real yet unformulable hinge propositions, has been to 
argue that below the level of propositional belief is another mode of belief which is 
expressed just in the way we act. This mode of belief is then conceived o f as providing the 
support for the propositions of everyday discourse that would otherwise have been 
provided by the problematic hinge propositions. This is consistent with the point of view 
I have tried to develop in the previous section. However, there, when I spoke of action, I 
was speaking not of non-linguistic behaviour, but of the persistence239 with which we make 
the judgements that we do. In the present case, by contrast, we are concerned with the 
possibility of viewing propositions as linguistic analogues to a fundamental order in our 
non-linguistic behaviour. Hence we will be developing a quite different sense in which
239 C£: CI obey the rule bhndtj (PI 219).
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the propositions of normal discourse are supported by actions. Wittgenstein makes many 
remarks that appear to be consistent with this view, of which the following are obvious 
examples:
My life shows that I know or am certain that there is a chair over there, or a door, and 
so on.—I tell a friend e.g. “Take that chair over there”, “Shut that door”, etc., etc.
(OC 7)
“An empirical proposition can be tested’ (we say). But how? and through what? (OC 
109)
What counts as its test?—“But is this an adequate test? And, if so, must it not be 
recognisable as such in logic?”—As if giving grounds did not come to an end 
sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is 2m ungrounded way 
of acting. (OC 110)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is 
not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)
A proponent of this solution is D. J. Orr, who argues that belief expressed in instinctive 
behaviour can substitute for belief expressed in propositions, and so form an 
ungrounded, i.e. non-rational, foundation for propositional beliefs.240 Levett’s riposte, as 
has been noted, is that ‘belief expressed in behaviour cannot give support to 
propositions, since it can have no logical structure and so can have no logical connection 
with them. The primary assumption in Levett’s position here is that behavioural content 
can only ‘supporf propositional belief if there is a logical relation between them. This can 
be challenged,—which will mean developing a different conception of ‘supporf from 
Levett’s. The crucial issue will be the relation between linguistic expressions of belief and 
the behaviour that is supposed to correspond to the truths expressed in hinge 
propositions, not the truths expressed in ordinary contingent propositions. For the 
moment, however, we will start by examining the latter and their analogues in behaviour.
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of a central point made in Chapter 4, that the 
concept of belief — along with many other concepts of phenomena within human life — 
has a wider scope than being the concept just o f something done in language. Belief is a 
phenomenon o f human life manifested both propositionally and non-propositionally; it is 
a relation to ourselves and to the world showing both in what we sag and in what we do. 
Hence there is no metaphor in judging from a dog’s behaviour that he believes he is going 
to be taken for a walk; the concept belief is just as at home here as when a child expresses 
in the same in words.
240 Orr p. 141.
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The concepts of belief and action are internally related throughout, for the 
propositional expression of belief depends on the relations of propositions to actions.—  
It is not something ‘made possible’ by an already given logical relation between a 
proposition and reality, as if once the relation between propositions and reality is 
established we can then ‘use’ them to express our beliefs.241 The relations that 
propositions have to reality is a function of the role they have in our lives. This lies in the 
way in which they belong to how we act. And the pertinent dimension of this action is the 
natural, behavioural expression of belief. The very constitution of propositions is a 
function of the context of human action; for what makes what we say an expression of 
anything at all — and an expression of belief in particular — is to be found in its engagement 
with the rest o f our lives.
By contrast, it is a manifestation of the conception of language as a system of 
propositions that identifies the essence of belief in an attitude towards propositions rather 
than in the way that propositions belong to our attitude towards the world. This is not to 
deny that we may, in special circumstances, speak of belief as an attitude towards 
propositions — for example, if we are trying to explain the use of the word to a foreigner 
who already has the concept belief embedded in his understanding of ‘proposition’ — only 
this will not provide us with a fundamental understanding of the nature of belief and its 
relation to behaviour. Levett remarks that:
It is important here not to confuse our attitude towards these truths, and the nature of 
these truths themselves given the role that Wittgenstein ascribes to them. It has 
recendy been suggested, for example, that these truths are to be understood as ‘non- 
propositional’, their nature to be spelled out in purely behavioural terms.242 However,
I think insofar as we have any grasp of the nature and role of these truths we must 
think of them as propositional. (Levett p. 159)
Levett takes it for granted here that if non-linguistic behaviour is to provide the 
substrate for the beliefs expressed in language, then it must be by virtue of truths grasped 
non-propositionally. It is at this point that he makes the further assertion that, since 
anything grasped non-propositionally will fail to achieve a logical relation to any 
proposition, such ‘truths’ must be in a propositional form after all — albeit an abstract 
one. This conclusion is inevitable if we try to characterise non-propositional belief in 
terms of the grasp of truths. Wittgenstein does make some remarks that might be
241 See Chapter 4, Section 4.
242 Orr p. 141.
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interpreted in this way;243 but this is not a necessary interpretation, and it is certainly not a 
necessary formulation of the concept of non-propositional belief.
It surely falls within the general concept of belief that a propositional belief may be 
conceived of as being ‘supported’ by non-propositional modes of belief. For within the 
embrace of the concept of belief, the relation between beliefs as expressed in behaviour 
and beliefs as expressed linguistically does not have to be a ‘logical’ one. The belief- 
expressing behaviour that pervades our lives provides the framework for the expression 
of propositional beliefs: the possibility of expressing beliefs in propositions depends, as I 
have noted above, on their being embedded in a life characterised by belief expressing 
behaviour. This is where the relation of support between behavioural and propositional 
belief lies and which we now need to define more closely. To demonstrate this, we need 
to show how the identity o f a proposition as expressing a belief is dependent on its being 
seen within the context of such belief-expressing behaviour. Note, again, that at this 
point in the argument, we are not restricting ourselves to the support that is offered to 
expressions o f belief by behaviour of the kind that is supposed to correspond to hinge 
propositions, but to the general situation where linguistic beliefs are surrounded by 
behavioural expressions o f belief — beliefs that could be expressed propositionally but 
happen not to be. We should also note that our concern here is with beliefs that are 
directly to do with our relations to our immediate environment, rather than those where 
the connection between the linguistically expressed belief and any specific modes of 
behaviour is more attenuated. What we require, then, is to show that the concept of a 
propositionally expressed belief is the concept of something given against the 
background of specific natural expressions of belief (or where such expressions are 
always possible).
We might begin by considering behaviourally expressed belief o f the kind that we might 
observe in the life of an animal — just to distinguish it clearly from linguistic modes of 
belief. A dog hesitates and falters before jumping across a stream. Perhaps it runs up and 
down until it finds a narrower section. Eventually it finds one and jumps confidently. 
Here it would be quite natural to say that when the dog is hesitant it doubts, and when it is 
confident it believes, that it can jump the stream. Again I emphasise that this way of 
speaking is not metaphorical: our concept of belief is determined just as much in these 
circumstances as when belief is expressed linguistically. We commonly predicate beliefs 
o f pre-linguistic children and dumb animals where we see forms of behaviour that are, in
243 OC 403, for example.
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obvious ways, shared with ourselves as language users. Their lives are a constant stream 
of just such behaviour.
Now the same goes for the life of linguistic human beings,—the difference of course 
being that the flow of life is penetrated by speech.244 I too may find myself running up 
and down the same river bank: here I may say, TSFo, I can’t jump this’; there, ‘Maybe’; and 
further on, ‘Yes, here I can’. These are all expressions of belief. They are strictly 
analogous to the behaviour of the dog; indeed the person may behave just like the dog 
but without speaking at all, even ‘to himself. But now, in what circumstances do we 
regard (or judge) that the utterances o f the person are expressions of belief? In the 
situation I have just described, the utterances themselves will normally be taken as 
sufficient. But what if I constantly acted in contradiction to what I said? Or what if there 
were never any observable connection between my speech and my actions? What right 
would we have to say that my remarks were still expressions of belief? Indeed, at the 
limit, what right would we have to say that I am still speaking intelligibly at all? The 
attitude towards my utterances, that they are expressions o f belief, is an attitude that takes 
what I say in the context of my actions. In other words, there is an internal connection 
between my behaviour and my words, but not in the sense that the sense of my words is 
logically dependent on the ‘sense’ of my behaviour.—The behaviour does not have a 
logically structured content related to the content o f the propositions that it supports — 
which Levett rightly points out is incoherent. Rather, the judgement that these words 
express this belief is internally (i.e. logically) related to the judgement that they occur within 
these patterns o f behaviour: our conception of any given utterance as the expression of a 
belief is logically related to our conception of its surrounding behaviour as expressing the 
same and/or related beliefs. It is in this sense that we may say that the beliefs expressed 
in the surrounding behaviour ‘support’ those expressed linguistically. Non-propositional 
belief supports propositional belief, because what makes a proposition the expression of 
belief that it is is the context of non-propositional modes of belief-expressing behaviour 
which are its natural surroundings.
An important point about this way of looking at the relation between non-linguistic and 
linguistic expressions of belief is that it is not a question of the linguistically expressed 
belief bzmg justified by reference to the underlying non-linguistic form — either from the 
point of view o f a subjective ‘justification’ on the part of the agent, or in the context of a 
‘transcendental’ account o f the possibility of linguistically expressed belief. For in looking
244 See Chapter 4.
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to the behavioural surroundings of linguistically expressed beliefs, we are not engaging in 
a traditional foundationalist account of language. We are simply examining the relation 
between natural and linguistic expressions of belief as they fall within our concept of the 
expression of belief. My argument is that it belongs to the grammar of the concept of the 
linguistic expression of belief that it is surrounded by non-linguistic, behavioural 
expressions o f the same and connected beliefs. It is important to emphasise this, since 
the discussion of these issues can confuse these two approaches. What is at issue is the 
constitutive role of behaviour within that larger conception o f belief which also contains 
the concept of its linguistic expression.
O f course, a speaker may well reflect upon his actions and allow his instinct or 
inclination to act in one way or another to influence the formulation of his verbal 
expressions of belief. This also belongs to our conception of the circumstances in which 
beliefs may originate, and so it adds to the senses in which a person’s natural impulses to 
act in a specific way may support his verbal expressions of belief. However, this is a 
comment on how the transition may be made from non-linguistic to linguistic 
expressions of belief; it does not depend on the idea of a logical’ relation between 
linguistically and non-linguistically expressed beliefs. Neither is it a case of the agent 
finding a non-propositional ‘ground’ for his propositional beliefs.
The behaviour that surrounds linguistic expressions of belief is pervaded by natural 
expressions of belief that might otherwise, and in appropriate circumstances, have been 
expressed linguistically. This is integral to our concept of belief. The remaining issue is 
whether within this flow of behaviourally expressed beliefs we can intelligibly identify 
those behaviourally expressed beliefs which are supposed to correspond to the beliefs or 
certainties expressed in hinge propositions; and if not, whether such behaviour may play 
any other role in determining our concept of certainty. These are the crucial issues.
5 ~ Doubt, Certainty and Action
Wittgenstein distinguishes between ‘comfortable’ and ‘struggling’ certainty:
One might say: ‘“I know’ expresses confortable certainty, not the certainty that is still 
struggling.” (OC 357)
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The ‘I know’ he refers to here is the kind we find in Moore (in this case, ‘I know that 
it’s a chair’245), not the ‘I know’ we use in ordinary circumstances. It is the comfortable 
certainty of hinge propositions, which apparently has it origins in the intrinsic certainty of 
human action. The certainty that is struggling, on the other hand, is the certainty that is 
expressed in the ordinary course o f events (linguistic or non-linguistic) — the certainty 
which might otherwise have been a doubt and which always remains open to challenge 
(or at least, where challenge is always intelligible).
Elizabeth Wolgast makes much use o f this distinction in her account of the dilemma 
that Wittgenstein found himself in in On Certainty, namely that as soon as we take what is 
comfortably certain and express it in words, it cannot but be exposed to the possibility of 
doubt and so is immediately transformed into a struggling certainty.246 However, before 
going on to examine Wolgast’s attempt to resolve this dilemma, I would like to look 
briefly at one other way of making a distinction between comfortable and struggling 
propositional certainties;— one which has the attraction of allowing for the intelligibility 
o f comfortable certainties, but unfortunately does not ultimately resolve the difficulty 
confronting us here.
In the ordinary course of daily life, we frequendy make explicit expressions of certainty, 
e.g. ‘I know that the book was here this morning, I saw it’, or ‘I am certain no one saw 
me’, etc. These are clearly examples of struggling certainties, for it is easy to see how they 
might be challenged. However, the basis for any such challenge will be statements which, 
for the purpose of making the challenge, are not themselves challenged. For example, I may 
be asked whether I am sure it was this morning that I entered the room and saw the 
book, or whether I wasn’t getting it muddled with the time I popped back into the office 
the evening before. Here it is not challenged that I did in fact see the book. That will be a 
certainty that is part of the context for the challenge, and any intelligible challenge will have 
such certainties as their context. If, on the other hand, any of these certainties is 
challenged, then it will just be that the context of the original challenge will have changed, 
and other certainties will have arisen in the foundations of the new challenge. This 
provides us with a perfectly intelligible way of making a distinction between comfortable 
and struggling certainties, namely a context based distinction in which struggling 
certainties are those treated as vulnerable to challenge, whilst comfortable certainties are 
those which are treated as the basis of any such challenge (or which are cited in the 
course of making statements expressing struggling certainties). The distinction is
245 OC 355.
246 See, for example, Wolgastl p. 164.
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therefore a relative one in which it is the role of the propositions in context that 
determines what is comfortable and what is struggling.
However we should also note that this distinction is not one in which the comfortable 
certainties correspond to hinge propositions. Rather, it is a distinction arising within the 
class of propositions that Wolgast counts as struggling certainties; that is, it applies to that 
class of propositions that are cited during normal discourse. Nevertheless it does raise an 
important issue, for it suggests that we ought to be wary of speaking of the 
‘challengeability’ of propositions — as Wolgast seems to — as if that were a property of 
propositions outside any context,— as if it were an intrinsic property of propositions. This 
is harmful firstly because it is another encouragement to the idea of language as a system 
o f propositions. It is also problematic to the extent that it carries, as a corollary, the idea 
that in order to establish certainty — either in propositions or in actions — it has to shown 
to be an intrinsic property. This is a theme that will emerge in the following discussion.
Returning to Wolgast, she examines one attempt to resolve the dilemma over 
comfortable and struggling certainty which appeals to the idea that certainty is a form of life 
— a move already suggested by Wittgenstein, though with little conviction.247 If successful, 
this would enable comfortable certainty to be removed from the linguistic to the non- 
linguistic sphere, thereby placing it beyond the reach of linguistic scepticism. Wolgast 
rejects this solution, but not for the right reason, in my view. She argues that we cannot 
remove this problem by invoking ‘certainty as a form of life’, since, for one thing, we 
cannot describe the mode of life as expressing comfortable certainty without that being a 
move in the language-game, thus returning us to a struggling certainty. For example, if we 
observe a person acting with comfortable certainty, we can always ask what this certainty 
is ‘based on’.248 According to Wolgast, the fact that we are able to ask this means that we 
have engaged with the agent and are therefore participants in the language-game. In so 
doing we are making explicit what he is certain about and so opening it to question, with 
the result that it is turned into a struggling certainty once more. Hence it is not possible 
to observe a comfortable certainty neutrally in behaviour without making it into a 
certainty expressed in language.249 She concludes that comfortable certainty cannot be 
‘buried’ in the certainty o f action:
The burial ceremony is empty. Even to speak about their certainty is to assert them by
implication, and that means bringing them back into the game. (Wolgastl p. 159)
247 See OC 358.
248 Wolgastl p. 160.
249 Ibid. p. 160.
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Unlike a person’s hope, which can be ascribed to him as part of a description,
someone’s certainty involves the speaker and his own judgement With ascriptions
of certainty, our own evaluations enter in. (Wolgastl p. 164)
Having denied that linguistically expressed comfortable certainties can be grounded in 
analogous certainties expressed in behaviour, Wolgast is then able to isolate hinge 
propositions from any behavioural context: we no longer have to try to understand how 
they might have a ‘use’ (in the way that I have tried to do), the nature o f which has to do 
with their relation to the bedrock of human action.—Wittgenstein would have been 
better off placing less emphasis on them.250 Moreover, Levett would have found less to 
make an issue o f and certainly less scope for imputing to Wittgenstein a view of language 
as a system of propositions. She can then conclude that hinge propositions are just ‘relics’ 
of little significance:251
It seems to me more apt to characterize the comfortable certainties as curiosities, as 
relics in a philosophical museum, than to try to give them a role in some dynamical 
system of propositions. Why should we think that ordinary language, and the usual 
language-game of certainty, needs them in order to exist? Put this way, it seems 
obvious that we should not. Their role as foundational and structurally necessary is a 
piece of mythology. (Wolgastl p. 165)
I certainly do not wish to give them such a role (as Levett does). But I do think there is 
something wrong if this is taken to imply that action at bedrock therefore has no role in 
our conception o f the expression of certainty (linguistic or otherwise). I believe that 
Wolgast’s inability to recognise this lies in her failure to distinguish properly the nature of 
the observations that are being made of bedrock action and its relation to linguistic 
expressions o f certainty; for these observations are conceptual’ not participatory. We are not 
restating the agent’s certainty, just observing that this is what he does. In other words, we 
are describing the behavioural context for language use. We are making a conceptual link 
between (what for the moment we shall suppose to be) the comfortable certainty 
expressed in behaviour and that expressed in propositions. It is quite irrelevant to this 
whether the certainty expressed in behaviour is ‘based’ on anything. For if — following 
Wolgast — our recognition of that stimulates us into asking ‘what did he based his belief 
on?’,252 all that shows is that for the moment we have left the conceptual investigation in
250 Ibid. p. 165.
251 Note that Wolgast’s conclusion is echoed in Wittgenstein’s remark: T)oes my telephone call to New 
York strengthen my conviction that the earth exists? Much seems to be fixed, and it is removed from the 
traffic. It is so to speak shunted onto an unused siding.’ (OC 210) But this is not enough to sanction their 
radical dismissal.
252 Wolgastl p. 160.
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favour of participating in the language-game,—we have moved from a position o f not 
asserting the certainties, to becoming accomplices to their assertion.
The purpose of Wolgast’s argument was to show that we cannot remove comfortable 
certainty {qua hinge propositions) to the non-linguistic sphere, with the conclusion that 
there is nothing of substance in behaviour that can provide support — from a place 
beyond doubting — to our normal discourse and struggling certainties. But the lesson I 
wish to draw from the failure o f this argument is not that we should return to the idea 
that comfortable certainties are, after all, expressed in behaviour and can fulfil the role that 
Wolgast denies. Rather, I will argue that behaviour at bedrock is relevant to the integrity 
of the language-game, to linguistic competence and to the concept of certainty,— only 
that this will not be by claiming that certainty is expressed or contained in some way in 
behaviour at bedrock. So I intend, firstly, to deny the intelligibility of the idea that 
behaviour at bedrock is an expression of certainty, and then to show how, in spite o f this, 
behaviour at bedrock is nevertheless an important component of our concept of the 
expression of certainty.
We should note here that what I am denying is not that certainty may be expressed in 
behaviour in certain contexts. Indeed we may also apply to action, mutatis mutandis, the 
relative distinction between comfortable and struggling propositional certainties which I 
explained above. What I shall be arguing against is the notion that certainty is an intrinsic 
property of action,—which would then apply to action at all levels, even at ‘bedrock’.
The principal remarks of Wittgenstein’s that show that he thought o f comfortable 
certainty as something rooted directly in instinctive reactions (either in linguistic reactions 
of in non-linguistic behaviour) are:
Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second.
(OC 354)
Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or 
superficiality, but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly 
thought as well.) (OC 358)
But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or 
unjustified; as it were, as something animal. (OC 359)
I really want to say that a language-game is only possible if one trusts something (I did 
not say “can trust something”). (OC 509)
If I say “Of course I know that that’s a towel” I am making an utterance. I have no 
thought of a verification. For me it is an immediate utterance.
I don’t think of past or future. (And of course it’s the same for Moore, too.)
It is just like directly taking hold of something, as I take hold of my towel without 
having doubts. (OC 510)
And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to a sureness, not to a knowing.
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But don’t I take hold of a thing’s name like that, too? (OC 511)
But why am I so certain that this is my hand? Doesn’t the whole language-game rest 
on this kind of certainty?
Or: isn’t this ‘certainty’ (already) presupposed in the language-game? Namely by 
virtue of the fact that one is not playing the game, or is playing it wrong, if one does 
not recognise objects with certainty. (OC 446)
....As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an 
ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting. (OC 110)
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is 
not certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. (OC 204)
These remarks are emphatic that what lies at the bottom of the language-game is a 
certainty or a sureness or a trust — or whatever we like to call it — which is manifested 
either in the way we utter certain propositions as standing fast for us, or in the way we 
make ordinary judgements,253 or in the surrounding behaviour in which the use of 
language is embedded. I have dealt with the first two of these in earlier sections, and so 
my interest now is principally with the last. What concerns me about speaking of the 
bedrock of non-linguistic behaviour as ‘non-doubting’ is that it makes it look as if 
certainty were of the essence o f action, that it were intrinsic to action: as if normal action 
were the very expression of certainty and doubt in essential conflict with it,—the 
exception that proves the rule. But it seems to me that it only makes sense to speak of 
any behaviour as non-doubting or certain if it might otherwise be replaceable by a doubt 
or an expression of uncertainty. And that means that we can, in any case, only speak of 
the expression of certainty in behaviour at all where it is o f the struggling kind.
It is not difficult to see how we might be driven to think o f certainty as being of the 
essence of action, just because there is an obvious sense in which doubts can only be 
raised in the midst of the flow of life, i.e. where there is already a surrounding of 
certainty. And at first sight it is tempting to say that this (relative) certainty must go fight 
down to bedrock;—indeed the deeper it goes the more it appears to be the epitome of 
certainty. It would seem that without a layer of comfortable certainty that cannot be 
convertible to doubting behaviour, there is no bulwark against the possibility of falling 
into a pervasive state o f doubt expressed in every waking movement. It seems to be a 
necessity to characterise behaviour as such as either certain, or confident, or non-doubting,
253 Cf. 1 obey the rule blindly (PI 219).
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or unhesitating. But there is surely something wrong with the very idea of such pervasive 
concepts of doubt or certainty.254
The way out of this impasse must be to recognise that at bedrock what we have is just 
action itself, unqualified by any further terms. Action is a fundamental concept in its own 
right; it does not stand in need of qualification in terms of certainty, or non-doubting, or 
lack o f hesitation, or sureness, or trust. These are conceptions of action only applying in 
specific contexts and which take for granted the concept of action in its unqualified form. 
What underlies both doubt and certainty is what we might call the fundamental coherence of 
our primary activity,255— of behaviour at bedrock. This distinction, between the level at 
which the language-games of knowledge and certainty are constituted and the underlying 
coherence that they presuppose,256 is, I believe, what Malcolm is struggling to express and 
which he refers to as the ‘fundamental thing’:
This fundamental thing is so fundamental that it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to 
describe it in words. One would like to characterise it in mental terms — to call it 
knowledge, or belief, or conviction, or certainty, or acceptance, or confidence, or 
assumption. But none of the expressions fit. All of them have their appropriate 
application within various language-games. Whereas Wittgenstein is trying to call 
attention to something that underlies all language-games. (Malcolml p. 17)
Wittgenstein speaks in a similar vein o f the ‘thing that really matters’:
If the shopkeeper wanted to investigate each of his apples without any reason, for the 
sake of being certain about everything, why doesn’t he have to investigate the 
investigation? And can one talk of belief here (I mean belief as in ‘religious belief, not 
surmise)? All psychological terms merely distract us from the thing that really matters.
(OC 459)
But I do not agree with Malcolm that the reason why these expressions do not fit is 
because there are no words to describe what ‘underlies all language-games’. As I have 
argued at length, there is a language-game of talking about the various language-games 
and their behavioural context.257 In observing the behavioural context for a language- 
game, we are not obliged to try to step outside all language-games and provide ourselves 
with a transcendental perspective on them, which inevitably results in the failure —
254 This is not to contradict the point that doubt requires a surrounding of behaviour and propositions that 
are certain. Rather, the surrounding of certainty is certainty of the struggling kind, whilst this, as I shall go 
on to argue, requires a context o f behaviour at bedrock of which it can add nothing to say that it expresses 
certainty.
255 And which o f course extends throughout our behaviour.
256 That the concept o f them ‘presupposes’, not that the language-game itself contains an assumption.
257 This attitude is reflected in Wittgenstein’s remark quoted earlier (OC 446) that one is playing the 
language-game wrong if one does not recognise objects with certainty. This is not a transcendental 
observation but a grammatical remark within our concept of the language-game — though in the present 
context my intention is to argue that we cannot take the concept o f certainty down into the bedrock of  
human action.
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predicted by Malcolm — to construct the transcendental concepts required to articulate 
this perspective. Neither are we in the position of trying to provide the foundations of a 
given language-game from within, which would mean taking for granted the very concepts 
one is trying to provide a foundation for. No, all we have to do is to recognise that 
underlying the language-games of doubt and certainty is just the active life. We may wish 
to say that this forms the solid base which makes sureness and certainty possible, and that 
without this base the broad stock of sure and certain actions — and the doubts that may 
be placed against them — would not exist. But this is not to say that action pure and 
simple represents a kind of super certainty. At bedrock is not non-propositional belief, 
but just action expressing neither certainty nor belief. Certainty is not the intrinsic or 
essential property of action; at best it is a property that action can acquire in specific 
circumstances,—just as we may speak, in certain specific contexts, o f behaviour as 
expressing beliefs.
This may be made clearer by returning to consider the relation between the supposed 
expressions o f belief lying in the bedrock of human behaviour and the genuine non- 
propositional expressions of belief that we noted in the example of the dog by the 
stream. For example, the behaviour expressing the dog’s belief that it can jump the 
stream would, at bedrock, be supposed to ‘hinge’ upon behaviour expressing the belief 
that ‘this is my leg’, or that ‘I am standing on the bank of a stream’, and so on, i.e. truths 
similar to those Wittgenstein thought held fast for us such as ‘I know that here is a 
hand’.258 But this immediately brings us to a difficulty. For here we are having to interpret 
the normal behaviour of the dog as a natural expression of such certainties; and the 
trouble is that it is not easy to see what the content might be of such an interpretation. 
The sense in regarding the dog’s final jump as a natural expression of belief is easy to 
grasp because it contrasts clearly with the previous state of uncertainty and hesitation. 
But it is not at all clear that there is anything in the ordinary course o f the life of a dog 
which we could sensibly interpret as expressing the doubt that ‘this is my leg’, etc. 
Likewise in a human case, it is not obvious that it makes any sense to say that when I 
scratch my head this expresses my certainty that I have a hand and a head. When we 
think of the behaviour at the stream as expressive of belief/doubt, we are thinking of 
particular events in the life o f the dog. But if we try to think of the behaviour as 
primitively expressing the certainty that ‘this is my leg’, we are thinking of something that 
must itself pervade the course of the dog’s life at every step and in all its waking
258 OC 9.
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movements. If we then try to think of a contrasting behavioural expression of doubt in 
this context, it is difficult to avoid imagining anything other than the behaviour of the 
dog simply falling into confusion or incoherence. But this is not to imagine a primitive 
expression of doubt, which is surely to imagine something belonging to the flow of 
behaviour and is not to imagine that flow merely breaking down.
To view behaviour as expressing belief or doubt is already to regard it at a level of 
organisation that takes for granted a considerable measure o f coherence in the way a 
creature behaves and relates to its surroundings. Thus we distinguish hesitation from 
merely having a fit. This background of action provides the context within which we 
identify behavioural expressions of doubt or certainty, i.e. expressions of belief. Hence, the 
manifestation of such coherence cannot in itself be regarded as even a primitive 
expression of belief, since the latter presupposes such coherence at bedrock (i.e. the 
concept of the latter presupposes the concept of the former). But this is just what we are 
doing if we try to characterise the normal behaviour of a dog as a primitive expression of 
the belief that ‘this is my leg’, etc.
This fundamental coherence certainly is a pre-requisite for language-games. This is why 
it is tempting to say that it cannot itself be the prototype for any one language-game, and 
so lies ‘beyond description’. But it is a prerequisite only in the sense that it is already 
contained in the concept of behaviour, and so is, o f course, already integral to our concept 
of a language-game — any language-game. Its seeming to be ‘beyond description’, then, is 
just a reflection of the fact that the concept of action is itself irreducible, and is not 
further illuminated by introducing any additional qualifying terms. We may also say that 
this fundamental coherence is what ‘supports’ beliefs and certainties expressed both 
behaviourally and propositionally. For it is constitutive of the forms of behaviour that 
are, at another level and in specific surroundings, conceived of as expressing belief or 
disbelief, certainty or doubt, trust or mistrust, confidence or hesitation.
6 ~ Possessing the Concepts of Certainty and Knowledge
In previous chapters we looked at how the possession of certain concepts is at least a 
function o f how we are oriented towards the corresponding phenomena within our lives. 
In Chapter 4, for example, we examined how the possession of the concept belief takes 
for granted the ability to express beliefs in our speech; whilst in Chapter 6, the subject 
matter was the part played by our subjectivity in the formation of subjective, or
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psychological, concepts. In the present and parallel cases, we need to reflect on how the 
possession of the concepts o f certainty and knowledge might be similarly rooted.
The expression of certainty in our use of language is not something that we leam after 
we have leamt the use of propositions. It is integral to our use of language. It is a facet of 
the use of language in normal situations. ‘Certainty’ here does not mean merely the 
sureness with which we make assertions, but the way in which we treat what we say as 
certainly true. It shows in how we think and work things out, and in the way we respond 
to questions, challenges, etc., from others. If I haven’t learned to utter propositions with 
certainty in this sense (i.e. in the relative sense as it applies to both the comfortable and 
struggling certainties), then I have simply not learned to speak: it is a feature of the 
spontaneous use o f language. Similarly, that I can know things is not itself something that 
I leam only after having learned to speak: if I have learned to speak at all, then I already 
know plenty. And likewise, I show that I understand that I know things in the way that I 
can back up the things that I say in the course of conversation with others, and so on.
The ability to handle language in these ways -  and which shows, in an important sense, 
that I understand what I am doing — is essential to our grasp of the concepts of certainty 
and knowledge. We judge that a child is getting hold o f these concepts in the way that it 
shows that it is acquiring a general competence in the handling of language. The child’s 
development o f this relation to his own use of language is what I have already referred to 
in Chapter 4 as the ‘primary’ understanding of the respective concepts: the child is 
learning to treat things that are said as expressions of certainty or as demonstrations of 
knowledge, and this capacity is constitutive of the child’s acquisition and possession these 
concepts. The child is, o f course, also learning the terminology of the language-games of 
knowledge and certainty and learning to make judgements using the words ‘certainty’ and 
‘knowledge’, etc. But this must be secondary. Learning to make these judgements cannot 
be achieved by having the phenomena of certainty and knowledge pointed out,— except 
insofar as the child already shows an understanding of them that is implicit in its use of 
language.
Relating these observations, at last, to the conception of language-games as extensions of 
more primitive behaviour, we would be justified in conceiving of the language-games of 
belief and doubt as extensions of behavioural expressions o f either comfortable or 
struggling certainty, as long as these are conceived of in the relative sense described 
earlier. But they cannot be conceived of as extensions of a more fundamental certainty 
beyond words, for there is none.
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7  ~  Conclusion
If hinge propositions have a function it is not, whilst in anti-sceptical philosophical 
mode, to state facts that are comfortable certainties; neither do they belong to a system of 
propositions. Rather, their function it is to bar the way, whilst within the flow of 
discourse, to the projection of sceptical questioning into the foundations of the language- 
game. They do so by means of a kind of ungrounded affirmation of the language-game’s 
normal conduct. In a sense we might say that it is the language-game ‘speaking for itself 
and brushing aside sceptical questioning.
However, there is a problem arising out of this ‘use’ of hinge propositions, which is that 
it is only too easy to misconstrue the context of their utterance and to present them as 
normally intended propositions which are, therefore, open to doubt: the ‘comfortable’ 
certainties corresponding to hinge propositions will, if expressed, collapse into 
‘struggling’ certainties. The distinction between comfortable and struggling certainties can 
only be maintained if it is construed as a relative distinction in which, in a given situation, 
the comfortable certainties are those cited in support of struggling certainties but which 
are not themselves given support. There is no scope for an absolute conception of 
comfortable certainty, and neither is it required.
This situation is mirrored at the purely behavioural level. Ordinary struggling certainties 
may be expressed in behaviour, just as they are at the linguistic level; but it makes no 
sense to speak of comfortable certainties as being expressed in behaviour, unless of 
course we construe the distinction, again, as relative. Behaviour ‘at bedrock’, i.e. that 
behaviour which we might otherwise think of as expressing comfortable certainty, 
requires no further qualification in terms of ‘certainty, or acceptance, or confidence, or 
assumption’.259 The expression of doubt or certainty in behaviour depends on the 
behaviour being seen in the context of a bedrock of coherent behaviour o f which it can 
mean nothing (or is just a plain confusion) to say that it is expressive either of certainty or 
uncertainty. This coherent behaviour is the fabric out of which all our specific acts and 
language-games are fashioned. And whereas the language-games of doubt and certainty 
may be regarded as extensions of their primitive behavioural expressions, they cannot be 
seen as an extension of coherent behaviour as such. ‘In the beginning was the deed’ — the 
deed being prior to certainty or uncertainty, knowledge or ignorance.
259 Malcolml p. 17.
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Chapter 8 ~  This Philosophical Form o f Life
1 ~ Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I have tried to give an account o f how intimately the 
possession of our concepts — and especially o f those that are most pervasive of our 
thinking — is woven into the fabric of our lives. In particular, I have tried to emphasise 
how the possession of these concepts is not just an adjunct but is constitutive of our lives 
(including, of course, our mental life). Along the way, I have also tried to indicate at least 
something of the bearing that these observations have on our understanding of the 
genesis o f philosophical perplexity and of the form that our understanding of these 
concepts must take in philosophy. In this final chapter, I shall examine aspects o f these 
latter issues more closely.
In those earlier chapters I looked at the possession of these concepts — and language 
generally — from the point of view of the instinctive nature of the linguistic and non- 
linguistic reactions and modes of behaviour that are characteristic of that possession. 
This was principally because to identify what is instinctive in our form of life is to identify 
what most determines its character; and it says that we do not have to look to some 
phenomenon lying behind the ‘given’ of human life when trying to explain or characterise 
it.—We do not have to turn to rationalism or mentalistic theory, for example.260 So an 
important extension to this discussion will be an examination of the extent to which 
philosophical perplexity itself has its origins in instinct — that its confusions are not just 
mistakes in our thinking. This will tell us something more about how such perplexity is 
structural to our form of life; and it will also make clearer the nature of the 
misunderstandings that such perplexity can give rise to. It is here that we will need to 
look in more detail — and following on from the latter chapters — at the ways in which we 
are orientated towards the specific concepts that give rise to philosophical perplexity, that 
is, at the manner o f our possession of them.
This re-examination of the origins o f philosophical perplexity will acknowledge the 
reality and the importance o f the modes of genesis that are traditionally associated with
260 Again, it should go without saying that this is not a ‘theory’ of human life.—The investigation remains a 
grammatical one: we are making a conceptual connection between language, concepts and behaviour as such. 
We may note also that the ‘given’ includes mental life, but not a conception o f mental life involving a 
conception of privacy informed by a notion o f private ostensive definition.
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Wittgenstein. I have in mind the influence of confusingly similar surface grammatical 
forms or the ‘pictures’ that lie in the language and which fox us as to the proper relations 
between our concepts — and there are others besides. However, my intention will be to 
extend this catalogue to include other origins, such as those deriving from the complex 
relations to our concepts that I have tried to explain in the previous chapters. I shall also 
be drawing attention to the fact that Wittgenstein did not confine his own account to the 
former — most often quoted — origins o f philosophical perplexity.
Before that, however, I shall revisit some of Rhees’s general observations regarding the 
nature o f philosophical perplexity, and the responses I gave them in Chapter 4.
2 ~ Philosophy and the Grammars of Particular'Expressions
In Chapter 4, I agreed with Rhees that he is right to warn against identifying the roots 
of philosophical problems in the ‘confusion of grammars of particular expressions’,261 if 
that simply means getting into a tangle over the rules governing these expressions. The 
reasons for his warnings lie partly in the fact that it is a view that owes much to the 
confused conception of the use of language as the operation of a technique — a point on 
which he found Wittgenstein wanting. But perhaps more importantly for Rhees, it 
detracts from the appreciation of the truly central issue in philosophy — whose ancestry 
goes straight back to Plato — namely the question of how we make the world intelligible 
to ourselves at all o f how discourse is possible. This cannot be answered just by examining 
in a narrow way the use we make of the expressions to do with the use of language, i.e. 
how we employ the expressions language’, ‘meaning’, ‘grammar’, ‘truth’, ‘fact’, etc.
This is agreed, but here we need to be careful not to move too swiftly to a 
condemnation of this approach based on the most narrow and damaging interpretation 
of what constitutes the ‘confusion of the grammars of particular expressions’,—which, I 
believe, is ambiguous. If we try to think of the use of language as the exercise o f a 
technique, or as the application of a set o f rules as in a game, then this implies that the 
technique or game can be described externally — like any other practice — and does not 
presuppose an internal understanding of it.262 From this it may seem that giving an account 
of the grammars of particular expressions must be essentially a trivial exercise and not a 
direct path to answering the central philosophical problems. But this is a confusion.
261 Rhees3 p. 74.
262 See Chapter 2 for this and the following paragraphs.
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Now it is certainly true that an account of the use of some expressions can profitably be 
compared with the description of a technique, namely in those cases which are defined by 
reference to facts, i.e. where there can be a description of the use of an expression in 
terms that are intelligible prior to the understanding of the use of the expression itself.263 
And certainly such an account will seem a long way from the deeper questions of 
philosophy. But this does not apply to all those other expressions whose ‘meaning lies in 
the language-game[s] in which we use [them]’;264 that is, where the description of the use 
of the expression presupposes an understanding of it (the concept expressed by it) — 
examples of these being: ‘discourse’, language’, ‘meaning’, ‘truth’, etc. In these cases what 
shows in their employment is part of our understanding of the use of the expressions. It 
follows from this that an examination of the grammars of these expressions will, of 
necessity, involve an exploration of the corresponding concepts and their wider 
conceptual ramifications. Hence, I think it is clear that elucidating these grammars is 
integral to what is required in order to illuminate questions about the possibility of 
discourse and the response to scepticism, since these are after all conceptual questions.
It is not established, therefore, that the point Rhees wants to make can be made by 
contrasting the latter endeavour with treating the ‘confusion of the grammars of 
particular expressions’ — at least, not without further qualification. The most we might say 
is that we should be aware that the grammars of the expressions corresponding to our 
more fundamental concepts lie in different ways in the language, and that we should be 
warned against treating them on the model of expressions such as ‘sitting down’ — where 
an account of the concept will differ little from a description of the usage of the 
expression, and does not begin to mark out the deeper conceptual boundaries within our 
thinking. It may certainly be wise to avoid framing the investigation into the possibility of 
discourse in terms of an investigation into the use of particular expressions, just in order 
to avoid superficiality in the treatment of the grammars o f the underlying concepts,—it is 
vital to warn against a narrow focus on the way these expressions are used. But we should 
not allow this to obscure the continuities between the different levels of grammatical 
investigation that we may find in philosophy.
263 We should also add that even concepts such as ‘sitting down’ contain — amongst other concepts — the 
concept o f a physical object, which is therefore taken for granted in giving an account of it and cannot 
itself be accounted for in this way. But I think that such would not normally be regarded as a part of the 
account o f the grammar of the expression ‘sitting down’, which can otherwise be described more along the 
lines of a description of a technique.
264 Rhees2 p. 49.
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The gap between examining the uses of various expressions and answering the deeper 
questions in philosophy is further compounded by the fact that the kind of investigation 
we require in philosophy may, from other perspectives, appear not to be (simply) a 
conceptual matter in any case. Let us look at this a little more closely. When Rhees speaks 
o f making clear ‘the possibility of discourse’ and of combating scepticism,265 it looks as 
though what is required is a general account of language.— Not the kind of account that the 
study of linguistics or the psychology of language demand, but nevertheless an account in 
the sense in which that is distinct from the elucidation of a concept (as one might 
ordinarily understand it). For example, if we examine what Rhees provides us with when 
giving such an account, we find a very wide ranging description of the various 
circumstances in which we speak of someone having a language: of their ‘having 
something to say’; of the relation between speaking and living; o f the kind of life in which 
speaking has a part; o f the circumstances in which we speak of logic in connection with 
the use of language; of the part language plays in the way we make sense of the world and 
our own lives; o f the distinction between speaking and operating a calculus or technique; 
and so on and so forth.
The essential feature here is that the account involves the collation o f many facts. It is 
this especially which deflects the attention from the conceptual nature of the 
investigation. But here again we have to remind ourselves that many concepts — even the 
most fundamental — may be constituted partly be reference to facts. And so the point 
must be made that the relevance of the gathering together these facts for the purpose of 
solving the deep problems of philosophy depends on seeing them in relation to the 
elucidation of the concepts o f which they are components. Once this is understood, we 
must then recognise the further point that the constitutive facts are relatively superficial 
aspects of the determination of these fundamental concepts since — as has been argued 
previously — what is most fundamental to them belongs to the realm of what can only be 
shown (i.e. it is presupposed in anything this is said). As a result, the connection with the 
conceptual — and, especially in the present context, what is shown in the elucidation of 
the grammars o f the corresponding expressions — is maintained.
The fact remains that the kind of account of language that we require in philosophy is 
essentially a conceptual account. Moreover, attention to the grammars of particular 
expressions will remain a principal point of entry into both the genesis and resolution of 
the underlying issues in philosophy. When we speak of investigating ‘the grammar of a
265 E.g. Rhees 1 p. 278.
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particular expressions’, this can be applied just as much to the grammar of ‘language’ and 
‘discourse’ as to ‘sitting down’, and the like. The crux of the matter is that if we do apply 
it to the former, then it must be borne in mind that the investigation is into something 
lying deeply in our ways o f thinking and which is not revealed merely by looking at isolated 
or individual circumstances of their use. If Rhees’ warning is against this kind of 
reduction, then it is well taken. But it should not be taken to mean that an investigation 
into the possibility of discourse (and the batde against scepticism) is not, at bottom, a 
grammatical investigation, nor that the grammars of these fundamental concepts will not 
surface in the way their particular expressions are used in particular circumstances.
I have laboured this point at the outset of this chapter because I shall be devoting much 
time to looking at reactions withy or to, particular expressions that are typical of the 
genesis of philosophical problems. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that 
these reactions normally also belong to widely ramifying patterns o f inquiry and only in 
this interconnectedness amount to expressions of the fundamental problems of 
philosophy. The grammars o f the expressions corresponding to the concepts on which 
the major issues turn are not isolated, and so, in any case, cannot be examined fruitfully 
except as a part o f the whole.
3 ~ The Disease is Different from the Cure
At this stage, we need to distinguish clearly between, on the one hand, the actions that 
need to be pursued in order to solve philosophical problems and, on the other, the 
responses or interests that express the original philosophical perplexity that gives rise to 
this need. The natures o f both of these are of interest to us, but it is the latter that are 
most relevant to this thesis and which are the least well understood; and so it is 
principally in this direction that my efforts to distinguish the two will be aimed.
It has been a consistent theme of this thesis that the kind of inquiry required to solve 
philosophical problems has to be recognised explicidy as conceptual But I think it is 
equally clear that a recognition of the conceptual nature of philosophical problems is 
certainly not a requirement for the original, spontaneous generation of philosophical 
perplexity. In the first place, if I am baffled or uncertain about the nature of mind, or 
truth, or reality, I will not necessarily conceive of my bafflement as being over the 
grammars of the respective concepts nor even as conceptual at all,—at least, not unless I 
am already acquainted with philosophy as a subject and have arrived at a view of the
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nature of its subject matter. Hence, if I am looking at the people around me and 
wondering whether I can know the reality of their minds, then, in terms of the place that 
these reactions have in my life, this is not consciously the same reaction as being baffled 
over (the grammar of) the concept mind. Similarly, if I wonder whether I can really know 
or be certain about anything, this is not the same as being puzzled by the grammars of 
the concepts of knowledge or certainty. The philosophical perplexity does not first show 
its hand in puzzlement over what the concepts mind, belief and knowledge amount to; rather, 
we wonder whether we can really know other minds, what our belief in the world is based on or 
whether we can really know anything. This is the form of our puzzlement in its most natural 
state;—it is not explicitly a reflection upon a concept, but a reaction by means of our concepts 
to the respective phenomena. I believe that this is an important distinction notwithstanding 
the recognition that the original puzzlement remains conceptual in kind.
This idea that the instinctive philosophical reaction is essentially a reaction to a 
phenomenon rather that to a concept should be understood in connection with a 
position I urged in Chapter 2, namely that the concepts we have formed of the world, of 
ourselves, and o f our relations to the world form our understanding of the nature o f these 
things in their most generalform. This is why, when we are thinking in the most general way 
about the nature of a phenomenon (e.g. mental life), our reflections really are reflections 
upon a phenomenon and not just upon the language in which the concepts are expressed. 
This is the role they have in our lives, and it also clarifies what is meant by saying that 
philosophical perplexity arises within our understanding of the world.
We may distinguish, therefore, between the preoccupation with phenomena, which 
characterises the perplexity that is at the instinctive origins o f philosophical thinking, and 
the explicit reflection upon our concepts that is required in response to this original 
perplexity. The latter will engage with these same reactions, but it also requires a further 
step, namely an immersion in the subject o f philosophy and a recognition — or at least a 
view — of the nature of the difficulties encountered. Interestingly, responding to this 
perplexity may also require engaging with a different set of instincts; for the arduous 
intellectual activity that is required to resolve these difficulties will depend on reactions 
which go against the former instincts,— or at least, which require the mobilisation of 
instincts in a different dimension:
People are deeply embedded in philosophical, i.e. grammatical confusions. And to free 
them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections 
they are caught up in. One must so to speak regroup their entire language.—But this 
language came about /  /  developed//  as it did because people had—and have—the
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inclination to think in this way. Therefore pulling them out only works with those 
who live in an instinctive rebellion against / /dissatisfaction with/ /  language. Not with 
those who following all their instincts live within the herd that has created this 
language as its proper expression./ (BigT p. 185)
Clearly Wittgenstein thought that unless we have an instinct to rebel against these 
forms of language — that is, an instinct occurring at the level at which the forms of 
language are generated and working in the opposite direction to the instincts that give rise 
to confusion — we are not going to be in a position to resist the instincts that drive that 
confusion.
This passage is also interesting for containing a suggestion that is the opposite of the 
one that is most frequently attributed to Wittgenstein, namely that it is just an accident 
that our language is brimming with irresistible false analogies and pictures — the 
‘mythology’ deposited in the language. On the contrary, we may not be such passive 
victims in this process, for we might just as well suppose that the form of our language is 
the product of a deep seated inclination to think in certain ways, and that the false 
analogies lying in the language may only crystalli2e and perpetuate these deeper 
tendencies. This is, I think, an important possibility, without which it is perhaps not so 
easy to understand why philosophical confusions and perplexities have the extraordinary 
grip on our thinking that they do have. My aim will be to examine a range of the non- 
surface grammar’ circumstances which may be implicated in generating the instinctive 
reactions that are at the bottom of philosophical perplexity. Before this, however, I shall 
make some more general observations about these reactions and their relation to the use 
o f language.
4 ~ The Instinct for Metaphysics
Wittgenstein remarks:
We must not forget: even our more refined, more philosophical doubts have a 
foundation in instinct. E.g. that expressed in We can never know...’. Continuing 
accessibility to further arguments. We should find people to whom we could not teach 
this mentally inferior. Still incapable of forming a certain concept. (CV p. 73)
I really want to say that scmples in thinking begin with (have their roots in) instinct. 
Or again: a language-game does not have its origin in consideration. Consideration is 
part of a language-game.
And that is why a concept is in its element within the language-game. (Z 391)
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... .the very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand.
What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will. (BigT p.
161)
Wittgenstein believed that philosophical problems have their roots in instinctive 
reactions, and evidently found a comparison between the origin of philosophical 
perplexity and the generation of the instinctive reactions that are at the bottom of 
superstitious practices and beliefs. One could examine the textual evidence for this claim 
in detail, but for the present it should suffice to point out that he used the very same 
phrase in both the Hemarks on Fraser’s Golden Bough’ and in the ‘Big Typescript’ to 
comment on how both our magical and our metaphysical inclinations are rooted in us:
In unserer Sprache is eine gan2e Mythologie niedergelegt. (RFGB p. 132 & BigT p.
198)
Which is translated as:
A whole mythology is deposited in our language.266
The relationship between these two, and their connection with the instinctive 
foundations of philosophy, has been explored by H. O. Mounce.267 Mounce observes that 
certain kinds of superstitious belief have their origins not in some faulty or mistaken 
reasoning but in certain reactions. These reactions are not in themselves (rational or) 
irrational268 but they may, if unchecked, develop into irrational beliefs. As examples, he 
cites the disturbed reaction to the loss of a wedding ring, which may lead to the belief the 
marriage is in jeopardy, or the revulsion at sticking a pin into a picture of one’s mother, 
which may develop into the irrational belief that her sight will be affected by the action.269 
The important feature here, for our present purposes, is that these are primitive reactions — 
they occur to us irresistibly and are not the product of (faulty) reasoning.270 Indeed the 
attempt to use a rational explanation to explain them away would be a failure to see the
266 L. Wittgenstein, ‘Remarks on Fraser’s Golden Bough’, translated in The Human World, No. 3, May 1971, p. 
35. I prefer this translation to that given in Philosophical Occasions, to wit: ‘An entire mythology is laid down 
in our language’, (RFGB p. 199).
267 H. O. Mounce, ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’, Philosophy, Vol. 48, 1973, pp. 347-362.
268 Ibid. p. 359. One may wish to question whether the reactions themselves are irrational or not. However 
the important point here is to distinguish between the primitive reaction and the belief that may or may not 
arise from it. If I am subject to the spooky feeling that if I am able to avoid stepping on the cracks between 
the paving stones then, in some nebulous way, I will be ‘all right’, one might say that this is an absurd and 
irrational reaction. But I think we would hesitate before saying that in exhibiting this reaction I  had fallen 
into irrationality unless I took it seriously and allowed it to enter into my beliefs about how I should 
promote my well being. A similar example: ‘touch wood’. We see the attraction — i.e. the apparent 
intelligibility -  of what we otherwise recognise as an irrational idea.
269 Ibid. p. 353.
270 Ibid. p. 355.
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reactions for what they are.—This is why the attempts by philosophers and 
anthropologists to dismiss these primitive responses as just stupid errors are 
misunderstandings of them and of how they are situated in our lives.
If I may introduce an example of my own: imagine finding a friend throwing darts at 
the picture of some hated politician. We ask him what he is doing, to which he replies ‘I 
am throwing darts at the prime minister, whom I hate’. And let us suppose that we 
respond by saying ‘Oh, you are not really throwing darts at the prime minister, this is only 
a picture of him; in fact in reality this is only a sheet of paper with inks distributed about 
its surface’. I think he would have the right to say that we had missed the point; indeed 
that we had misunderstood him, and to which he might reasonably reply: ‘No, I am throwing 
darts at the prime minister, whom I hate’. Our response would comparable with missing 
the point of — or trying to explain away — a joke. Any attempt to reconstruct his reaction 
on some other model would be a misunderstanding. Unless we recognise that the way he 
speaks has its own integrity and accept that no other way of speaking could be 
substituted without distortion, we will not see the reaction for what it is: an action directed 
at the prime minister. This of course is not to say that we are committed to attributing to 
him the belief in a systematic relation of cause and effect between his actions and the 
demise o f the prime minister.—Although, of course, it would not difficult to imagine this 
reaction developing into something that we would call an irrational belief, for example, if 
he went on to contact the police and inform them that he had just assassinated the prime 
minister.
Mounce now compares these sorts of reactions — and the irrational beliefs that they can 
give rise to — with the genesis of philosophical problems, and finds, similarly, that we may 
distinguish between the reactions that are often at the bottom of philosophical 
puzzlement and the genuinely confused metaphysical beliefs that they can generate. This 
distinction is perhaps most easily observed when we distinguish in philosophy between 
what we are tempted to say and what our critical faculties tell us is intelligible or not; the 
salient point here being that we may continue to feel the temptation in spite of our 
recognition that giving way to it would lead us into irrationality.
A typical example of such temptation is the one mentioned by Wittgenstein above, 
namely the feeling that ‘[w]e can never know...[what another person is feeling, for 
example]’. Unchecked, the reaction may develop into scepticism about other minds. 
Mounce also cites another example relating to the nature of mind, and which bridges the 
realms of the superstitious and the metaphysical, namely the belief that ‘there are certain
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men who can see into other men’s minds’.271 This is a common enough belief amongst 
‘primitive’ peoples, but it also has its analogue in ‘civilised’ society. For example, we may 
imagine a man who, noticing that someone about whom he had just been thinking is 
looking at him, feels instinctively that the man can see into his thoughts.272 In all these 
instances, and in many more besides, the pattern is repeated: an instinctive reaction — 
innocuous enough in itself — arises in particular circumstances and then leads, normally as 
a matter of course, to conceptually confused beliefs.
Now such a transition from an instinctive reaction to a fully fledged language-game 
with its own system of concepts is, of course, typical of the growth and development of 
language — as has been discussed at length previously.273 It will be helpful, therefore, to 
examine more closely the nature of this transition as it occurs in the parallel case of the 
development of philosophical beliefs.
5 ~ Instinctive Reactions and the Metaphysical Language-game
The alignment o f the origins of philosophical perplexity with superstitious reactions has 
been helpful in conveying the deeply rooted nature of that perplexity, and that it is not 
merely an intellectual stumbling over the rules governing our concepts (not a foolish 
‘entanglement in our own rules’274). One way of responding to the question ‘how deeply 
rooted?’ will be to remind ourselves that philosophical talk arises naturally out of our 
lives,— out o f our responses to the world. Now it is an abiding theme of this thesis that 
amongst the determinants of a language-game — and so of the formation of the concepts 
within the language-game — are the instinctive reactions (linguistic and non-linguistic) that 
are its cornerstones. There may be some mileage, therefore, in conceiving of the 
instinctive reactions that are at the bottom of philosophical perplexity as themselves 
determinants of a language-game: the metaphysical language-game.™ To be sure, the reactions 
in question do (very often) represent a tendency to abuse these concepts; but it does not 
follow from this that a comparison with concept-formation may not be fruitful. It is a 
commonplace to speak of philosophically confused conceptions, and so it is not especially
271 Ibid. p. 360.
272 Ibid. p. 360.
273 See especially Chapter 5.
274 PI 125.
275 1 use the word ‘metaphysical’ here to distinguish talk dealing specifically with conceptions of the natures 
of things from the concepts which have been forged within philosophy as tools in the general application 
of its critical methods,— for the elucidation of the grammars of concepts, for example. See also my 
comments on the use o f ‘metaphysics’ in Chapter 1.
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remarkable to speak of philosophy as generating specifically metaphysical concepts. But I 
suspect that the notion of a philosophically confused conception is normally thought of 
as a conception that has been arrived at by making wrong moves in an analysis. By 
contrast, the principle I wish to establish here is that confusion originates at a level that is 
prior to analysis, indeed at a level comparable with that at which our other most 
fundamental conceptions emerge,—in other words in the direct establishment of a practice 
rather than by describing a rule or giving a definition.
We might start by reminding ourselves o f some of the essential features of what I have 
referred to as ‘secondary’ use of words — that is, where a concept is formed by means of a 
primitive linguistic reaction that is parasitic on a previously established use of a word.276 
This can be an important component in the determination of subjective concepts,—in 
the use of ‘dull’ in ‘a dull pain’, for example. Here too we may be inclined to say that the 
secondary use is a kind of abuse of the primary use. But there is an important difference 
between this and the case of the metaphysical reaction, in as much as the language-game 
that is subsequendy erected upon the secondary use is not in conflict with the primary 
uses. This is because the secondary use occurs in a new context, whilst in philosophy the 
difficulties arise precisely because the new conception (of ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ or 
whatever it may be) is returned to its original context, where it attempts to occupy the 
same logical space’ as the established concept. This is one of the central conflicts in 
philosophy.
The relation between the two can perhaps be made clearer by considering an example 
which — depending on context — might count either as a secondary use of language or as 
the beginnings of a conceptual confusion. In the course of the ‘private language 
argument’ sections of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein considers the 
spontaneous statement: ‘I know how the colour green looks to mel211 This is the kind of 
remark that might get uttered in the course of a philosophical argument by someone 
defending private ostensive definition; but there is no reason why it might not also be 
uttered outside the context o f philosophical discussion where the phrase may be used to 
express a particular ‘sensation’ of privacy. And if one objects that sense cannot be made 
of such a conception of privacy, then of course the same might be said of any secondary 
use of language, e.g. ‘[f]or me the vowel e is yellow’.278 For it is of the essence of the 
secondary use o f words that they do not ‘make sense’ — at least, not if that means being
276 See Chapter 6.
277 PI 278.
278 Ibid. p. 216.
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able to derive their secondary employment from their primary use. Either way, the facts 
remain: a) that we have the irresistible inclination to use these expressions in these ways, 
b) that these uses are not the product of reasoning, and c) that this inclination is shared 
amongst people. This is enough to establish a legitimate language-game — to determine an 
intelligible concept — just as long as it is not treated as a logical extension of a primary use, 
and is not brought into conflict with its primary use.
Wittgenstein noted for himself the equivocal character of such reactions a litde later in 
the Investigations, where he spoke of our inclination, when reflecting on our perceptions in 
a particular way, to speak of ‘[t]he visual room’:
The Visual room’ seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a 
new way of speaking, a new comparison; it might even be called a new sensation. (PI 
400)
When the visual room seems like a discovery, it gives rise to a conception that is at the 
bottom of philosophical idealism and other subjectivist theories of perception. Left 
undeveloped, it is just a harmless sensation. But in both cases, a concept is determined.
Wittgenstein describes the compelling and primitive nature of the subjective 
impressions that disorientate our appreciation of the organisation of our concepts and 
the kinship between these impressions and secondary uses of language,— or at least, the 
secondary ‘experiences’ which they express:
Think here of a special kind of illusion which throws light on these matters. — I go for 
a walk in the environs of a city with a friend. As we talk, it comes out that I am 
imagining the city to lie on our right. Not only have I no conscious reason for this 
idea, but some quite simple consideration was enough to make me realize that the city 
lay behind us. I can first give no answer to the question why I imagined the city in this 
direction. I had no reason to think it. But though I see no reason still I seem to see or 
surmise certain psychological causes for it. In particular, certain associations and 
memories. For example, we are walking along a canal, and once before I had followed 
a canal which lay in the direction I had imagined. I might as it were psychoanalytically 
investigate the causes of my conviction. (Lastl 787)
But how is a person who feels that the city is located in this direction to express his 
experience correctly? Is it correct, for example, to say that he feels it? Should he really 
coin a new word for it? But then how could anyone leam this word? The primitive 
expression of the experience couldn’t include it He would probably be inclined to say 
“I feel as if I knew that the city lay over there”. Well, the very fact that he says this, or 
something like it, in these circumstances is itself the expression of this singular 
experience. (Lastl 789)
“I feel as if I knew the city lay over there.” — “I feel as if the name Schubert fitted 
Schubert’s works and his face.” (Lastl 791)
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It is important to note that the compulsion to speak in these ways does not arise only in 
connection with the use of individual expressions in specific situations. The inclination to 
use the expression ‘the visual room’ is not isolated from the way we use other expressions 
and say other things. If that were so, then the reaction would amount to litde more than a 
nervous tic. On the contrary, the use of the expression forms part of a whole network of 
related trains of thought.—This is a hallmark o f a concept.
Now we may still feel reticent about calling the generation of these responses concept- 
formation, on the grounds that the new concept is not applied, that is, it does not find its 
way into the way we engage with the world about us. Well, even if the new concept is 
confined to the realms of the imagination — to idle moments of philosophical speculation 
— this should not necessarily undermine its status as a concept; for this role too is a ‘use’, 
even if an incoherent one. But in any case, we should not assume too hastily that these 
tendencies do not find expression is our outward lives. It is beyond the scope of this 
thesis fully to address this question, but one might reflect, for example, upon the 
influence that the notion of mental privacy has had upon the genesis of the idea that the 
soul has an identity independent of the body — an idea that has had ramifications 
throughout human history.
We might also take into account the fact — as previously noted — that these are 
responses to the world. They are reactions to our circumstances and are not confined to the 
working out of abstract conceptions, and so are not wholly idle in this respect. It might 
be relevant here to make the connection again between these kinds of reactions and the 
example of the person throwing darts at the picture. I argued there that it would be a 
misunderstanding to treat his reaction as a mistake. For just as throwing darts at the 
picture has the form of a reaction to a person, so the reactions expressing philosophical 
perplexity have, in their most instinctive roots, the form of a general reaction to a 
phenomenon — which may include reactions to situations, or to persons or experiences, or 
whatever. This tells us of the position that these reactions occupy in our lives — that they 
are not merely intellectual in origin — and hence also of the kinds of relations they can 
have to other aspects of our lives, to our religious and moral beliefs, for instance. It 
matters not that these perplexities, if they develop into metaphysical views, can by 
conceptual investigation be shown to be confused; just as it does not detract from the 
reality and the quality of the instinctive superstitious reaction that its subsequent 
development into a superstitious belief about the nature of things would be demonstrably 
irrational.
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We are trying to avoid a rationalist account of the origin of philosophical problems,—  
that is, the account that holds that our philosophical conceptions originate in faulty 
reasoning mistakenly applied to our concepts. Certainly the primitive metaphysical 
reactions drive confusion in our thinking; but in themselves they are no more based on 
reason than are our concepts in general. These instinctive reactions are the cornerstones 
of the metaphysical language-game, and their primitiveness confers on the concepts to 
which they give rise a kind of independence from their analogues in daily discourse — 
whose roots are elsewhere.
6 ~ Philosophical Perplexity and Natural Uncertainty
We may now return to the nature of the reactions themselves. I have been arguing that 
the origins of philosophical perplexity may lie not so much in the effect o f the repetition 
of misleading analogies in the forms of our language — though there is no denying their 
importance — as in the circumstances of the possession of our concepts. Some of these 
circumstances have already been described in detail, especially in the latter sections of 
Chapters 4 and 6, however, the discussion may now be broadened and further examples 
examined.
For the most part, we shall be considering reactions which, in their nature, show an 
inclination towards a confusion of concepts; but we may also encounter reactions that 
exhibit not confusion but natural uncertainty about the workings of a concept and the 
behaviour that surrounds it. It might be helpful to begin by considering an example of 
this kind, since it will also be suggestive o f the larger framework of circumstances that 
can provoke philosophical difficulties. Consider the following remarks by Wittgenstein:
Think of the uncertainty about whether animals, particularly lower animals, such as 
flies, feel pain.
The uncertainty whether a fly feels pain is philosophical; but couldn’t it also be 
instinctive? And how would that come out?
Indeed, aren’t we really uncertain in our behaviour towards animals? One doesn’t 
know: Is he being cruel or not? (RPP2 659)
For there is uncertainty of behaviour which doesn’t stem from uncertainty in thought.
(RPP2 660)
The inclination here may be to conclude that there is an interesting parallel — but 
nothing more — between the uncertainty that arises when reflecting philosophically on the 
problem of other minds and the familiar uncertainty that is commonly experienced in
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everyday situations. And if we take it for granted that philosophical confusion arises only 
through misleading analogies and pictures lying in the language, then it might remain an 
interesting parallel only.279 On the other hand, I have already argued that our instinctive, 
inter-subjective relations (to other persons and animals) are integral to the formation and 
possession of psychological concepts. And so to the extent that such relations are 
infected by this uncertainty, there is no reason why it may not also be bound up with the 
intellectual puzzlement at the root of genesis of the problem of other minds.
The uncertainty here is of the validity o f projecting a concept into a situation differing 
from those in which the concept has been determined (the latter of which must of course 
be ‘certain’ otherwise the concept will not have been determined). But it is not merely an 
instance o f that very familiar case where, at the boundary, a concept is simply not clearly 
determined. For example, it is not like the uncertainty over what we are prepared to call a 
‘heap’ or not,—which we may say is arbitrary. Rather it is an uncertainty already lying in 
the patterns of behaviour — linguistic and non-linguistic — that surround the possession of 
the concept. It is something inherent in our form of life, and which may naturally vary 
from one person to another. Hence there may not be an ‘intellectual’ solution to the 
conceptual problems that arise from it; nor a way of reconciling the differences between 
people’s attitudes towards animals.
In as much as the determination o f our concepts is dependent on instinctive linguistic 
and (especially) <?x/ra-linguistic reactions, and insofar as there is both enough common 
ground between people to determine a concept and yet a significant band of divergence 
also, it is quite possible for irreconcilable conceptual differences to emerge. These 
differences are not philosophical differences, but they may give rise to intractable 
difficulties within philosophical argument.
7 ~ The Outer-ness’ of the Language-game and Psychological Concepts
Psychological concepts (and concepts generally to do with mental faculties) lend 
themselves especially to situations that conspire against the achievement of a clear 
reflective understanding of them. I am thinking particularly of how the subjective 
component of their possession can clash with the circumstances in which we do 
philosophy,— circumstances which, in their very nature, divert our attention from the
279 One might wish to argue that the uncertainty of our behaviour towards the fly is itself the product of 
philosophical uncertainty. But I see no reason to assume this, and Wittgenstein is surely right that there is 
such uncertainty that exists independently of thought,— the dog at the river side in Chapter 7, for example.
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subjective mode. Discussing the relationship between concepts of the ‘inner’ and of the 
‘outer’, Wittgenstein remarks:
“Of course actually all I see is the outer.”
But am I not really speaking only of the outer? I say, for instance, under what 
circumstances people say this or that. And I do always mean outer circumstances. 
Therefore it is as if I wanted to explain (quasi-define) the inner through the outer. And 
yet it isn’t so.
Is the reason for this that the language-game is something outer? (Last2 p. 63)
In earlier chapters, I explained that the elucidation of a concept is conducted not 
exclusively by direct appeal to a selection of what we accept as sensible propositions 
employing it, since the description of the circumstances o f its employment will also be 
important. This is because a) there are grammatical links between a concept and the 
concept of the language-game in which it is embedded, and b) the concept of the 
language-game may be partly constituted by facts about it which may then be described. 
Hence it is perfectly legitimate to describe the outer circumstances of any language-game 
as a part o f the elucidation of its concepts.
Now of course, very many concepts (the overwhelming majority no doubt) have as 
their whole context their outer circumstances. Hence an account of those circumstances and 
the employment o f language within them will coincide with a complete account of the 
concept.—The ‘account’ will be either in the form of a description, or, if the concept of 
those circumstances is irreducible and graspable only in practice and without reference to 
fact, in the form of a ‘showing’. Moreover, the material reality of any language-game is 
itself something ‘outer’. As a result there may be a natural tendency to think of the 
circumstances of any language-game as its outer circumstances. But this equation breaks 
down in the case o f psychological concepts; for when we speak of the circumstances o f a 
language-game in which psychological concepts are embedded, this ought to include both 
its outer and its inner circumstances. This is because the concept of a subjective response is 
also an element in our conception of the language-games that articulate psychological 
concepts.280 Certainly an account o f the outer circumstances of psychological-concept 
language-games will be a valuable contribution to their elucidation; but this does not 
exhaust what is understood when we understand a psychological concept, since this 
understanding is also a function of its inner circumstances. For this reason the description 
of these circumstances can only provide a partial elucidation of the concepts embedded 
within the language-game.
280 See Chapter 6.
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To speak o f the ‘inner circumstances’ of the language-game in this context is to make 
the link between the outer circumstances and what is subjective in the grasp of the 
concepts embedded in it, since the concept of a subjective response is evidently 
grammatically linked to the subjective/psychological concepts embedded in the language- 
game. Evidently it can mean nothing to speak of understanding the concept o f a 
subjective response unless we are already in command of a range o f concepts, the 
understanding o f which has a subjective component. Hence our concept of the language- 
game is itself dependent on the understanding we have of the subjective component of 
the concepts embedded within the language-game.
We might also be reminded that when we describe the outer circumstances of the 
language-game, we are describing the surrounding facts that are integrated into our 
conception o f it.281 These facts belong to what can be said in the elucidation of the 
concept, and for this reason come more readily to hand than what can only be shown — 
which is naturally more elusive. The subjective component of the understanding of 
psychological concepts — and of subjectivity generally — lies in that aspect of the grasp of 
the concept that is, in essence, both practical and irreducible, and hence can only be 
elucidated by showing.
Taking these observations together, we can see how, when we approach our account of 
psychological concepts through an account o f the circumstances of the actions 
surrounding the language-game, our attention is easily diverted away from their subjective 
component. There is therefore a powerful inducement, if we take this approach, to 
reduce psychological concepts to outer circumstances, and so to behaviourism. And yet 
this diversion is not necessary. The description o f the outer circumstances should not 
prevent us from acknowledging the subjective component.—Hence Wittgenstein’s 
remark, ‘And yet it isn’t so’.
Now it may be objected here, again, that the subjective component of a psychological 
concept is not relevant to the improved understanding of it that we seek in philosophy; 
all that we have to do to achieve this is to observe, with greater clarity, what is allowed in 
the way that various expressions can be used in connection with one another, i.e. their
281 For example, if we are giving an account o f the use o f visual concepts, we will describe the use o f visual 
language in connection with the handling o f objects in front o f our eyes. This is part o f our concept o f the 
language-games with visual concepts, though the description — as far as it goes — does not in itself 
presuppose the use o f visual concepts. The behaviourist will, o f course, try to stop the account o f visual 
concepts at this point. To avoid the behaviourist cul-de-sac we have to have the courage to continue to use 
the language ‘full blown’ (PI 120), which will mean employing visual concepts in the description. This of  
course makes the description circular, so that what we leam from it is something ‘shown’ and not ‘said’.
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formal relations. This is enough to show Vhat kind of object anything is’.282 Hence only 
the language-game as something ‘outer’ is, in any case, relevant to the solution of the 
philosophical perplexity, since this is the arena within which propositions are handled. 
Against this I have argued283 that philosophical perplexity arises within our understanding 
of our concepts and not just within the observation of the formal relations between 
propositions or expressions. Hence it is the observation of those formal relations that 
should serve the growth of a greater understanding of the concepts, and not the other way 
about.—That is, it is not that the understanding o f the concepts is, at best, only a necessary 
condition for understanding the analysis of their formal relations or, at worst, irrelevant to 
the analysis. For if philosophical activity is to cure diseases of the understanding, then the 
analysis cannot serve only itself; it must serve the enrichment of our understanding of the 
concepts themselves in the special circumstances in which we reflect on them.
The concept o f understanding psychological concepts is the concept of something in 
the life o f a person that includes the fact of his subjectivity and his subjective relations to 
language. It is perhaps the general failure to recognise this that makes it look as if we 
were on the horns of a dilemma: either psychological concepts are determined wholly 
within the concepts of outer circumstances, in which case we are driven to behaviourism, 
or they are determined by private ostensive definition, in which case we are driven to 
mentalism. No doubt there are many other roots to these philosophical positions, but 
one influence might simply be that we are deceived by the ‘outer-ness’ of the language- 
game: when we turn our attention to the language-game we are immediately in ‘outer 
mode’, as it were; this eclipses the subjective aspect of the determination of psychological 
concepts.
8 ~ Subjective Sources of Philosophical Perplexity
The kinds of phenomena that may confound our understanding of our most 
fundamental concepts are not limited to the external circumstances of our language- 
games. Familiar subjective impressions may also play a part,— the impression that one 
can give oneself a private ostensive definition of a psychological or mental concept 
perhaps being the most notorious. The origin o f this phenomenon undoubtedly has 
many roots. Amongst these must be counted the powerful influence of certain specific
282 PI 373.
283 Initially in Chapter 2, but in later chapters also.
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subjective experiences associated with the use of language. Principal amongst these, I 
believe, is the so called ‘experience of the meaning of a word’. Wittgenstein discusses this 
and related experiences at length in Part II o f the Philosophical Investigations. In some 
respects the phrase ‘the experience o f meaning’ shares much in common with ‘secondary5 
uses of words in as much as meaning is not, after all, an experience. In other respects, 
however, it is not like other secondary uses. In particular there is an obvious sense in 
which the experience can be shown to be an intelligible — indeed expected — product of the 
way that words are woven into our actions; for we should expect words to be 
experienced differently from other objects in virtue of the part they play in our lives. 
Moreover, we should also expect to experience individual words as meaningful in their 
own unique way in virtue of the unique role that each has — as unique as Schubert’s name 
fitting his face and works, for example. And yet the fact remains that meaning is not an 
experience. For this reason, the extension of this experience to the thought that one is 
actually experiencing the very essence of the concept to which the word corresponds is 
illusory and is a transition guaranteed to create havoc. It is especially dangerous when it 
occurs in connection with subjective or psychological concepts, where it undermines our 
understanding of the nature of mental life and of the kind of reality that subjective 
phenomena have.
The belief that one can give oneself a private ostensive definition of a mental state is a 
case in point. For it is not difficult, I think, to see the connection between the experience 
of meaning and the subjective feeling that one can also experience the essence of the object 
to which the word refers,—the essence of a colour, for example. The perception of 
meaning and the perception o f the essence of a thing are evidently sister experiences. We 
may — with justification — present the descriptions of experiences of meaning and essence 
as secondary uses of words in their own right; but if so, we are equally obliged to make 
the further observation that the potential of these experiences to convert into beliefs 
about the natures of the phenomena is the potential for conversion into confused 
metaphysical beliefs.
A closely related experience is described in one o f Wittgenstein’s most striking 
evocations of the sensation of mental privacy:
It seems that I can trace my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body.
And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body, the
identity of my mind. (NFL p. 270)
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I have already referred to this remark in the Introduction to Chapter 6, where I 
described it as expressing a natural reaction to our own subjectivity. In this respect, it 
belongs amongst those instinctive responses — again akin to secondary uses of language — 
that are, in themselves, the harmless expressions of subjective states. But it evidently also 
provides the foundation for the confused belief in the existence of the mind or self as an 
independent object.
Returning to the Visual room’, we now find Wittgenstein exploring further the 
interaction between subjective impressions and philosophical problems:
The ‘visual room’ seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a 
new way of speaking, a new comparison; it might even be called a new sensation. (PI 
400)
You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object You interpret a 
grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon which you 
are observing. (Think for example of the question: “Are sense-data the material of 
which the universe is made?”)
But there is an objection to my saying that you have made a ‘grammatical’ 
movement. What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As 
if you had invented a new way of painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of 
song.— (PI 401)
Wittgenstein describes here the muddling up of the formation of a new concept with 
the discovery o f a new fact (object).284 The subsequent wavering between a movement in 
grammar and a new way of looking at things is really a fluctuation between two aspects of 
the same thing: the formation of a new concept — understood either from the point o f view of 
its being a new extension to our grammar, or from the point o f view of its content (way of 
looking at things). But the important point remains: we are not in the act of discovering 
some new object — a new fact — but a new conception.285 And whereas a new conception may 
not be merely a new ‘style’ of thinking but represent a new insight into the form of the 
world (or at least, a new possibility within our relations to the world), the demonstration 
of what is new remains a matter of showing a new grammatical form and not a new fact.
Now the explanation for this muddle may well have to include the confusion that arises 
from analogies in surface grammar.— Clearly the confusion of fact and concept arises 
partly from the fact that we express grammatical points using factual language (again, see 
Chapter 2). But I suspect other forces are at work here. The tendency to interpret a 
concept as if it were a fact is closely associated with the distinction I made in Chapter 5 
between the view of the world ‘from the boundary’ versus the view ‘from the midst’. Our
284 See Chapter 2.
285 The assumption here is that we are dealing with a concept that does not contain a fact.
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possession of our concepts lies, as I have been arguing throughout, in the dynamic o f life; 
that is, it lies essentially in our practice. And yet this dynamic goes unobserved when — as 
we do in philosophy — we focus our attention on statements of fact. It is important to 
observe here that we do not have to refer to the dynamic when stating a fact; on the 
contrary, the dynamic is the very thing — the established background — which makes it 
possible to focus ju st on the statement and on the state of affairs it describes. Yet our whole 
appreciation of the relation between language and reality is affected if, in ignorance of 
this pragmatic context, we take what is immediately present to us (the proposition and 
the state of affairs it describes) as our guide to understanding the general nature of this 
relation. It is precisely this divorce in our thinking between the propositions considered 
in themselves and their pragmatic context that generates the View from the boundary’.
The ‘experience of the meaning of a word’ is, again, implicated in this divorce. Precisely 
because it presents the sense of the proposition as if it were an item o f experience, the 
experience of meaning reinforces the conception o f the proposition as a picture in its own 
right.—The proposition just hangs there, mirroring the state of affairs it represents. 
Consequendy, not only do we not have to recognise how the sense of what we say 
depends on the whole of our social and physical interactions with the world — the ‘hudy- 
burly of human actions’286 — we also have a ready explanation for this: the sense of what 
we say is an independent property of our mental states. The opportunity to appreciate the 
pragmatic context of language has been short-circuited.
I wish to emphasise here the tie up between our preference for what is most easily 
grasped, i.e. facts, and the View from the boundary’. Our most fundamental 
misconception of our relation to the wodd is also an aspect of our misunderstanding of 
the nature of philosophical perplexity. For the preoccupation with grasping facts that 
generates the View from the boundary’ is also an aspect of the failure to distinguish the 
nature of that which can only be shown. There is an image from Zen Buddhism in which a 
person looking at the reflection of the moon in a pool reaches out to try to grasp the 
reflection, but his hand breaks the water and the image is lost. Understanding does not 
consist in ‘grasping’ the thing, but learning to sit and look. If we set the stage correcdy 
and dispose ourselves in the right way towards it, what we seek will show itself. This is 
the same sentiment that Wittgenstein expresses in On Certainty'.
Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described?
You must look at the practice of language, then you will see it (OC 501)
286 Z 567.
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But o f course in order to come to this realisation, first you have to recognise that this is 
what you have to do; and it is hard to recognise this just because this too is something 
that has to show itself,—whilst our instinct tells us otherwise.
9 ~ Our Concepts Passing us by
Finally, on the origins of philosophical perplexity, I should like to return briefly to 
points I made in Chapter 4 (Section 4 and following) on the different relations we have to 
those concepts that are especially implicated in the major philosophical issues (i.e. belief, 
truth, meaning, fact knowledge, etc.). I argued there that in these cases we have what I 
called a primary understanding of them (and their grammar), which is an understanding 
that is inseparable from our actual command over speech,— from our ‘being able to 
speak’.287 For example, our ability to distinguish true from false within the flow of 
discourse — which belongs to our possession o f the concepts of truth and falsity and which 
is essential to saying of anyone that they are in command of the language — is not the 
result o f being taught the concepts true and false, if that means anything like having true 
and false statements pointed out to us or being trained explicitly in the application o f the 
concepts true and false. For we can hardly learn the explicit (i.e. secondary) employment of 
the concepts unless we are already in command of the distinction within our speech,—in 
our trying to say things that are true, or in distinguishing truth from falsity in the things 
that people say. Acquiring a primary command of these concepts is a part of learning to 
make any kind of sense at all in language, and is a presupposition of our secondary 
understanding.
The relevance of this to the present discussion is that, on the one hand, it provides a 
further explanation for our inability to reflect clearly upon the grammars of these 
concepts; whilst from another point o f view it makes it more puzzling why the twisted 
versions of our concepts which we find so tempting are not more transparent to us in 
their falsity. Let us examine this paradox.
We are principally concerned here with those concepts whose possession is 
fundamentally constitutive o f our consciousness.—The concepts truth, meaning, belief 
knowledge, etc., are structural to the consciousness that is expressed through our linguistic 
relations to the world. For this reason alone it would seem reasonable to suppose that the 
workings o f this consciousness are not in themselves natural objects of conscious
287 Rhees3 p. 74.
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attention. Now our first inclination in trying to expand upon this observation might be to 
point out that there is an obvious sense in which we attend most naturally and most easily 
to what we have learned and apply explicitly (either by statement of fact or by practice), 
whilst our grasp of the more troublesome concepts, which are more deeply and 
pervasively situated in our lives, is acquired less self-consciously and so is less obviously 
present to us and comes less easily to hand. However, I think this does not get to the 
bottom of the matter, which can be put more strongly. In the first place, let it be 
understood that it is because our most fundamental concepts are woven into our ‘ability to 
speak’ that as ‘conceptual agents’ we can attend to anything at all. Or to put it another 
way: our mode of attending to anything at all is inseparable from our ability to speak, and 
hence belongs to the exercise of our primary understanding. We could almost say that, in 
their primary understanding, these concepts are not learned explicitly (or consciously) as 
‘concepts’ at all, just because they are so much a part of the fabric o f our ability to speak; 
but we should note that, in spite of this, we may still maintain that the primary 
understanding remains an essential constitutive element of our understanding of these 
concepts, since it is taken for granted in the learning and application of what is explicit in 
their possession. My point, then, is that the difficulty o f reflecting on our concepts arises 
not merely from the fact that we acquire our primary understanding unreflectively, it is 
rather that the very manner of this understanding is to be a part of the framework of our 
thinking, and hence is not something for which we will have normally developed the 
tools to think about. O f course, the fact that the ability to attend is constituted in our 
primary understanding is not in itself a reason for supposing that it cannot be reflected 
upon. It is rather that the difficulties — discussed previously — of turning our attention 
upon the grammars of these concepts, i.e. the difficulties associated with showing as 
opposed to saying, are taken into a new dimension with these concepts. Indeed it is 
perhaps only if we are possessed of Wittgenstein’s ‘instinctive rebellion against language’ 
that we are fit to develop this critical ability.
Let us look at an example. In what sense is the impossibility of a private language 
shown? We might put it this way: such a language is impossible since there is no distinction 
between following it and seeming to follow it,—between talking sense in it and only 
seeming to talk sense in it. Or similarly: the concept of speaking, or following, a private 
language is at best the concept of a subjective state, whereas to qualify as a bona fide 
language, it must make sense to speak of succeeding or failing to talk sense,—this being a 
distinction that cannot be founded on the irresponsibility o f a subjective judgement. Now
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if we accept this argument as demonstrating that the concept of a private language is 
incoherent, then this is not because we have accepted any contingent fact about the 
circumstances o f the use of language, nor any contingent fact of linguistic usage,—of 
what we call language’. Neither is it that we have recognised any fact as having been 
integrated into our conception o f what constitutes the intelligible use of language (though 
that will no doubt be an element in what has been demonstrated). And it would also not 
be enough to be able to refer to some agreement that the establishment of sense and the 
subjectivity of judgement have been stipulated as incompatible. For these are not concepts 
that can have been consciously determined at all.—They are not voluntary concepts. Rather, 
they are concepts that have developed in proportion to the development of language 
itself. They are, as it were, part of the branch we are sitting on if we are saying anything at 
all. Hence, the incompatibility between our conception o f what is fundamental to 
language and subjective judgement is already given in our speech: it lies in what is already 
fundamental and structural to the understanding on which speech depends. And the 
acknowledgement that this is so — the acknowledgement that is necessary for us to realise 
that these are incompatible — is dependent on an appeal to that understanding and not, in 
the first instance at least, by reference to any fact or to anything stipulated. For indeed, 
the force of any such references will itself already depend on the underlying, primary 
understanding of what makes sense and what does not. It is this, and the manifold ways 
in which it informs our judgments as to which o f the moves in the argument are valid, 
that determines the view of language — and its ‘possibilities’ — that we accept as making 
sense. The force o f the conclusion that the notion of a private language is not intelligible 
must therefore come from conceptual insights in which the concepts ‘speak for 
themselves’.288—This is the sense in which the insights depend on something being shown. 
And the problem with the really troublesome concepts is that what needs to be shown in 
order to resolve philosophical difficulties is something that must show itself in the way it 
ramifies throughout our language-games and which does not reveal itself — or at least only 
in a fragmentary way — in the immediate circumstances of their specific employment or in 
what is explicit in their employment.
From this it might seem intuitively obvious why it should be so difficult to reflect on 
these concepts without hindrance — or at least, why we are so vulnerable to being blown 
off course in these reflections — just because what needs to be seen cannot be gathered 
from the surface o f language but is buried deep. But we only have to shift the point of
288 Cf. OC 139.
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view a little before we begin to feel that it still does not really explain why, when we are 
first touched by philosophical perplexity, these truths — which we possess so intimately — 
so resolutely refuse to speak for themselves. For we are not merely observers to them, 
but are speaking of something built into our very understanding of them. So why does this 
understanding not speak out more clearly for itself? In previous sections I have 
catalogued various forces that conspire against clarity of conceptual vision; yet it seems 
that we still have the right to wonder why our deeper understanding is not able to brush 
these annoyances aside.
At this point I think we need to distinguish between two situations in philosophy where 
the primary understanding has the opportunity to assert itself. The first is when we are 
trying to give an account of the grammar of a concept, the question then being whether we 
have the right to expect to be guided by the primary understanding in giving that account. 
The second is whether we feel we have the right to expect this understanding to prevent 
us from being seduced by our instinctive metaphysical reactions. Just to clarify the latter a 
little, it will be remembered that in the case of the primitive superstitious response there 
is no conflict between someone feeling the attraction of the superstitious reaction — the 
disturbance at sticking the pin into the photo of one’s mother, for example — and 
recognising simultaneously that it would be irrational to allow the reaction to develop 
further into a superstitious belief. Similarly there is no obvious reason why we should not, 
on the one hand, feel attracted to the idea o f a private language, whilst seeing just as 
clearly that it is senseless.
O f these two situations, the first is perhaps the more easily explained, since the ability 
to reflect on and give an account of a concept has many aspects that may well be 
regarded as skills in their own right, and this no doubt provides opportunities for making 
wrong moves and taking wrong turnings. However I suspect that in both cases, 
something like the following is at work: that they demonstrate the size of the gulf 
between our capacity to form, possess and apply concepts within their normal home 
range, and our capacity to project them into contexts unanticipated by the circumstances 
in which they were determined. If we pursue this line of thought, then I think it also 
helps to explain why the most fundamental concepts, those which are most integral to 
our thinking, prove to be the most troublesome. For it is perhaps precisely because the 
most fundamental order in our concepts is integral to being able to say anything at all, 
and so is structural to that normal range of circumstances, that we find ourselves so easily 
at sea when tempted outside that range. This can explain why we are so vulnerable to
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being blown off course and so unable to recognise their sensible application when we try 
to project them into circumstances departing from normality. In these situations we find 
ourselves alienated from our own more fundamental understanding and without the 
instinctive reactions required to repair it. And yet, appeal to this primary understanding 
we must if we are to pull ourselves out of ‘the immensely manifold connections [we] are 
caught up in’.289
10 ~ Showing and the Contemplative A rt of Philosophy (Instinct and the Expression of
Understanding)
In this final section, I want to turn to the other side of this same coin and examine 
more closely the phenomenon of showing^  and in particular the different forms that it may 
take in the two contrasting settings I have referred to above.
If we are to employ concepts at all, then the application of those which are most 
fundamental must ‘speak for itself — that is, without further qualification or explanation. 
This notion o f ‘speaking for itself is identical with the idea of grasping what has to show 
in the application of a concept; for what must show is that aspect of the understanding 
we already have of the concept that is not explicable or reducible to any other concept or 
concept-forming fact. The point I wish to emphasise here is that this ‘speaking for itself, 
or showing, is a part of our normal possession and application of these concepts; it is not 
something raised only in the context of philosophical reflection. We can distinguish, then, 
between what shows in our daily use o f language — and which belongs to the 
consciousness with which we use language — and how this shows in the context of 
philosophical reflection. And we may mark this distinction by saying that when we are 
doing philosophy we are bringing what shows in our daily use of these concepts into the 
reflective arena. My interest in this section is to examine more closely what falls within this 
arena.
D. Z. Phillips expounds what he calls a ‘contemplative conception o f philosophy’:
A contemplative conception of philosophy raises fundamental questions about the 
nature of reality and the possibility of discourse. We are asked to give a certain kind of 
attention to our surroundings without meddling with them. 290
289 BigT p. 185.
290 Phillips p. ix.
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The principle at work in this conception of philosophy is that our aim is to view our 
concepts ‘where they are’ — in the logical space which is their home — and not to try to 
assimilate them to others or to reconstruct them on some newly invented models of our 
own. In philosophy what we seek is a reflective revelation of what already shows in our 
daily lives with our concepts.—This is the learning to sit and look that I have already 
referred to. Now in Phillips’ account, the contemplative element is presented principally 
from the point of view of how we should conduct ourselves in philosophical discussion’. 
that the account that the philosopher gives should resist meddling with its object. This is 
commendable and is the conception that also informs the present thesis. However, I 
believe that there is also room for another principle of contemplation here, which is 
consistent with the general principle of non-meddling but which is more direcdy to do 
with the showing than with the kind of account that we give, and could perhaps be 
distinguished by saying that it is (or can be) more in the nature of a contemplative state.
A first reaction to this suggestion might be to feel that the distinction I am driving at 
here is not a real one, for in order to be able to give a correct account of a concept in 
philosophy there must be an insight into the grammar of the concept in question and so 
— for as long as the account has not been meddlesome — something in any case must 
already have been shown. Hence the contemplative state — if it be real — is already a 
component of the contemplation that Phillips describes. Likewise we may argue that the 
criterion for having any kind of reflective insight into a concept must lie in our ability to 
give an account o f it; so the two are in any case not distinguishable. However, I believe 
this would be a mistake, since we can distinguish different reflective contexts in which the 
grammar of a concept is shown. The distinction we require here turns on the further 
distinction between the showing that is needed in order to be persuaded of the coherence 
or otherwise of a philosophical conception, i.e. the showing that belongs to being able to 
give an account o f a concept, and the showing that is linked with the instinctive reactions 
that, as I have argued, are prior to rational (or irrational) philosophical discourse. It is 
quite normal for these two modes of showing to lie in a state of tension alongside one 
another. Our responses to the private language argument will serve as an instance.
For those of use who find the private language argument convincing — and so agree 
that the notion o f private ostensive definition is incoherent — it is quite usual to find (in 
fact it is the norm) that we are not at the same time able to rid ourselves of the attraction 
o f the idea of private ostensive definition. The insight into its incoherence goes against 
the grain of the instinct to regard private ostensive definition as a possibility, and so the
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two remain in tension with one another. This situation is repeated throughout 
philosophy. Now of course, this intellectual insight is not possible except insofar as we 
have grasped what the application of the concepts of subjective judgement, experience, 
meaning, definition, etc., shows in normal circumstances; and this means that the 
concepts o f intellectual insight and of what shows in the application of the concepts are 
logically linked. But this must now be separated from the insight (or lack o f it) that 
expresses itself at the instinctive level, for it is equally evident that how we react with 
these concepts at the instinctive level also defines a context in which the intelligibility of a 
concept shows.
Let us look at this in more detail. The intellectual insight that is required in philosophy 
is an insight into our primary understanding of a concept, but it is one that is revealed 
principally through the processes of reason and argument. Typically, it works through 
coming to see the consequences of adhering to a particular metaphysical interpretation of 
our concepts,—its bearing on the other things we accept as making sense, for example. 
This kind o f reflection, then, is more by way of an extension of the normal application of 
our concepts but in a setting in which we are more attentive to their circumstances. For 
instance, being convinced by the private language argument is largely a matter o f coming 
to see that a private ostensive definition is not a judgement validated from some inner 
Archimedean vantage point but is merely a subjective impression — which is not 
acceptable as a justification for language, since it abolishes the distinction between 
making sense and only appearing to make sense. We are convinced of the incoherence of 
the notion of private ostensive definition, then, because in thinking it through we are 
forced to acknowledge that it is in conflict with other conceptions which we are not 
prepared to give up. Now the recognition of what we are prepared to give up (or not) is 
an expression of the concepts ‘speaking for themselves’ from the contexts in which we 
normally use them. So this process does depend on a showing in as much as it depends on 
a circular appeal to what we already understand of these concepts,— and so depends 
ultimately on our primary understanding of them. But it does not depend on a reversal of 
our first instinct, which is to find the notion of private ostensive definition attractive and 
intelligible. Hence, what we find intellectually convincing and what we find instinctively 
intelligible pass each other by.
I argued earlier that the instinctive metaphysical reaction is the manifestation of a 
tendency to misunderstand a concept.— It certainly represents a lack of insight into the 
concept at the instinctive level. The reaction may therefore be regarded as an instance of
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showing in its own right — albeit a tendency for a concept to show itself wrongly. Now it is 
at least conceivable for such instinctive reactions to go into reverse, and so for the 
concepts to speak correctly o f themselves (or show themselves correctly) at the instinctive 
level. If so, I believe this creates an alternative context in which we might speak of a 
contemplative conception of philosophy, namely one which is constituted at this 
instinctive level of insight into our most fundamental concepts. And I think we may 
fruitfully think of this as a contemplative state just because it occurs — if it occurs at all — 
at the level of our instinctive reactions to our circumstances, and so is directly implicated 
in our introspective states and our self-consciousness.
Let us re-examine an example of such a reaction that might also be a candidate for this 
reversal:291
It seems that I can trace my identity, quite independent of the identity of my body.
And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something dwelling in a body, the 
identity of my mind. (NFL p.270)
I described this reaction — in the first instance — as the harmless expression o f a 
subjective state or sensation. At one level it may be regarded as merely the expression of 
a subjective reaction to our own subjectivity, which in itself does not express either a 
rational or irrational act, and the words expressing it as being used in a ‘secondary’ sense, 
i.e. in a way that is not answerable to their normal, ‘primary’ use. But I also argued that it 
provided the foundation for the development of a metaphysical belief — in this case the 
belief in a ‘self dwelling in the body. Now the sense in which it may provide such a 
foundation needs to be refined in the present context, for I think we will have to say that 
the reaction is harmful not only where it actually generates a belief in the existence of an 
inner self, but also in the situation where it falls short of belief but nevertheless is not 
treated as merely secondary. Thus, to the extent that it contains the idea or appearance o f a 
‘something’ dwelling in the body, even if we are not led to believe in the existence of this 
‘ego’, there is a clear sense in which this thought/experience is illusory.—The apparent 
intelligibility of the concept o f an inner self, and its seeming presence, is an illusion.
We may apply the same principle to private ostensive definition. If  I say that I can 
perceive the essence o f a colour, then — in the absence of any further elaboration — 
‘essence’ may be being used harmlessly in a secondary sense. But to the extent that I do
291 See Chapter 6, Section 1 and Section 8 above.
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seem to perceive it, this is an illusion, since ‘essence is expressed by grammar’292 and is not an 
object of perception.
This distinction between philosophically harmless secondary uses of language and those 
that are problematic from the start has already been suggested in Section 5, where I noted 
that the reactions that give rise to philosophically confused conceptions do so because — 
unlike other secondary uses of language — they have the potential to compete with 
established concepts.293 This conflict is potential in the initial instinctive reaction, and 
actual when it develops into a belief.— Or, to express the point in Phillips’ terms, it 
becomes actively meddlesome, and hence generative of non-contemplative philosophical 
activity, as it turns into a belief. This potential for conflict is intrinsic to the new 
conception determined by the instinctive reaction, and it is this which justifies calling it 
illusory. By the same token, were these reactions to be reversed and replaced by ones 
which are ‘true’, these might then be regarded as expressing a reflective insight into the 
relevant concepts and so into the nature of the corresponding phenomena. We might cite 
as examples my ceasing to have any sense o f being able to trace my identity 
independently of the identity of my body, or of being able to give myself a private 
ostensive definition of this colour. These are insights ‘from the midst’, and they remain 
‘contemplative’ in Phillips’ sense insofar as they directly reflect the concepts as they are 
embedded in our lives.
11 ~ Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have concluded my thesis by applying the lessons of the previous 
chapters, in regard to the nature o f our possession of our concepts, to that arena in our 
lives where our concepts are most tested, namely in our struggles with certain of them in 
philosophy. The way in which concepts are embedded in our lives — in how they are 
structural to our form of life, and in how this is manifested in the different modes in 
which language enters our lives — is complex and confusing. To help elucidate this I have 
used as an anchor for the discussion the concept of what is instinctive in the use of 
language. This is central to our conception o f the relationship between language and the 
‘hurly-burly’ of life which together comprise the medium within which our concepts are 
possessed. It could be argued that the emphasis on instinct has brought a bias to the
292 PI 371.
293 It is difficult to see how ‘Tuesday is lean’ contains any kind of illusion, for example.
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discussion. However, I have endeavoured to avoid using it as an explanatory concept but 
rather to place it centrally as an elucidatory device', one amongst the preferred alternatives 
to the formulation of a ‘thesis’, within a philosophical tradition predicated on the 
principle that the result o f the investigation is something more shown than said,—more 
understood than proven.
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